Political Parties

The emergence of political parties in the United States in the 1790s was anything but preordained. The nation had risen from a colonial structure fearful and mistrustful of formal institutions of political power. James Madison's famous Federalist No. 10 (1787) was an indictment of political parties, or "factions," and his sentiment was shared by all major political figures of the day, regardless of ideological predisposition, from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington and John Adams, and even to Alexander Hamilton. The common belief was that parties produced political divisiveness and a general distrust in government, elements that had no place in a free society, especially a nascent one struggling to survive in a world of Great Powers.

At the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, these early American leaders believed that the source of good government lay in the creation of sound formal institutions. Specifically, a national Constitution, with explicit powers being granted to legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, along with clear checks and balances, was key. Hard lessons had been learned under the Articles of Confederation, with the national government given little meaningful authority over state governments, a scenario that hindered the collection of taxes, the payment of the postwar debt, and the stability of the nation's defenses, all of which threatened the viability of the great experiment in American democracy. The founders believed that the new federal system, with its allocation of greater authority to the national government, would be sufficient to generate sound and stable policy and produce the sort of good government that was preferred by all.

instability in the first congress

Unfortunately, this optimistic view was not to be realized. Upon the convening of the First Congress under the new Constitution in 1789, it became clear that legislative policymaking was anything but stable. Decision making was extremely difficult, as legislative initiatives waxed and waned because of significant instability in voting. Put simply, the nature of policy proposals could be altered easily by the inclusion of amendments, which would change either narrowly or broadly the general thrust of the legislation. This substantive alteration of proposals would then reshape the respective coalitions in support or opposition. Thus, a bill might appear close to passage at one moment; however, after its provisions were altered with an amendment, it would then be defeated. Moreover, decisions themselves were reversible; that is, some bills were in fact passed but were subsequently revisited, altered, and then defeated. Thus, instability reigned in the legislative process. The only way that stable policies were produced was via "vote trades," whereby coalitions would trade support (and votes) across policy areas and agree that eventual decisions were in fact final (and thus not to be revisited). One such case was the famous Jefferson dinner party of 1790, to which Jefferson invited Madison and Hamilton to discuss and finalize a vote trade on the location of the nation's capital and a federal assumption of state debts incurred during and after the Revolution. Yet vote trades were a highly inefficient way of conducting legislative business, since a significant amount of time and effort was needed to negotiate deals on a case-by-case basis.

Underlying the instability in the First Congress was a growing ideological rift on the primary issue dimension that had structured legislative debate and voting, namely the preferred size and scope of the new federal government. While most major political leaders in the early 1790s had been Federalists in the prior decade, supporting stronger national institutions than those under the Articles, differences in perspective existed, and these differences grew over time. Two coalitions subsequently formed, one around the views of Madison and Jefferson and the other around the views of Hamilton and Adams. The Madison-Jefferson coalition held that the apportionment of authority between the federal and state governments under the Constitution struck the right balance, believing that the increase in centralization was necessary but also that the rights and authority of individual states should remain predominant. The Hamilton-Adams coalition felt the Constitution did not go far enough in centralizing power at the national level, believing that an activist federal government was necessary to build and protect a burgeoning nation. The Hamilton-Adams coalition possessed a majority in the First Congress, but it was unable to realize its policy goals. Whenever a pro-federal majority was close to passing a legislative proposal, members of the Madison-Jefferson coalition tacked on an amendment, adding a local or regional dimension, that upset the fragile majority coalition. Assumption of state debt, which eventually became part of the "dinner party" vote trade, was one such case where the Hamilton-Adams coalition was thwarted. This pattern played itself out across the first session of the First Congress, generating constant instability and frustrating the will of the profederal majority.

the first party system

Eventually, Hamilton devised a plan to overcome the antifederal resistance. His strategy was to adopt a set of informal mechanisms that together would eventually form the structural basis of a political party. At the time, however, Hamilton had no grand scheme of party development in mind; rather, he acted pragmatically in hopes of achieving the more modest goal of organizing the profederal majority into a consistent voting bloc. If this could be accomplished, Hamilton believed, a consistent stream of legislative victories would follow. His strategy took two forms. First, he set up an informal caucus system so that members of the profederal group could come together, discuss strategies, and learn the benefits of coordinating their behavior. The caucus message was that if they organized and acted collectively, they would win more often. Second, Hamilton established floor leaders in both chambers of Congress to further institutionalize the organization. Their role was to prevent the opposition from introducing sectionally based amendments to split his profederal majority, as well as to serve as protowhips, keeping members of the coalition informed as to goals and strategies and assuring that they would act in concert. By the second session of the First Congress, his plan was in full swing, and by the third session, the benefits were clear. Specifically, Hamilton pushed through a set of financial measures—a system of taxation, a mint, and a national bank—that expanded the federal system. The first two measures were adopted rather easily, but the bank bill encountered significant opposition. Nevertheless, Hamilton's profederal majority hung together, staved off amendments, and passed the bill. Organization had led to stability, and stability had yielded legislative victories.

The success of Hamilton's coalition became abundantly clear to Madison and Jefferson, and by the Second Congress (1791–1793) they had begun to organize an opposition. Moreover, clear labels began to be used to define the individual coalitions, with Hamilton's group adopting the "Federalist" label and Madison and Jefferson's group taking on the "Republican" (or "Democratic Republican") label. Madison, who had once eschewed political parties, now framed them as democratic devices, egalitarian in nature, that could be used for achieving a greater good. More clearly, he framed his Republicans as the "people's alternative" to the more aristocratic Federalists. Parties, to Madison, were now an essential part of the American experience, crucial to giving diverse groups an equal voice in the political process.

Thus, by the Third Congress (1793–1795), a political party system was in full bloom, specifically an institutional party system. That is, a party-in-Congress had developed, with other national features such as a mechanism for presidential nominations (through congressional party caucuses). The other aspects of a modern party system—a party-in-elections, with clear partisan campaigns and mass party identification and linkages, and a party-in-government, with organized and integrated party-based units at the local, state, and national levels—were still decades from developing fully. Still, by the mid-1790s, the beginnings of such aspects were present, such as the emergence of party press organs, the use of party labels in electoral politics, and the rise of party organizations at the national level (like the New York–Virginia alliance).

For the remainder of the 1790s, the partisan schism between the Federalists and Republicans increased steadily. Events such as Jay's Treaty (1794), the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), and the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions (1798) continued to firm up partisan voting blocs in the Fourth (1795–1797), Fifth (1797–1799), and Sixth (1799–1801) Congresses. In terms of majority control, the Federalists reigned supreme for the first dozen years of the federal system, except for losing the House of Representatives briefly to the Republicans in the Fourth Congress. This Federalist domination changed in 1800 and 1801 as Jefferson was elected president (after an electoral stalemate and a thirty-six-ballot election in the lame-duck Sixth House) and the Republicans swept the elections to the Seventh Congress. The Federalists would continue to vie with the Republicans throughout the first decade of the nineteenth century, but their influence would wane substantially. The Federalists' electoral strength was in the Northeast, a section that became less influential politically as the nation's population grew and shifted toward the West and South, which were heavily Republican areas. The reapportionment after the 1800 census captured these population trends as the size of the House increased by nearly one-third, with the seat additions occurring almost entirely outside of the Northeast. Nevertheless, the Federalists maintained their organization and continued to serve as the major opposition party to the Republicans through the mid-1810s.

The ending of the Federalist-Republican system, or the First Party System, can be traced to events surrounding the War of 1812 (1812–1815). This second war with Britain was initiated by the War Hawks, a new group of nationalistic Republicans from the West led by House Speaker Henry Clay. The Federalists, on the other hand, with their historic ties to the British, operated as the antiwar party during this period. As such, they actually saw their numbers in Congress and state legislatures increase substantially, thanks to the growing antiwar sentiment in the nation and an uncertain political-economic environment. In December 1814 and January 1815, the Federalists met in Hartford, Connecticut, and denounced the Madison administration and the war with Great Britain. Unfortunately, the Hartford Convention was ill timed, as General Andrew Jackson won the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815, turning the tide of public sentiment toward the war. Very quickly, the Federalist Party was framed as the anti-American Party, as stories of near-treasonous events at Hartford, such as (unfounded) claims of secession proceedings, were reported in the Republican press. The Federalist organization, which had been relatively weak for more than a decade, could not overcome these accusations and slowly disappeared as a viable national party.

an unstable one-party era

Shortly after his election to the presidency in 1816, James Monroe predicted that the country was entering a new period, an Era of Good Feeling. His belief was that political battles would cease and that cooperation and concession would be the rule, since the Republicans would be operating as the sole national party. Monroe's prediction proved to be inaccurate, however, as this period of one-party rule was anything but amicable. With the Federalists no longer operating as a serious national party, the Republicans lacked a clear foil against which to organize and coordinate. As a result, regional and sectional issues were placed above national issues, leading to rifts within the Republican coalition. In particular, younger Republicans from the West, many of the War Hawk mentality, championed expansionism and a more activist national government (ironically echoing sentiments expressed by the Federalists), putting them at odds with older Republicans from the South, who supported the traditional party positions of states' rights and limited federal power. Congressional voting during this period was highly unstable, stemming from the lack of party discipline, the constant influx of sectional issues, and the general fluidity of members' policy positions. Indeed, the years between 1816 and 1824 have been called the most unstable period in congressional history, with voting patterns often bordering on chaotic.

In time, groups of these Republicans began coalescing around individuals who would become candidates for the presidency in 1824: John Quincy Adams, the secretary of state; William Crawford, the secretary of the Treasury; Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House; and Andrew Jackson, the war hero and U.S. senator from Tennessee. While Crawford would eventually receive the presidential nomination of the congressional caucus in 1823, this mattered little by that time. That is, the caucus nomination had been criticized as undemocratic for more than a decade, leading the other three potential candidates to reject it as politically definitive. Rather, they turned to "the people" for their nominations, as the Tennessee legislature nominated Jackson, the Kentucky legislature nominated Clay, and various groups in New England nominated Adams. As a result, the lead-up to the presidential election of 1824 was significant in opening up the political process, establishing fresh connections between citizens and candidates, and encouraging new and greater participation throughout the nation.

In the end, the presidential election of 1824 was thrown into the House of Representatives, as no candidate received a majority of electoral college votes. The House ballot was held in February 1825, and John Quincy Adams won a bare majority on the first ballot. Adams's winning coalition combined states loyal to him with states loyal to Henry Clay (who had finished fourth in the popular canvas and thus was excluded from the House ballot). In short order, charges of a "corrupt bargain" between Adams and Clay were reported in the press, made all the more compelling when Adams tapped Clay as his secretary of state. In reality, Adams and Clay were quite close ideologically, leading to a natural (and rational) joining of forces. Moreover, most of the conspiracy charges were manufactured and distributed by Jackson's cronies, with an eye toward the presidential election of 1828. Between 1824 and 1828, the Republican Party would split into Adams and Jackson wings, as Jackson's coalition began building the nation's first mass party organization. Jackson would go on to win the presidential election of 1828, and the Adams-Clay wing of the party would lead the anti-Jackson opposition for the next decade. By the late 1830s, the large group of nominal Republicans would finally split into two mass parties, the Democrats (the former Jackson wing) and the Whigs (the former Adams-Clay wing), and form the Second Party System.

See alsoArticles of Confederation; Congress; Constitutional Convention; Democratic Republicans; Election of 1800; Election of 1824; Election of 1828; Era of Good Feeling; Federalist Party; Hartford Convention; Madison, James; Monroe, James .

bibliography

Aldrich, John H. Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Dangerfield, George. The Era of Good Feelings. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952.

Dunn, Susan. Jefferson's Second Revolution: The Election of 1800 and the Triumph of Republicanism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004.

Elkins, Stanley, and Eric McKitrick. The Age of Federalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Hoadley, John F. Origins of American Political Parties, 1789–1803. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986.

Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Brian R. Sala. "The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824." American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998): 1157–1179.

Livermore, Shaw. The Twilight of Federalism: The Disintegration of the Federalist Party, 1815–1830. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Martis, Kenneth C. The Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789–1989. New York: Macmillan, 1989.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Jeffery A. Jenkins