Italy

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ITALY

Lucy Riall

Diversity is possibly the most enduring feature of Italy's history from the Renaissance to the end of the twentieth century. Variations in geographical regions, each with its own distinctive system of agriculture; in climate, depending on latitude and altitude; and in peoples and societies, with a gamut of cultural and linguistic forms, contribute to a remarkable array of competing and overlapping identities and economic and social structures. These variations, moreover, do not always conform to the established patterns of historical analysis, as they occur at times within regions and localities and within families and ruling elites; some differences disappear or are altered, only to be reestablished over time.

For the social historian, such diversity can be frustrating, as it works against meaningful generalizations. Yet it also makes Italy a fascinating subject for the study of social behavior and interaction. The social history of Italy offers particular examples of broader trends such as the structure of family life, the emergence of middle classes and the decline of the nobility, the crumbling of feudal jurisdictions, the process of refeudalization, and the road to modernity. Its complexities have consistently challenged historians' assumptions and forced them to reformulate both their explanations and the models on which these explanations are based.

To the reality of social diversity must be added the unevenness of scholarly attention: Italian social history has long been overshadowed by the country's cultural and political past. Thus Italy's social structures in the early modern period have tended to be neglected in favor of Renaissance art and learning; in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, historians have traditionally focused on the Risorgimento or Mussolini's Fascism, or have concentrated on the emerging sense of "Italianness" (italianità) in the same period, rather than examine underlying social change. The popularity of the Renaissance, Risorgimento, and Fascism as subjects for study has meant that the almost two hundred years between the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment—the "forgotten" centuries of so-called baroque Italy—remain relatively understudied.

FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE RISORGIMENTO (c.1250–1860)

The perception of early modern Italy as a "dreary interlude" (in Benedetto Croce's memorable phrase) between the Renaissance and the Risorgimento is itself the product of nation-building during the nineteenth century. At the time of national unification in 1860–1861, Italian political leaders appealed to and spoke about the nation's resurgence (risorgimento) after centuries of decline. Academics presented Italy's recent past as an experience of unremitting decay and backwardness. According to this interpretation, the high point of the Renaissance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—when Italy led Europe in economic and cultural achievements—had given way to foreign invasion and internal divisions, with Italy succumbing to Spanish and, later, Austrian despots and the influence of a Counter-Reformation clergy. Languishing in the cultural, political, and economic doldrums of European life, Italian patriots saw it as their duty to rescue Italy and restore it to its former status. This view of Italian history as a frustrated nation persists in political rhetoric; but it is almost entirely useless for understanding the course, chronology, and rhythms of the peninsula's social development between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.


Environment and populations. From the late Renaissance to the nineteenth century, Italy's cities and countryside attracted wealthy outsiders in search of beauty, art, or sheer escape. Yet northern Europeans seem rarely to have taken note of the lives and activities of the Italian people themselves, and they failed to see the landscape as the product of an interaction between Italians and their environment. The empty, open grainfields of southern Italy and Sicily were largely the product of deforestation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—itself a response to rapid rises in the price of wheat. The physical appearance of the Lombardy plain, an intensively cultivated land of corn, rice, and animal husbandry, was the result of vigorous land reclamation, of irrigation and drainage, during the same period. Italians had fled to the hilltop towns of the southern Italian interiors and drained the marshlands largely to avoid malaria ("marsh fever"). Thus behind the beauty that visitors enjoyed lay Italians' responses to the difficulties of everyday life.

Malaria proved, until the mid-twentieth century at least, the deadliest scourge of the Mediterranean plains. But it was only one of several factors, including war and environmental change, behind the dramatic fluctuations in the population of the Italian peninsula between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. From an estimated 7.3 million in 1150, the population rose to 11 million by 1300 and then fell dramatically with the so-called calamities of the fourteenth century—the Hundred Years' War, the Black Death of 1348, and four famines between 1339 and 1375—to about 8 million. In contemporary accounts the Black Death alone was said to have killed some 70 percent of Venetians and Genoans, and while historians have revised these figures to an estimated third of the total population, its impact on urban centers—emptying cities like Florence and leading to the disappearance of smaller towns and villages—was devastating. Although after 1400 Italy's population gradually increased again, reaching 11.6 million by the mid-sixteenth century, this trend was frequently interrupted by wars (Rome, Brescia, Pavia, Ravenna, Prato, and Genoa were all sacked by invaders between 1510 and 1530), by the return of major outbreaks of the plague in the 1520s, and by the arrival of syphilis from the New World. Affected by these pressures, the population of, for example, Verona fell from 47,000 in 1501 to 26,000 in 1518, and that of Pavia from 16,000 in 1500 to under 5,000 in 1535. Interestingly, however, the halt to Italy's population growth was only temporary. It continued to increase steadily until the two great demographic crises of the late sixteenth century: the plague of 1575–1576 and the crop failures of 1590–1592. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Italy had become one of the most densely populated regions in Europe. Then, during the seventeenth century, the pace of population growth slackened once more, affected as it was by famines and by the outbreak of bubonic plague in northern Italy in 1630 and in southern Italy in 1656, which caused mortality rates of 30 to 40 percent in the affected areas.

These fluctuations in population affected the cities and countryside differently; they also varied from one part of Italy to another and were sometimes accompanied by a process of internal migration. In the eighteenth century, however, emerged the entirely new demographic trend of sustained population growth. In approximate figures, from 13 million at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Italy's population increased to 18 million at its end, reached 24 million by 1850, and stood at just under 26 million in 1861. The huge population increases in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Italy correspond to, although lag behind, the more general European trend, attributable to a decline in the mortality rate probably caused by changes in diet and improvements in hygiene, which in turn halted the spread of disease.

Nevertheless, the decline in the mortality rate did not signal the end of demographic crises. Outbreaks of plague recurred until the early nineteenth century (notably in Messina and Reggio Calabria in 1743), malaria increased along with the rural population, and tuberculosis accompanied the process of urbanization. The peninsula was affected by famine and subsistence crises in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Improvements in diet were not all they seemed. Pellagra, a disease of malnutrition caused by a diet based exclusively on corn, became endemic to much of the Lombardy plain. Indeed, differences in diet and nutrition among the poor may explain why in this period population growth in the southern half of the peninsula, where the diet waas varied, consistently outstripped that of the center-north, where diet was almost exclusively polenta and potatoes. Finally, cholera, a new and deadly epidemic disease, swept through the cities of Italy in the mid-nineteenth century. An estimated one-sixth of the population of Palermo died in 1837. A widespread popular panic led to the temporary abandonment of cities, disrupting economic activity. Encouraged by antigovernment conspirators, the poor came to believe that cholera was a poison deliberately spread by their rulers, so that the epidemics also sparked off waves of political disorder and popular revolt.


City and countryside. During the Renaissance cities dominated the countryside, as is suggested by the formation of powerful city-states in northern and central Italy and by the centrality of urban areas to cultural, religious, and economic life. Hence Italian cities, especially those of the center-north, have long been associated with Italian civilization and with the banking, trade, and manufacturing activities for which Italy became famous during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. Not surprisingly given this perspective, Italy's supposed economic, political, and cultural decline thereafter is allied to the process of ruralization and to the increasingly agrarian character of Italian society, a characteristic that did not alter substantially until well into the nineteenth century. Whereas much of Europe outside Italy became increasingly urbanized during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in Italy the proportion of those living in towns of 100,000 or more fell to just 13 percent of the total population, while some medium-size towns like Pavia and Cremona lost between 20 and 40 percent of their inhabitants.

However, this juxtaposition between urban and rural life is a false one. Renaissance society was not in fact urban but largely rural: the rural population greatly outnumbered that of cities, many of which incorporated fields and orchards within their territory. Renaissance elites developed a taste for rural retreats and the rural aesthetic even as they mocked the crudeness of rural life. An idealized vision of the countryside as a place of escape and respite from the rigors of urban life persisted into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (and, of course, beyond). Furthermore, the economy of the countryside (contado) was closely integrated into urban life in Renaissance Italy. The countryside was a source of food, raw materials, revenue, and manpower for the towns; especially after the population decline of the fourteenth century, urban dwellers invested heavily in land, for example through sharecropping contracts in Tuscany and elsewhere. Moreover, the ruralization of the sixteenth century was accompanied by considerable prosperity, investment in agriculture, land reclamation, and the growth of textile production in parts of southern Italy. In the north the economic bust of the seventeenth century was also followed by a rural boom: by the recovery of agriculture, rural industrialization, and a further round of investment and innovation by energetic and innovative landowners.

In much of southern Italy and the islands in the early modern period, the relationship between city and countryside developed differently. Apparently unaffected by the demographic problems of the sixteenth century, the city of Naples grew rapidly from 100,000 in 1500 to an astonishing 245,000 less than fifty years later to become the largest city in Europe. By the mid-eighteenth century its population numbered 337,000. Although the growth of Naples was unusual, the result in part of incorporating the economic and political privileges of an administrative capital with the advantages of a Mediterranean port, it was not unique. Seventeenth-century Palermo grew substantially too, and for similar reasons.

The pattern of settlement within southern Italy shows considerable variation, notably a strong contrast between the market-oriented coastal areas and the more isolated interiors. In general, however, urban settlements in the south were fewer and much larger. Particularly in the remote and often mountainous interior, people tended to live concentrated in substantial nucleated centers occupying the high ground; they rarely took up residence permanently in the countryside. The lack of integration between city and countryside—indeed, the economic and cultural rift between them—was striking. This pattern of settlement in the south was partly a response, as has been noted, to the flight from the malarial plains. It was also the result of the deliberate "colonization" of the interior in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the purposes of grain cultivation: many of the towns were newly created and their inhabitants originally migrant labor. Hence, the separateness of city and countryside in southern Italy reflects social and economic relations, specifically, the concentration of a great deal of farmland in the hands of relatively few, powerful landowners. In these southern grain-estates (latifondo), rural life was far from idealized; hardly bent on improvements and innovations, many landowners tended to be absentee rentiers. Unlike Lombard agriculture, the southern grain-estates were not subjected to the process of modernization that took place in the late seventeenth century.

Throughout the Italian peninsula, population growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was accompanied by a renewed process of urbanization, initially in the administrative centers and the ports and subsequently in areas of early industrialization. Once again, however, this pattern was uneven. Turin, the capital of Piedmont, grew rapidly in the course of the eighteenth century, from 44,000 in 1702 to 92,000 by the 1790s and 138,000 by 1850. Milan grew from 123,000 in 1750 to 193,000 in 1850, by which year the population of Naples reached 416,000. Some cities grew much more slowly: from 1750 to 1850 Rome increased its population by only 13,000 (from 157,000 to 170,000), while the population of Venice stalled at about 138,000.

At around the same time, politics and economic change disrupted the traditional balance between city and countryside and between different cities. The modernizing and reforming rulers of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Italy began to dismantle some of the financial and political prerogatives, such as trade guilds, tax concessions, and industrial and administrative monopolies, with which cities had traditionally dominated the countryside and on the basis of which some cities did better than others. One major nineteenth-century victim was the city of Palermo, the administrative capital of Sicily; after the Bourbon monarchy's restoration in 1814–1815, the city saw its economic and political privileges eroded so that, by the time of national unification, its status had been reduced to that of a provincial town. Other Sicilian towns benefited from the administrative changes, while some ports profited considerably both from the increase in the volume of trade and the decline of Palermo. The societies of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Italy remained predominantly agrarian. In 1800 less than 5 percent of the country's population lived in cities of over 100,00 inhabitants; in England and Wales the figure was 10 percent, in the Netherlands 11.5 percent.


Social orders and social classes. Before the mid-nineteenth century, Italy's system of social stratification is best described as one of orders. The hierarchy was defined in terms of reputation, honor, and birth. A class system, in which the role played in the process of production or, more simply, income and wealth determined an individual or family's position, did not exist. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to assert that money played no role in deciding collective alignments and identities.

Even during the most stable periods, this society of orders was never entirely static. An important distinction must be drawn between the feudal nobility, associated especially with the southern kingdoms, and the urban ruling class, or patriciate, which, triumphant after the struggles of communal Italy, emerged in cities like Florence, Siena, Venice, and Genoa. Yet the status and internal composition of both groups was often quite confused; by the sixteenth century the distinctions between them had become blurred by intermarriage and by the pursuit of common economic interests. Relations beween urban and rural nobility, on the one hand, and the ruler, on the other, and between both and the church, also varied considerably over time, enhancing or undermining the predominance of the nobility. In the countryside feudal privilege persisted almost everywhere. Moreover, if at the apex of the social hierarchy stood the nobility, jealously controlling entrance to their ranks, their status, and their privileges, there was also more than one way to become ennobled—through service to the ruler, through professional qualifications, or, in a simpler and increasingly popular route, through money. In addition, access to power for the non-nobles was provided by vertical networks of friendship and patronage, and further avenues of influence were provided by guilds, religious confraternities, and community organizations.

On the whole, the Italian nobilities were remarkable for their success. Although scholarly opinion is divided on the long-term impact of this success, the defense of noble privilege, from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century, is uniformly regarded as no small achievement. Many historians of the Renaissance have pointed to the persistence of feudal jurisdictions long after the end of the Middle Ages, even in the more "capitalist" north; they argue that such persistence was often the result of an enduring legitimacy, popular loyalty, and "good lordship" rather than merely of coercion and exploitation. Feudal privileges and feudal lords survived, in other words, as an integrated part of a changing and progressive Renaissance society. Other historians write more negatively of a process of refeudalization during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of the reappearance at this time of feudal prerogatives, enabling the nobility to reassert both its political position "above the law" and its economic control of the countryside. The baroque seventeenth century also saw the strengthening of an ideology of nobility, of the growth of a cult of genealogies and a code of chivalry pursued sometimes obsessively for its own sake. The increasing tendency of urban patriciates, previously involved in trade and manufacturing, to invest in land and engage in agriculture as an occupation more fitted to their noble status, seems further proof of the (re)consolidation of feudal power.

This refeudalization thesis seems to explain both the relative industrial decline of Italy in the baroque period and the apparent capacity of the nobility, especially in the south, to smother the progressive middle class and exploit the rural poor. However, this thesis is perhaps too simple. In the crucial area of relations with the ruler, some nobilities were more successful than others. During the expansion of state power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some nobilities, most obviously where there was a preexising tradition of state service among the urban patriciate, adapted relatively easily to the growth of the state; they negotiated a new and profitable status quo whereby they cooperated with the ruler as administrators or tax collectors and were allowed to exercise considerable autonomy in local affairs. This pattern can be observed in cities like Florence and Milan. By contrast, the feudal nobility, which enjoyed extensive political and economic power in the countryside, was much more threatened by the process of state formation. Attempts to make the nobility accept the sovereignty of the state in fiscal affairs and in matters of law and order, and to push through a program of land reform and commercialization in the countryside, led to open confrontation with the state.

Resistance to reform was especially strong in Sicily and the kingdom of Naples, where in the late eighteenth century reformers attempted a direct assault on baronial privileges, and in the Papal States. In all these states the nobility successfully frustrated most of the major reforms. Yet the price of their success was a more or less permanent breach with the state and hence both the breakdown of the old status quo and the failure to arrange a new one. The consequences of this breach became all too clear in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the Bourbon monarchy in Naples made a renewed and more fortunate attempt to dismantle noble privileges and undermine the noble monopoly of landholdings. This second round of reforms had particularly devastating effects on the Sicilian nobility, who by the time of unification in 1860–1861 had lost a great deal of their economic and political power.

The extent to which the middle orders, or middle classes, were effectively smothered by the nobility is also open to question. The middle orders were a remarkably mixed group—merchants, professionals, bureaucrats, and magistrates—often internally divided and varying considerably in composition from region to region and from city to city. Before the industrialization of the late nineteenth century, it is probably more accurate to think of the middle orders in "humanistic" terms, as a group whose social formation was determined by participation in public institutions rather than by economic activity. From the Renaissance onward they seem to have been especially keen to acquire titles and other trappings of noble status and to ape the cultural styles and social habits of the nobility, despite attempts by the nobility to maintain their political and cultural distance. When they acquired spare capital, they tended to invest it in land rather than in industry or commerce, and, as the nobility's wealth and economic privileges were eroded in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they also tended to intermarry with the nobility. Does this evidence suggest, therefore, that the "middling orders" were never a distinct social grouping with a separate identity, value system, and ideology and were largely incapable of challenging the aristocratic domination of society and the state?

First, it must be remembered that mingling with the nobility was far from unusual, and such behavior can be found equally among German or British counterparts. Second, the attitudes and habits mentioned above can be somewhat misleading, and may mask entrepreneurial skills and a process of accumulation and upward mobility in which land ownership and even marriage were the most appropriate outlets. Considerable evidence also points to the emergence of a bourgeois identity and a separate bourgeois sphere in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: clubs formed theaters and cafés proliferated where middle-class men (but not women) could mingle and associate. These circles of sociability were a particularly prominent feature of Milan, Florence, and, to a lesser extent, Turin; they seem to have been less common in the cities of the south, although the scarcity of research makes it difficult to reach definitive conclusions. In other words, the reforms of the eighteenth century, the upheavals of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, and the economic and political changes of the Restoration era (1815–1860) contributed to the formation of a vigorous new elite, composed roughly of rich middle orders and the (perhaps less wealthy) nobility, an elite that was neither wholly aristocratic nor wholly bourgeois.

At the other end of the social spectrum were the urban and rural poor. The political, cultural, and economic gulf that divided the elites from the rest in Renaissance, baroque, and Risorgimento Italy was immense: it was the poor who were undernourished and more prone to disease and who, being close to destitution even in the best of times, suffered and died in times of war and famine. Yet research into the lives and conditions of the poor in early modern Italy has revealed that the poor too were divided by an internal hierarchy. Rural communities show considerable social differentiation among well-to-do farmers, tenants, sharecroppers, and landless laborers, just as in urban areas an acutely felt rift between a "labor aristocracy" of artisans, organized into and protected by guilds, and dependent wage earners caused friction and conflict.

The internal composition and definition of the poor was also affected by the political reforms and economic developments of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, the transformation of agriculture in the Po Valley and Lombard plain, and the development there of capitalist relations of production, led to a diminution in the number of sharecroppers and independent farmers and a corresponding increase in landless wage earners, or braccianti. In the large grain-estates of the south, where the peasant economy had always been precarious, many peasant families were rendered destitute by changes in the system of land tenure. In particular, government attempts to convert feudal domains to private property, in part by abolishing common-use rights and common land, resulted in what Emilio Sereni in History of the Italian Agricultural Landscape has called "a true and proper mass expropriation of the rights of those who farmed the fiefs" (Sereni, 1997, p. 283). Elsewhere, for example on the Po Delta and in the Tuscan Maremma (marshlands), land reclamation programs deprived traditional farmers of their means of subsistence and way of life.

For rural people, an obvious response to such expropriation was to migrate to the towns. Rural migration partly explains the increasing numbers of urban poor in cities like Milan, Turin, and Naples during the eighteenth century and afterward; once in town, rural men, women, and children came to form a hungry, underemployed mass of casual and easily exploitable labor. Indications of the mounting strain this placed on urban areas include the greater visibility of vagrants and prostitutes, the rising numbers of illegitimate births and abandoned infants in cities throughout Italy, and perhaps most tellingly, the increasing anxiety among urban elites about a tide of criminals and the threat from "dangerous classes." Especially in traditional urban centers, this situation also brought the rural poor into conflict with artisans and craftsmen, whose own status, skills, and earnings was threatened by imports of cheap, foreign-made goods and by government attempts to dismantle barriers to trade and the labor market. Thus, it is possible, to write about a certain proletarianization of the labor force in the first decades of the nineteenth century—that is, the loss of economic independence, the perceived erosion (if not the disappearance) of internal differentiations, and in some cases a deterioration in their material conditions. One direct consequence was a rapid escalation of social tensions.


Stability and conflict. The family played a crucial role in early modern Italian societies. Patrician families, such as the Gonzaga of Mantua and the Medici of Florence, could dominate a city's political and ecclesiastical life from generation to generation. The structures of family life also served as a safeguard and transmitter of wealth, and marriage served to increase wealth and cement personal alliances. There is also some evidence that the value placed on family life gave women a status and role not afforded them in public: the central role played by women within the family in Renaissance Italy, and especially their role in the upbringing of children, may have given them an economic and even spiritual leverage within society as a whole. For poorer families, kinship ties could offer both economic protection and security in hard times and a ready source of labor in others.

Yet for all the recognition of the family's persistent importance in Italian societies, there was little permanency about its internal structure. The historian of Renaissance Italy, for example, is struck above all by the enormous variety of family structures, by the coexistence of conjugal and multiple households, by the possibility of frequent change in family structures over time and of fluctuations according to economic circumstance, as well as by the distinctions between noble and non-noble families. In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, following a general European trend, the number of conjugal households seems to have increased; this trend can be linked both to urbanization and to the proletarianization of the rural workforce, as wage laborers tended to live in nuclear families. Nevertheless, rural families in the center-north bucked this trend (and did so not merely where sharecropping and tenant farming survived); extended families of three generations and of several conjugal units living under one roof remained a common occurrence.

Arguably, the prominent role played by the family in Italian societies also left its mark on the public sphere of politics and the economy. On the one hand, both the affective ties of love and friendship and the emphasis within the family on hierarchy and obedience gave stability and sometimes legitimacy to the prevailing social and political order. On the other hand, the family remained a world apart, an alternative source of loyalty and identity to that of the increasingly powerful state. For example, as new forms of social stratification emerged in the course of the nineteenth century, and especially as the new middle orders began to merge with the old nobility, the family could become a means of retaining a sense of distinctiveness, a way for the nobility to maintain their cultural and ideological distance, if only on a personal level.

Of course, the family was not the only alternative source of stability and loyalty. Another central pillar of the social order in early modern Italy was the Catholic Church. During the Counter-Reformation of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the confused and self-promoting systems of the Catholic Church were reformed. In their place emerged a much more absolutist and monolithic hierarchy, claiming for itself the sole right to decide doctrinal truth and define religious discussion and maintaining itself as rigidly separate from and superior to lay society. Repression of heresy and persecution of minorities (the virtual elimination of Protestantism and the expulsion or marginalization of Jews) also followed. In terms of its social impact, however, this change is perhaps less significant than what accompanied it—that is, a new commitment by the church to spreading the message of reform and an engagement with feelings of popular religiosity. This new mission manifested itself in the proliferation of cults, sanctuaries, and pilgrimages. It was so successful that by the eighteenth century religious fervor and the use of religious symbolism had become one of the most striking, and indeed persistent, features of Italian popular culture.

Family, church, and state, the pillars of the social and political order in early modern Italy, came increasingly into conflict with each other in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as secular rulers sought to establish absolute power through a series of administrative and economic reforms. A main target of this reform program was, as has been noted, the privileges and prerogatives of the nobility; but the church's economic and political powers were similarly challenged (and it should be remembered that the church hierarchy was made up largely of the nobility). Like the nobility, the church resisted this attack on its position in many ways. Two of the most important were by mobilizing popular religiosity and by posing as the defenders of the rural poor, whose livelihood was threatened by land reform. In the Jacobin period (1798–1799), the church actively encouraged and organized popular discontent against the new revolutionary order, notably in the violent counterrevolutionary movements in Tuscany, the Papal States, and in the bloody Sanfedist rising of Cardinal Ruffo in Calabria. Earlier agitation over land issues and the later revolts against the Napoleonic regimes in Italy (1801–1814), were also partly the result of church attempts to direct peasant unrest for conservative purposes.

Given the extent of political and economic upheaval, foreign wars, famines, and epidemic diseases affecting the Italian peninsula between the sack of Rome in 1527 and national unification in 1860–1861, the number of rebellions during this period is surprisingly limited. In fact, popular unrest did become a mark of Italian society, but not until the mid- to late nineteenth century. Before then, banditry was a fairly widespread, even infamous, feature of the Italian countryside. There were only two periods of urban revolt that resonated beyond their immediate areas: the first occurred during the seventeenth century, above all in southern Italy (Naples in 1647, Messina in 1671); the second occured during the European revolutions of 1848–1849, affecting all the states of the Italian peninsula. The 1647 revolt in Naples, preceded by revolt in Palermo and followed by one in Messina, was a popular revolt with a strong religious dimension, led by a charismatic fisherman known as Masaniello (Tomasso Aniello), against taxation and against the Spanish government. It spread rapidly to the countryside and to provincial towns and, in the struggle between peasants and nobility, acquired something of a class character. The 1848–1849 revolutions followed a prolonged period of economic deprivation and were led mostly by artisans and craftsmen in the cities demanding democratic rights of suffrage and association. Like the revolt in Naples, the later revolutions were undermined and eventually defeated by internal divisions, by the gulf between the elite and the masses, and by huge differences separating the city from the countryside. The 1848–1849 revolutions also revealed the mounting health, housing, and employment crisis within Italian cities, a crisis that neither the welfare systems nor the police proved able to control or withstand.


FROM NATIONAL UNIFICATION TO THE REPUBLIC (1861–c.1990)

It is a truism of historical research that Italy in 1860–1861 was united in name only. Geography, culture, economic activity, and regional and local loyalties continued to separate Italians after national unification as before. National unification was nevertheless a climactic moment in the long transition from a traditional to a modern society, a process that extended from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries throughout the Italian peninsula and that affected different areas and different groups in different ways. Yet perhaps the greatest social changes took place only after 1945, during the "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s and as a result of the "cultural revolution" of the 1970s.


The transformation of landscape and populations. Between 1861 and 1981 the Italian population more than doubled, from just under 26 million to 56.5 million. At the time of unification, Italy's birth and mortality rates (38 percent and 30.9 percent respectively) were high relative to Britain and France, and life expectancy, at 30.5 years, was more than ten years shorter. By 1981, however, these trends had been completely reversed. Compared with figures for Britain and France, Italy's birthrate (10.1 percent) and mortality rate (9.5 percent) were lower, and its life expectancy (77.3 years) was higher. Particularly noteworthy is the decline in the birthrate, which in 2000 was the lowest in the world.

The link between these demographic shifts and rising living standards is hard to pinpoint. Between 1870 and 1900, because of overpopulation leading to unemployment, the standard of living in rural Italy probably worsened, and many wage laborers fell below subsistence level. Population increase also led to the spread of endemic disease (pellagra in the north, malaria in the south). The Fascist years (1922–1943) saw a stagnation in wages and consumption. In reality the real transformation of living standards and lifestyles took place after the end of World War II, when real per capita income increased by a factor of 4.4. The number of cars, telephones, and televisions increased hugely between 1951 and 1987, as did the number of hospital beds, university students, and airline passengers. Housing and diet improved dramatically, the average height of Italians shot up (an Italian born in 1949 reached an average height of 1.69 meters; one born in 1955 reached 1.71 meters), and malaria was wiped out. The old-age pensioner became a common figure in Italian society. Yet an estimated one-seventh of Italians still lived below the poverty line in the 1980s, although income distribution in Italy was rather less unequal than in the other advanced European economies.

Hence, the transformation of Italian society took place at an uneven pace, reflecting in part the irregular rhythms of economic development. Undoubtedly the most striking and well-known aspect of Italy's uneven transformation is its regional imbalance, in particular, the gap between north and south. Notions of a northsouth divide are, in social and economic terms, an oversimplification (economic historians refer to three Italies—northwest, center and northeast, south), and perceptions of southern backwardness tend to underestimate both the economic dynamism and the extent of social diversity within the south; nevertheless, one constant of Italian history since 1861 has been the south's lower living standards, lower per capita income, lower per capita GDP (gross domestic product), higher unemployment, and higher rates of illiteracy as compared with the north. The process of industrialization—after unification in the triangle of Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy, and after World War II in central and northeastern Italy—together with the partial shift to a service economy after 1945, has led to marked changes in the composition of the Italian labor force. The percentage of those employed in agriculture fell from 52 percent in 1936 to 11 percent in 1981 and in industry rose from 25.6 to 41.5 percent during the same period. But the number of those employed in agriculture in the south has remained far greater than in the north (in 1981, 28 percent in Basilicata versus 3.8 percent in Lombardy), reflecting a weaker process of industrialization. The modernization of agriculture, moreover, has proceeded at a much slower pace in the south.

Another feature of the transformation of Italy's population was the acceleration of both internal migration and emigration. Emigration came first, reaching a peak in the decades between 1880 and 1910, when roughly 14 million applied to the government to leave. The majority of those who left were young men, often illiterate peasants, and while initially they came from the north, after the 1880s huge numbers left from the south. Interestingly, Italians dispersed more widely than other European migrants, arriving in the United States and Canada, Argentina and Brazil, Africa, Australia, and northern Europe. Although a significant proportion of migrants returned (an estimated 50 percent from the Americas between 1905 and 1920) and peasant households and whole villages could be enriched by emigrants' remittances, emigration also caused social upheaval, perhaps especially for the women who waited behind.

After 1945 came a further wave of emigration, notably to Argentina and Australia, but the 1960s and 1970s saw an unprecedented migration within Italy. The migration from the south to the northern cities was probably helped by the rapid improvement in communications and the construction of motorways, but it also reflected the rejection of a rural way of life by many southerners. The huge population influx placed the cities of the north under a terrible strain—the proliferation of squalid housing on city peripheries dates from this time—and led often to the bitter resentment and bad treatment of southern migrants (called terroni, bumpkins). It also emptied southern towns and villages of young men and, later, young women. Another demographic trend emerged after the 1980s, that of Italy as "receiving nation." Migrants to Italy, often from north and east Africa, some of them illegal (that is, without residence or work permits), have tended to concentrate in the larger Italian cities and in Palermo and Naples almost as much as in the north.

The challenge of a changing society. Perceptions of the Italian middle class as economically and politically backward relative to their counterparts in northern Europe, and as subordinate to the nobility, pervade the historiography of modern Italy. This analysis of middle-class weakness, particularly as applied to the social structures of southern Italy, is used to explain the so-called peculiarities of Italy's political development, above all the collapse of parliamentary government and the rise of Fascism after World War I. However, a subsequent analysis that has replaced the older one stresses the vitality of the Italian middle class, the rapid pace of social change, and the marginalization of the nobility from the mainstream of Italian life.

Research has shown that considerable social mobility, whether through education, public employment, or commercial and entrepreneurial activity, produced an increasing number of middle-class Italians in the decades after national unification. A distinct bourgeois identity was defined through sociability, marriage, and political activity. In many regions of Italy, the process of amalgamation with the old nobility—in terms of politics and economics if not always culture—also continued. One unusual feature was the tendency of this new elite to keep to their immediate regions and cities, to marry those from nearby, to form clubs confined to their own area, and to maintain a strictly local focus on national politics. However, this too was to change, if only gradually, beginning in the years before 1914 but especially occurring during the Fascist period and above all in the postwar decades. Yet notwithstanding the growth of a national identity among the middle classes, that identity has continued to coexist with a strong sense of local or regional loyalty.

Some of the greatest changes affecting Italian society after 1861 were felt by the poor in urban and rural areas, but their impact varied greatly. A major spurt of industrial development took place after 1896, concentrated in the engineering and automobile sectors, but only in the provinces of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria. Milan in particular saw the pioneering of methods of the "second industrial revolution," and its inhabitants experienced the first developments of mass consumption and leisure. Still, older industries, notably textiles, continued to be important, and they continued as in the past to employ unskilled, often underpaid female workers. Although real wages in industry rose by 40 percent from 1900 to 1913, it was mainly the "labor aristocracy" of skilled workers whose lifestyles perceptibly improved.

The industrial cities also became a focus of political and social radicalism and remained so throughout most of the twentieth century. There were violent riots in Milan in 1898, and Milan and Turin were the focus of much strike activity in the years before 1914 and in the biennio rosso (two red years) of 1919 and 1920. The unexpected labor radicalism of the late 1960s and early 1970s were also partly centered on Milan. Indeed, radical and socialist movements tended to concentrate their organizational activities in the north and were disinclined, especially in the 1890s and in 1919–1920, to take an interest in peasant unrest in the southern half of the peninsula.

The Italian peasant world changed in fits and starts. In truth it was never as unchanging or unvaried as outsiders liked to think, but in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was subject to unprecedented commercial pressures and to greater government intervention. Peasants in the south, already a rural proletariat at the time of unification, continued to suffer badly as a result of the privatization of common and church land in the 1860s. Popular revolt first erupted in southern Italy in the decades preceding unification, and it expressed the anger and desperation of peasant families excluded from land and the means of subsistence. This situation reached a climax after 1860 in the "brigands' war" on the mainland and in the spread of unrest and general lawlessness through the western provinces of Sicily. Demands for land redistribution and for the negotiation of new, less unequal contracts between landlord and peasant resurfaced again in Sicily during the 1890s, and this time peasants formed agricultural unions (fasci siciliani) to press their case. Like the protests of the 1860s, however, these movements were repressed by the state. Arguably, greater benefits may have been gained from emigration which, starting in the 1890s, caused a scarcity of labor and may have resulted in higher wages being paid to rural workers.

The situation in the north was equally complex. The agricultural revolution of the 1890s in Lombardy, Venetia, and Emilia-Romagna was spearheaded by large tenant farmers and limited companies employing day laborers; the system of sharecropping further declined. Great wealth was in other words achieved through the proletarianization of the labor force, which bore the brunt of seasonal unemployment; huge disparities in wealth became a dominant feature of northern agriculture. It was also in this area, the Po Valley, that rural strikes spread during the turbulent early years of the century and after World War I. Throughout the Fascist period peasant landownership continued to decline in the north and made little headway in the south. Despite efforts by Benito Mussolini, the Fascist dictator, to encourage both rural smallholdings and extol the virtues of a rural way of life, a process of deruralization (migration to industry and the towns) was under way. Some steps were taken to establish a rural society peopled by small peasant farmers in the huge land reform of 1950, aimed mainly at the southern grain-estates, and in the local seizures of land led by communist activists, which took place in central Italy. However, as mentioned above, the flight from the land accelerated during the 1950s and 1960s, and, in the south at least, many peasants lacked the money or skills to farm their newly acquired plots. Southern peasants also found that in the setting up of state agencies to administer the reform, they had merely swapped one landowner for another, equally powerful one.


Nationalization and politicization. The eighty or so years between national unification and the establishment of the first Italian Republic were years of immense political upheaval. The elitist parliamentary structures of the first decades, when less than 2 percent of the population had the vote, gave way reluctantly to a broader-based, but arguably more corrupt, system prior to World War I. After 1922 came the years of the Fascist dictatorship, which in its turn collapsed into the turmoil of 1943–1948. This period also marks the emergence, often contested and sometimes reversed, of mass participation in politics in Italy and accompanied by successive waves of popular and political protest.

To what extent does this process of mass politicization point to the creation of a national culture in Italy? After unification the task of fare gli italiani (making Italians) was seen as one of the most pressing facing Italy's rulers, not simply because of the huge cultural and social disparities within the peninsula but also because the only truly national institution at the time, the Catholic Church, had declared itself openly hostile to the new political order. The aim to make Italians from Sicilians, Calabrians, Neapolitans, Florentines, and Venetians lay behind the educational and infrastructural programs of liberal Italy (1861–1922). It also produced statues and monuments in every Italian city, the organization of festivals and demonstrations, and, under Mussolini, more explicit attempts at social control through cinema, radio, and the organization of mass leisure. The extent to which these efforts were crowned with success is open to question. Especially in the liberal period, efforts at nation building were compromised by political resistance, by the opposition of the Catholic Church, and by the glaring gap between the myth of national unity and the reality of campanilismo (localism). Although the importance of nationalist sentiment among the elite should not be underestimated, local loyalties and identities continued to predominate.

Postwar trends seem to point in another direction entirely. The 1960s saw the rise of a mass or consumer society, in part the result of the "economic miracle" and of migration to the cities. The rising tide of cinema, television, and pop music, of automobile travel and mass publishing, among other expressions of modern life, led to a decline in local peasant cultures, traditions, and dialects; this trend continued during the 1980s and 1990s with the creation of national newspapers like La Repubblica and the concentration of ownership in the mass media. A number of countertrends should also be noted. The creation of a national culture was accompanied by its Americanization, especially in cinema and music, while at the same time Italy began to export its own distinctive lifestyle—cars and scooters, coffee and Chianti, women's shoes and men's suits. The creation of a consumer society was opposed by a vigorous counterculture, which found its fullest expression in the protest movements of the late 1960s and 1970s. And despite the secularization of Italian culture, a striking feature of the postwar period, religious symbols and icons did not disappear. All in all, the creation of a national culture from the different regions, cities, and localities of the Italian peninsula has been one of the slowest and most compromised processes of social change in the modern period. But it has also been one of the most remarkable. It has helped to produce a culture that is as varied as it is vibrant, and this not least because of its open-ended character.

See alsoEmigration and Colonies (in this volume);Fascism and Nazism (volume 2);Banditry (volume 3);Catholicism (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Works

Braudel, Fernand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. 2 vols. Translated by Siân Reynolds. Berkeley, Calif., 1995. Seminal work by celebrated Annales historian.

Carpanetto, Dino, and Giuseppe Ricuperati. Italy in the Age of Reason, 1685–1789. Translated by Caroline Higgitt. London and New York, 1987.

Clark, Martin. Modern Italy, 1871–1995. London and New York, 1996.

Cochrane, Eric. Italy, 1530–1630. Edited by Julius Kirshner. London and New York, 1988.

Duggan, Christopher, and Christopher Wagstaff, eds. Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture, and Society, 1948–1958, Oxford and Washington, D.C., 1995.

Ginsborg, Paul. A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–1988. London and New York, 1990.

Hay, Denys, and John Law. Italy in the Age of the Renaissance, 1380–1530. London and New York, 1989.

Hearder, Harry. Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790–1870. London and New York, 1983.

Holmes, George, ed. The Oxford History of Italy. Oxford and New York, 1997.

Riall, Lucy. The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification. London and New York, 1994.

Sella, Domenico. Italy in the Seventeenth Century. London and New York, 1997.

Woolf, Stuart. A History of Italy, 1700–1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change. London and New York, 1979.

Zamagni, Vera. The Economic History of Italy, 1860–1990. Oxford and New York, 1993.


Rural and Urban Life

Cochrane, Eric. Florence in the Forgotten Centuries, 1527–1800: A History of Florence and the Florentines in the Age of the Grand Dukes. Chicago, 1973.

Marino, John A. Pastoral Economics in the Kingdom of Naples. Baltimore, 1988.

Petrusewicz, Marta. Latifundium: Moral Economy and Material Life in a European Periphery. Translated by Judith C. Green. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996. Revisionist account that challenges the view that southern grain-estates were uniformly backward.

Sella, Domenico. Crisis and Continuity: The Economy of Spanish Lombardy in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, Mass., 1979.

Sereni, Emilio. History of the Italian Agricultural Landscape. Translated by R. Burr Litchfield. Princeton, N.J., 1997. Pathbreaking study by Marxist historian using interdisciplinary methodology.

Waley, Daniel. The Italian City-Republics. 3d ed. London and New York, 1988.


Demography, Disease, Migration

Cipolla, Carlo M. Fighting the Plague in Seventeenth-Century Italy. Madison, Wis., 1981.

Gabaccia, Donna R. Italy's Many Diasporas. Seattle, Wash., 2000.

Snowden, Frank. Naples in the Time of Cholera, 1884–1911. Cambridge, U.K., and New York, 1995.


Religion, Family, Culture

Burke, Peter. The Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication. Cambridge, U.K., and New York, 1987.

Forgacs, David. Italian Culture in the Industrial Era, 1880–1980: Cultural Industries, Politics, and the Public. Manchester, U.K., and New York, 1990.

Forgacs, David, and Robert Lumley, eds. Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction. Oxford and New York, 1996.

Gentilcore, David. From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto. Manchester, U.K., and New York, 1992. On the Counter-Reformation in southern Italy.

Ginzburg, Carlo. The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller. Translated by John and Anne Tedeschi. New York, 1982. On heresy.

Hay, Denys. The Church in Italy in the Fifteenth Century. Cambridge, U.K., and New York, 1977.

Herlihy, David, and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber. Tuscans and Their Families: A Study of the Florentine Catasto of 1427. New Haven, Conn., 1985.

Kertzer, David I., and Richard P. Saller. eds. The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the Present. New Haven, Conn., 1991.

Klapisch-Zuber, Christiane. Women, Family, and Ritual in Renaissance Italy. Translated by Lydia Cochrane. Chicago, 1985.

Social Classes and Social Conflict

Cardoza, Anthony L. Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy: The Piedmontese Nobility, 1861–1930. Cambridge, U.K., and New York, 1997.

Davis, John A. Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy. Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1988.

Davis, John A., and Paul Ginsborg, eds. Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento: Essays in Honour of Denis Mack Smith. Cambridge, U.K., and New York, 1991. Contains a useful collection of essays on the Italian middle classes, crime, poverty, the family, and women.

Pullan, Brian. Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice: The Social Institutions of a Catholic State, to 1620. Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1971. On the problems of welfare.

Riall, Lucy. " 'Ill-contrived, badly executed [and] . . . of no avail'? Reform and Its Impact in the Sicilian Latifondo (c.1770–c.1910)." In The American South and the Italian Mezzogiorno: Essays in Comparative History. Edited by Rick Halpern and Enrico dal Lago. New York, forthcoming. An analysis of the changing social structure of Sicilian rural society.

Villari, Rosario. The Revolt of Naples. Translated by James Newell and John A. Marino. Cambridge, U.K., and Cambridge, Mass., 1993. The classic account of the famous revolt.

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