Ireland

views updated

IRELAND

David W. Miller

Although recent students of modern Irish social history have concentrated on topics which reflect the country's peripheral position vis-à-vis England, their conclusions have highlighted the differences within the Irish experience as often as the contrasts between Ireland and its powerful neighbor. This essay uses spatial differentiation within Ireland to explicate both continuity and change since the Middle Ages.

LAND, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND THE STATE

At the end of the Middle Ages Ireland was divided into two zones with different social systems, each dominated by overmighty subjects able to frustrate the ambitions of the centralizing English monarchy. In the south and east of the country much of the English lordship (see map 1) had been organized on the pattern of feudalism since the Norman invasion of the twelfth century, and a small portion of this zone (the "Pale") was actually governed by an English administration based in Dublin. The remainder of the country, including most of the north and west, retained the lineage-based Gaelic social system. That system was distinguished from feudalism by, for example, rules which might allow a number of kinsmen to contend for succession to a chieftaincy and which sometimes provided for periodic redistribution of landholdings. It was better adapted to the lifestyle of transhumance—the seasonal movement of livestock between upland and lowland pastures, which still prevailed in some parts of the Gaelic zone—than to the settled agriculture which underlay classic feudalism.

The differences between the two social systems and the geographic boundary separating them had become blurred by more than three centuries of contact. The distribution on map 1 of sites occupied for at least some part of that period by Anglo-Norman settlers, however, reflects the latter's preference for the well-drained, fertile soils of the south and east over the more oceanic north and west. Some such division between those two areas remained a feature of the social landscape even after both the systems which it demarcated had disappeared.

Military conquest of Gaelic territory by the Crown was sometimes followed by "surrender and regrant," the process by which a defeated chieftain might surrender the lands under his jurisdiction and receive them back from the Crown as a fief in which his rights and duties as an English-style nobleman would be clearly spelled out. Another mechanism for getting rid of the old order was plantation, the process of inducing English (and, after 1603, Scottish) gentry to settle on confiscated lands with British tenants. Both mechanisms often led to disappointing results, but in one spectacular instance of surrender and regrant the former chieftains inexplicably abandoned their new fiefs, and the government seized upon their default to launch the most ambitious and successful of its plantations. The resulting settlement in Ulster left another enduring mark upon the social landscape, which can be seen in map 2.

When the English state became Protestant in the sixteenth century, the state church in Ireland followed suit, but virtually the entire native-born population, including most members of both the English and Gaelic elites, remained Catholic. As politics in the three kingdoms became increasingly polarized along religious lines, both Gaelic and "Old English" Catholic landowners in Ireland became especially vulnerable to confiscations of their property for disloyalty. The political upheavals throughout the British Isles in 1638–1660 and in 1688–1692 resulted in huge transfers of property to "New English" Protestants. Although in 1641 Catholics still owned about 59 percent of the land, by 1688 their share had been reduced to 22 percent and by 1703 to 14 percent. Except in parts of Ulster, the class division between landlord and tenant corresponded to an ethnoreligious distinction between English Protestant and Irish Catholic. Even in Protestant districts of Ulster, Scottish Presbyterian tenants usually had members of the (Anglican) established church for landlords.

In the years following the defeat of Jacobite forces in 1691, the "Ascendancy," as the Protestant landed class came to be known, consolidated its position by anti-Catholic legislation in the Irish parliament known as the "Penal Laws." If strictly enforced, the Penal Laws might theoretically have stamped out the Catholic religion entirely. The conversion of the Catholic population, however, was not a serious objective in the enforcement of these laws. Rather, they were used to exclude the Catholic elite from the polity by denying them access to military resources and the franchise and by preventing them from increasing their much-diminished landed property. Students of the period have been impressed by the extent to which members of the Catholic elite managed to retain status and power by husbanding their resources, by winning assistance from well-disposed Protestants (including relatives who had at least nominally converted), and by entering mercantile careers in the major towns.

Whether eighteenth-century Ireland should be treated as an example of colonialism or as a European ancien régime is a subject of debate. Proponents of the colonialism model are impressed by similarities between the dominance of a settler elite in Ireland and power relationships in modern colonialist societies. Certainly the confiscations contributed to the relatively early modernization of agrarian economic relationships. Nearly everywhere land was owned by landlords under clear modern titles and held by tenants for cash rents. (Indeed, one of the difficulties in making the plantations work as planned had been the willingness of native occupiers to pay higher rents to be left undisturbed than potential immigrants from Britain would offer.) There were relatively few feudal anachronisms left to be swept away in Ireland compared, for example, with the country from which the concept "ancien régime" was borrowed.

Advocates of the ancien régime model, notably S. J. Connolly in Religion, Law, and Power, point to evidence of vertical ties of patronage between landlord and tenant despite differences of both religion and ethnicity. Although the decades after 1760 were marked by recurring waves of rural violence, the perpetrators—who adopted such names as Whiteboys and Rightboys—were usually reacting to innovations such as the enclosure of common pasture and were appealing to the landed class to restore their traditional rights. As the use of force by both the rioters and the authorities seems to have been markedly less lethal than in England, one can reasonably speak of a "moral economy" until the 1790s, when, as Thomas Bartlett argues, the panicked response of the governing class to widespread disturbances generally severed reciprocal ties of patronage and deference between Protestant landlords and Catholic tenants.

Indeed, during the last two decades of the eighteenth century the exclusion of various nonlanded and/or non-Protestant groups from the Irish polity was being actively challenged. The culmination of these excitements in a 1798 rebellion backed by France persuaded the British government to abolish the separate Irish polity by the Act of Union (1801), which created a new polity with a parliament in London for the entire British Isles. The delay of full membership for respectable Catholics in the new polity until 1829, when they were finally permitted to hold parliamentary seats, no doubt contributed to the rise of Irish nationalism, but ironically the landed Protestant class were the long-term losers from the union. After the famine of the 1840s, the Irish land tenure system was blamed by British elite opinion for many of Ireland's ills, although economic historians now doubt various components of that diagnosis. Irish landlords were unable to prevent a series of land reforms which ultimately made Irish land such an unattractive investment that they welcomed land purchase legislation in 1903 which converted Irish farmers from tenants into owner-occupiers.

The fact that land agitation was closely connected to nationalist politics in the late nineteenth century has tended to obscure stratification and even conflict within the agricultural labor force. Agrarian "outrages," especially common during the decades immediately prior to the famine, were often committed against Catholic farmers by Catholic agricultural laborers. The sharp contraction of this "underclass" from the time of the famine no doubt facilitated the mobilization of farmers in disciplined and effective nationwide agitation for land reform from the late 1870s. The holders of substantial farms—say fifty acres or more—together with Catholic tradesmen in provincial towns emerged as the main political elite which overthrew the old landlord class and dominated the politics of the southern Irish state for more than a generation after its formation in 1922.

SETTLEMENT, POPULATION, AND THE FAMILY

To the extent that the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century shift in land ownership had led to marketoriented agriculture, it tended to promote dispersed settlement in isolated farmsteads with individual tenancy of farms. However, the large-scale Ordnance Survey maps of 1824–1846 reveal that nucleated settlement was common, especially in the area where Gaelic social structures had been dominant in the late Middle Ages (map 1). Early students of these settlement clusters saw them as a direct survival of Gaelic communal practices of tillage and pasturing. Further research suggests that many of the particular settlement clusters extant in the early nineteenth century are postenclosure outcomes of population pressure rather than relics of continuous practice in situ of rundale (a system of joint tenancy under which each landholder cultivates a collection of noncontiguous strips) dating back to medieval times. Such spatial discontinuity, however, may well be consistent with substantial temporal continuity in the mentalities associated with collective agrarian decision making. An important task confronting Irish social historians, as Robert Scally suggests in The End of Hidden Ireland, is to tease out the mentalities which this settlement pattern may have sustained in a huge underclass whose creation and destruction were the primary social consequences of modern Ireland's peculiar demographic experience.

Ireland's population rose from perhaps 1 million in the mid-sixteenth century to something over 2 million in the early eighteenth, with especially high rates of growth in the latter part of this period compensating for the devastations of mid-seventeenth-century conflicts. Growth slowed during the second quarter of the eighteenth century, but from mid-century the population increased at extraordinary rates which outpaced even those of England until the decade or so prior to the great famine of the 1840s. Unlike England, however, Ireland experienced far too little industrialization to provide new sources of employment for its increased population. The potato, which had hitherto been used mainly to supplement a cereal diet, could be grown in sufficient quantities on a very small plot of land to meet the caloric requirements of a family. The smallholder might subdivide a modest farm to provide subsistence for several heirs and the more substantial farmer carve out several subtenancies, each consisting of a cottage and a garden, to accommodate agricultural laborers (cotters), all of whom depended for nutrition almost exclusively on the potatoes they could grow. The result was the emergence of an agrarian underclass.

Earlier demographers' reliance on high fertility resulting from extraordinarily low marriage ages to explain the pre-famine rise in population has generally been rejected (though differences in nuptuality between the underclass and better-off farmers remain an important area for investigation). Current explanations rely on relatively low mortality rates made possible by the nutritionally complete, if dull, regimen of a diet composed almost solely of potatoes and dairy products. Mortality was driven even lower by the fact that such a small proportion of the population was subject to the bacteriological hazards of urban life. Until around 1830 rates of emigration remained low among Catholics, though not among Protestants, for whom migration to a frontier was already an option validated by tradition. The slowing of population growth after 1830 raises the possibility that Irish society was beginning to respond to the dysfunctions of rapid population growth unsupported by new sources of employment. Whether a less traumatic transition to a new demographic regime was possible must remain conjectural, however, for the 1845, 1846, and 1848 potato harvests were virtually destroyed by Phytophthora infestans. The 1851 census reported a total population of 6,552,385, nearly a 20 percent decline from the 1841 population of 8,175,124, and 2 million fewer than would have occurred if the previous decade's growth rate had continued. Deaths in excess of normal mortality probably totaled about 1 million.

Much famine research has focused on British government policy. In 1838 an Irish Poor Law had been enacted on the model of the new English Poor Law. A board of guardians in each of 130 districts would levy local taxes to support the destitute in workhouses under principles of "less eligibility"—conditions sufficiently severe to ensure that no pauper would prefer workhouse life to the least attractive employment available. The new system failed its first serious test, for when the famine struck the number of starving soon far exceeded the total capacity of all the workhouses. Sir Robert Peel's Conservative government had prepared "outdoor" relief plans before it fell in the summer of 1846. The new Liberal government of Lord John Russell was so wedded to classic liberal ideology reinforced by a providentialist evangelicalism that, despite a second harvest failure, it initially refused to take actions which political economy might condemn as incentives to indolence or as interference with a divinely ordained free market.

Within a few months officials realized that their policy was having catastrophic consequences, and they began to implement outdoor relief and other departures from liberal orthodoxy. It was too late, however, to prevent massive mortality in the terrible winter of 1846–1847. The popular belief that the government had deliberately sought to exterminate the Irish people was generally dismissed, along with many other nationalist verities, by "revisionist" historians beginning in the 1950s. In the 1990s the sesquicentennial observances called forth "postrevisionist" accounts, which document official thinking that certainly seems callous to modern sensibilities. There is no serious challenge to the argument that official policy was wrongheaded. Postrevisionists, however, have failed to persuade many of their colleagues that policymakers were motivated by such malice as would justify the term "genocide" or "holocaust."

The continued decline of population for another century had two principal components. First, emigration became a routine part of Irish life; between 1851 and 1920 an average of more than sixty thousand persons left for overseas destinations each year, in addition to substantial migration to Britain. The fact that males and females went in approximately equal numbers distinguished Irish emigration sharply from the male-dominated emigrant streams of various other European countries. What was left of the underclass after the calamity of the 1840s was steadily depleted by emigration. Second, although age at marriage rose only slowly, the proportion who never married doubled between 1851 and 1911, at which time more than one quarter of those aged 46 to 55 had never been married. In consequence, despite quite high levels of marital fertility, overall birth rates were moderate.

Since urban growth remained sluggish, these two factors—emigration and permanent celibacy—should be understood in the context of the rural economy. Throughout much of the country in the aftermath of the famine, the tiny subsistence holdings of the agrarian underclass were eliminated, farms were consolidated into commercially viable units, and the practice of subdivision was permanently abandoned. In some northern and western areas of marginal agriculture, however, seasonal migration of agricultural laborers to Britain and to more prosperous parts of Ireland enabled some families to retain possession of otherwise unviable holdings and thus resist for a time the trend toward population decline.

Generally the standard of living of country people rose over the two generations after the famine. A demographic regime which had probably governed the behavior of better-off tenants before the famine became the norm for most of rural society. Since the farm was to be maintained intact at all costs, all but one son and probably all but one daughter would typically face a choice between migration and staying at home as an unmarried member of the farm's labor force. Timothy Guinnane, in The Vanishing Irish, argues that we should understand the workings of this regime not as a set of inflexible rules but as a framework within which the individual negotiated and made choices in accordance with his or her preferences and personal circumstances. Thus, for example, it could happen that the son favored with succession to the family farm was not the eldest but the one left after more ambitious and adventurous brothers had chosen other alternatives. Even substantial rates of celibacy among those males who did inherit holdings can be explained as rational choices in a culture which construed marriage much less as an opportunity for sexual expression than as an economic transaction. Joanna Bourke documents in Husbandry to Housewifery the resourcefulness with which women carved out a distinctive economic role, for example in poultry rearing, within this domestic regime.

TRADE, COMMUNICATION, AND INDUSTRY

In the late Middle Ages, towns were confined mostly to the English lordship. There was an arc of ports around the southern half of the island: Drogheda and Dublin on the east coast facing Britain; New Ross, Waterford, and Cork on the south coast; and Limerick and Galway at the head of great western harbors facing the open Atlantic. As the New World was colonized by Europeans, these towns, several of them Norse foundations from about the tenth century, were well positioned to participate in the resulting long-distance trade.

The existing urban system was less well suited to the commercialization of the countryside. Within the English lordship some local markets did exist, but only in the southeast—where there was one inland town, Kilkenny, comparable to the major ports—was a classic central-place hierarchy beginning to develop. In Gaelic areas most exchange consisted of goods extracted by chieftains from their subjects in return for such services as military protection and redistributive rituals of feasting. To the extent that a chieftain participated in the global market, it was mainly through barter with the occasional captain who sailed into a coastal haven in his territory. The transformation of the Gaelic peasantry from tribute-rendering "freeholders" to rent-paying tenants in a cash economy in consequence of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century confiscations was an important step toward a fully monetized market economy in the countryside.

Towns were Anglophone islands in a sea of Irish (Gaelic) speakers. There was a significant body of literature in the Irish language; indeed, the old Gaelic social system had well-established roles for the learned classes. Hereditary jurists (breithiúna, brehons) arbitrated disputes under Gaelic law. The poets (filid) not only sang the praises of their patrons but also had the shamanlike role of issuing curses against enemies. Readers of this volume will be pleased to learn that even historians (seanchaithe) enjoyed special status. The literate elite, however, were generally the first to acquire English in a given locality. By the end of the eighteenth century, therefore, only a minuscule number of Irish speakers were literate, even though about half the population still spoke Irish. Most country folk who acquired literacy did so in English, though whether literacy was acquired in the same generation as the spoken language varied according to local conditions. The spread of literacy was greatly accelerated by the establishment of the national education system, which provided state-funded primary education starting in the 1830s, four decades earlier than the comparable innovation in England. The movement to revive the Irish language beginning in the 1890s was primarily composed of townsfolk whose families had been monoglot English speakers for some time.

The erection of a network of planned towns as part of the Ulster plantation not only accelerated commercial development in that region but also provided the marketing infrastructure for protoindustrialization. Partly because of mercantilist legislation to exclude Irish woolens from the English market, a vigorous domestic linen industry developed during the eighteenth century in various parts of Ireland. Only in Ulster, however, did protoindustrialism evolve into successful factory-based industry. A catalyst of this process was the importation of cotton, which began in the late 1770s. Between 1800 and 1830 cotton-spinning mills in Belfast attracted many handloom weavers from the countryside to continue plying their craft in an urban, but still domestic, setting. After 1825, when the invention of the wet-spinning process made machine spinning of linen possible, the Belfast textile industry abandoned cotton for the region's traditional fabric.

In the absence, prior to the 1850s, of a satisfactory power loom to produce the fine linens in which Ulster specialized, weaving continued to be done on handlooms in workers' homes both in the Belfast area and in the countryside. Very low wage rates prevailed and country weavers still spent part of their time cultivating their tiny agricultural holdings. These weavers were nearly as vulnerable as the potato-dependent underclass in other parts of Ireland at the time of the famine of the 1840s. Indeed, a sharp rise in wages, resulting from scarcity of weavers after the calamity, prompted rapid investment in power looms, which completed the transition to factory-based production.

Throughout most of its domestic phase, linen manufacture had been a highly gendered process—women spun and men wove—though a "Rosie the weaver" phenomenon did emerge during the Napoleonic Wars. At least in Belfast itself, most of the linen mill workers were female, but this gender imbalance was complemented by a predominantly male labor force in the engineering and shipbuilding industries, which grew rapidly during the second half of the nineteenth century. Belfast was transformed from a commercial center of about 20,000 in 1800 to the only industrial city in Ireland. By the turn of the century its population (about 350,000) was comparable to that of Dublin and its suburbs, though Dublin remained the commercial and cultural capital of the country even after partition.

Industrial development has been an important priority of the southern Irish state since its formation in the 1920s, but until the 1960s its efforts had disappointing results. Analysts disagree over whether those results were due to structural factors such as the heritage of colonial dependency or to cultural factors reflected, for example, in the antimaterialist values which President Eamon de Valera expounded. Since 1960 the agricultural sector has become relatively less dominant in the overall economy of the state. Some of this change resulted from manufacturing growth, but as in much of Europe, the service sector has grown even faster. Although Dublin and its immediate hinterland has experienced much of the service-driven growth, many new industrial enterprises, in response to government incentives, have located in less developed western districts. A striking feature of the manufacturing labor force is its recruitment of many small farmers who continue part-time agricultural work and retain possession of their holdings as a hedge against job insecurity.

RELIGION, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY

In the early Middle Ages the Irish church was notorious for its noncompliance with Roman norms of morality and organization, and indeed a papal commission to redress the situation was the pretext for Henry II's assumption of the title "lord of Ireland" in the twelfth century. Especially within Gaelic territory (map 1) the situation was still quite unsatisfactory in the early sixteenth century. Neglect of sacraments, lack of preaching, and failure even to conduct regular religious services were all common. Vocations had decreased and the requirement of clerical celibacy was widely disregarded. At least among the Gaelic elite, Celtic secular marriage—which permitted divorce—was much more common than Christian marriage.

Thus the failure of the new state church to gain the adherence of any significant group living in Ireland in the mid-sixteenth century was not the result of extraordinary Irish devotion to Rome. Indeed, in its early years the Reformation did gain some adherents, at least among those members of the Old English elite who were in contact with government officials. It is clear, however, that by the early seventeenth century the state church had lost whatever opportunity it may have had to convert either the Gaelic or the English elite, not to mention the general population. The established "Church of Ireland" would draw its constituency essentially from New English officials and from the beneficiaries of the land confiscations and the settlers whom they brought with them from England. A third religious system, Presbyterianism, emerged among the Scottish settlers in the north and assumed permanent institutional form after the Restoration.

Outside the elite, three ethnic groups—English, Scottish, and Irish—distinguishable by such factors as speech, diet, and dress, became the constituencies of three religious systems—Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic. For most of the eighteenth century each of the three churches was content to minister to its ethno-religious community and made little serious effort to win converts from the other two. Internally, each of the three religious systems, as Raymond Gillespie argues in Devoted People, was shaped by a dialogue between elite theological ideas and popular supernatural beliefs which had evolved to meet the needs of ordinary folk.

To the extent that the resulting syntheses helped validate and sustain popular magical and providentialist beliefs, they contributed to the forms of eighteenth-century collective action. In Aisling Ghéar (Bitter Vision), Breandán Ó Buachalla documents the rich messianic, millenarian, and prophetic traditions through which Catholic country folk made sense of their past and future. Such traditions informed the Whiteboys and other agrarian movements which flourished from 1760 as well as, significantly, the Defenders—the rural Catholic component of the rebel coalition of the 1790s. I. R. McBride, in Scripture Politics, provides a complementary analysis of the rural Presbyterian mind. He demonstrates how an active expectation of providential action, together with the obvious millennial implications of the downfall of the Catholic Church in revolutionary France, might lead country Presbyterians into alliance with those very Catholics in Ireland whom the Almighty, in his inscrutable wisdom, had invited to lend a hand in laying low the Antichrist.

The excitements of the 1790s could not have risen to the revolutionary level, however, without the leadership which came from critical groups within or at least on the margins of the polity: members of the Belfast Presbyterian elite, certain wealthy Dublin Catholics, and some descendants of the dispossessed Catholic elite (notably in the extreme southeast of Ireland), together with a few radicalized members of the Ascendancy. These elements created the initially reformist but ultimately revolutionary societies of United Irishmen. The abortive nature of the United Irish rebellion in 1798 reflected harsh repression during the preceding year, but the geography of the principal outbreaks is nevertheless significant. Major insurrection under local leadership occurred only in the northeastern and the southeastern corners of the country. In the northeast a sophisticated, enlightened Presbyterian elite successfully mobilized at least some of their country cousins. The rising in the southeast used to be depicted as a spontaneous peasant jacquerie, but L. M. Cullen and Kevin Whelan have established that it benefited from crucial leadership by relatively well-off local Catholics. The only important 1798 insurrectionary activity in the Gaelic zone (map 1) occurred not in response to indigenous leadership, but as a result of a belated landing in County Mayo by a small French expeditionary force.

These events of the late eighteenth century are central to all interpretations of identity formation in modern Ireland. In traditional nationalist history the participation of northern Presbyterians on the same side as Catholics in 1798 demonstrated their membership in the Irish nation, and their stubborn refusal in the twentieth century to accept the consequences of their own nationality was treated as a kind of false consciousness induced by the British. Many professional Irish historians in recent decades, in keeping with the view widely held by social scientists that every nationality is a social construction, have doubted the supposed continuity between the "colonial nationalism" of late eighteenth-century Protestants and late nineteenth-century Irish nationalism, which had an almost totally Catholic constituency. These revisionist interpretations are challenged by postrevisionist authors who stress, for example, the "politicization" of elite Catholics concurrently with the flowering of colonial nationalism.

Pre-famine peasants were seen by revisionist authors as identifying more strongly with local communities than with an imagined national community. Postrevisionist accounts have attended to expressions of national consciousness in Gaelic popular literature prior to the nineteenth century and to the politicizing role of the Defenders and of a successor secret society, the Ribbonmen, in the early nineteenth-century countryside. What gave Irish Catholics their standing with respect to nationalism, however, was not rebellion but electoral politics. Although the land question was useful in mobilizing the Catholic electorate for nationalism, the settlement of that question did not diminish the remarkable electoral solidarity among Catholics for the claim to national autonomy. Although the political process which led to that outcome is beyond the scope of this article, its social origins are to be found in demographic, class, and religious change.

On the eve of the famine the Catholic Church was still struggling to attain the standard of canonical practice prescribed by the Council of Trent nearly three centuries earlier. As map 3 illustrates, compliance with the requirement of weekly Mass attendance was substantially higher in the area which had been within the English lordship at the end of the Middle Ages than in the north and west. During the nineteenth century Catholic Ireland underwent changes which Emmet Larkin has called a "devotional revolution" and associated with reforms of discipline and devotional practice initiated by Paul Cardinal Cullen between 1850 and 1878. Population decline no doubt facilitated the process, not only by relieving the strain on the church's resources for providing pastoral services, but perhaps also by virtually eliminating the underclass, whose members may well have been the least observant stratum of Catholics (see maps 3 and 4).

From the late nineteenth century until the 1960s there seems to have been virtually universal observance of Tridentine norms within the Catholic ethnoreligious community. In recent decades this pattern has been significantly eroded, to the point where one journalist has entitled a book Goodbye to Catholic Ireland—though she was unaware that the "Catholic Ireland" to which her generation has been saying "Goodbye" had said "Hello" only slightly more than a century earlier. As Lawrence Taylor has argued in Occasions of Faith, the religious consequences of the devotional revolution are closely intertwined with the consolidation of Irish nationalism as a fundamentally Catholic identity. The direction of any causal arrow which might relate extremely observant Catholicism to nationalism (like that of one which might relate it to the unusual nuptuality patterns of the same period) is difficult to determine. Such relationships, however, were no doubt mediated by the formation of a respectable class of Catholic farmers and townfolk in the wake of the departed underclass.

The obverse of the rise of an essentially Catholic Irish national consciousness (which liberal-minded Protestants were welcome to adopt, but not to challenge) was the development of a Protestant identity which replaced the separate—indeed, mutually hostile—identities of Church of Ireland members and Dissenters which were so evident in the 1790s. The Loyal Orange Order, which now reflects a pan-Protestant identity, originated between 1795 and 1798 in the Anglican zone south of Lough Neagh (map 2). The shift among Presbyterians to emphasis on their Protestantism rather than their Dissent has usually been explained as a reaction to the better-understood rise of nationalism on the Catholic side during the nineteenth century. An explanation grounded in the social realities of the Protestant communities themselves would be more satisfying. In "Irish Presbyterians and the Great Famine" David Miller suggests the beginnings of such an explanation in the transformation of Presbyterianism in the nineteenth century from a communal to a (middle) class church which by mid-century had already lost much of its own underclass of handloom weavers. The origins of the system of ethnoreligious identities so central to the Northern Ireland conflict of the past generation, however, remain poorly understood.


CONCLUSION

Casual observers of Irish affairs often surmise that nothing much ever changes in Irish history. In fact, despite many continuities largely dictated by the country's peripheral position, Irish society has experienced sharp discontinuities in several important domains of social history during the period since the end of the Middle Ages. Will the late twentieth century come to be seen as a new moment of fundamental discontinuity in Irish social history? Certainly the striking and rapid secularization occurring among the Catholic majority will not easily be reversed. But will the end of the devotional regime which began in the nineteenth century erode the nationalism which that regime did so much to foster? Net population decline has ended, but there is still significant emigration, notably among skilled professionals. Nonagricultural employment has been growing briskly, but risk-averse agrarian mentalities continue to shape work patterns. Enthusiasm for the European Union remains high, but whether EU membership will ultimately transform Irish society or lead to a new form of peripherality remains uncertain.

See also other articles in this section.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bartlett, Thomas, and Keith Jeffery, eds. A Military History of Ireland. Cambridge, U.K., 1996.

Bourke, Joanna. Husbandry to Housewifery: Women, Economic Change, and Housework in Ireland, 1890–1914. Oxford, 1993.

Clark, Samuel, and James S. Donnelly Jr., eds. Irish Peasants: Violence and Political Unrest, 1780–1914. Madison, Wis., 1983.

Connolly, S. J. Religion, Law, and Power: The Making of Protestant Ireland, 1660–1760. Oxford, 1992.

Cullen, L. M. The Emergence of Modern Ireland, 1600–1900. London, 1981.

Curtin, Nancy J. The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798. Oxford, 1994

Gillespie, Raymond. Devoted People: Belief and Religion in Early Modern Ireland. Manchester, U.K., 1997.

Graham, B. J., and L. J. Proudfoot, eds. An Historical Geography of Ireland. London, 1993.

Guinnane, Timothy. The Vanishing Irish: Households, Migration, and the Rural Economy in Ireland, 1850–1914. Princeton, N.J., 1997.

Larkin, Emmet. "The Devotional Revolution in Ireland, 1850–75." American Historical Review 77 (1972): 625–652.

McBride, I. R. Scripture Politics: Ulster Presbyterians and Irish Radicalism in the Late Eighteenth Century. Oxford, 1998.

MacCurtain, Margaret, and Mary O'Dowd, eds. Women in Early Modern Ireland. Edinburgh, 1991.

McKernan, Ann. "War, Gender, and Industrial Innovation: Recruiting Women Weavers in Early Nineteenth-Century Ireland." Journal of Social History 28 (1994): 109–124.

Miller, David W. "Mass Attendance in Ireland in 1834." In Piety and Power in Ireland, 1760–1960: Essays in Honour of Emmet Larkin. EditedbyS.J.Brown and D. W. Miller. Belfast, 1999.

Moody, T. W., and F. X. Martin, eds. The Course of Irish History. Rev. ed. Boulder, Colo., 1994. Still the best general introduction to Irish history.

Moody, T. W., F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne, eds. A New History of Ireland. Oxford, 1976–. The standard multivolume reference work. Publication still in progress.

Ó Buachalla, Breandán. Aisling Ghéar: Na Stíobhartaigh agus an tAos Léinn, 1603–1788. Dublin, 1996.

Ó Gráda, Cormac. Ireland: A New Economic History, 1780–1939. Oxford, 1994.

Scally, Robert James. The End of Hidden Ireland: Rebellion, Famine, and Emigration. New York, 1995.

Taylor, Lawrence. Occasions of Faith: An Anthropology of Irish Catholics. Philadelphia, 1995.

Vaughan, W. E. Landlords and Tenants in Mid-Victorian Ireland. Oxford, 1994.

Whelan, Kevin. The Tree of Liberty: Radicalism, Catholicism, and the Construction of Irish Identity, 1760–1830. Notre Dame, Ind., 1996.

More From encyclopedia.com