Karadžic, Radovan (b. 1945)

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KARADŽI?, RADOVAN (b. 1945)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Serbian leader and accused war criminal.

In 2005 Radovan Karadži? was one of the two "most wanted" fugitives from justice at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia—the other was Ratko Mladi? (b. 1943), with whom he stood indicted jointly on many counts. Karadži? is an ethnic Serb born in Montenegro in 1945. His early childhood was overshadowed by his father's imprisonment for his wartime service with the Chetniks, Serb guerrilla fighters who opposed the communist-led partisans. The Chetniks favored the restoration of the prewar Serbian monarchical dynasty and the authority of the Orthodox Church. The same allegiances clearly lodged deeply in Karadži?, but were necessarily concealed as he made his early career in communist Yugoslavia. In 1960 he moved to Sarajevo, where he graduated in medicine and later practiced as a consultant psychiatrist; he has also published poetry and is something of a musician.

As communist Yugoslavia began to break up, Karadži? and a group of nationalist intellectuals formed the Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia, which campaigned with the aim of creating a unified state for all Serbs—a Greater Serbia. They were backed by Slobodan Miloševi? (1941–2006), president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the successor state to Tito's (Josip Broz, 1892–1980) federation. Although reduced territorially to Serbia and Montenegro, the FRY controlled the Yugoslav army, by far the most powerful military force in the region. Anticipating international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state (6 April 1992), the Bosnian Serbs rejected the authority of the Sarajevo government, and on March 27 proclaimed the breakaway Republika Srpska (Serb Republic), with its capital and assembly at Pale. The military arm of the new entity was the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), fifty to eighty thousand regular troops of the Army of Yugoslavia, supposedly natives of Bosnia, assigned by Miloševi? to fight in what he presented as a civil war, not an invasion. At Miloševi?'s insistence, General Ratkó was appointed to command the Serb forces, although Karadži? was nominally Mladi?'s political Mladic superior.

Karadži?'s brief moment in the international political limelight came in the context of a bigger game being played out by Miloševi? and Mladi?. The BSA overran 70 percent of Bosnia within days, and (assisted by Serbian paramilitaries) carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing, committing atrocities that drew mounting international condemnation. It seems clear that Karadži? had littlé in deciding military strategy, which was coordinated through Belgrade in concert with the operations of the Yugoslav army in Croatia. Karadži? was politically secure only in his power base in Republika Srpska. As long as Miloševi? had a use for him, Karadži? was allowed to cut a genial and cultured figure in the media (he speaks good English) and at international peace negotiations. By the spring of 1993, however, Miloševi? was under enormous pressure from western sanctions, and he was forced to withdraw his support for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. In May 1993 Karadži? was induced to agree to the Vance-Owen plan, which provided for the cantonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but stipulated that it must be ratified by the Pale Assembly. Two hardliners, Biljana Plavši? (b. 1930) and Mom?ilo Krajišnik (b. 1945), engineered a veto, egged on by Mladi?. From then on, Karadži? increasingly faded from public view, but he did attempt a bold personal initiative in December 1994. Through a medical-school friend in the United States, he contrived to bring former U.S. president Jimmy Carter (b. 1924) to Sarajevo to negotiate an end to the war, and once more Karadži?'s headquarters at Pale became the focus of intense media attention. Why the initiative failed is a matter of debate, but Karadži? emerges from the episode with unexpected credit, given the picture often painted of him as an intransigent nationalist and major war criminal. It is of interest to note that by this time his relations with Mladi?, who was now entering a phase of wild defiance of international opinion in his brutal conduct of the war, had broken down completely.

The extent of Karadži?'s culpability for genocide and war crimes remains to be decided at The Hague, where he is indicted on two counts of genocide and nine other grave charges of violations of human rights. Whatever the outcome, all the evidence is that Karadži? was, and remains, a charismatic and popular figure among the Bosnian Serbs. The Dayton Agreements left the Republika Srpska intact, and as of 2006 its people are probably hiding him still, after nine years on the run. Karadži? championed the right of the Serbs to self-determination in the face of what he saw as the breakup of Yugoslavia by outside powers, and they will not easily give him up.

See alsoBosnia-Herzegovina; Crime and Justice; Miloševi?, Slobodan; Mladi?, Ratko; Montenegro; Sarajevo; Serbia; Yugoslavia .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allcock, John B., Marko Milivojevi?, and John J. Horton, eds. Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: An Encyclopedia. Denver, Colo., 1998.

Bulatovi?, Ljiljana. Radovan. Beograd, 2002.

? avoški, Kosta. The Hague against Justice Revisited: The Case of Dr. Radovan Karadži?. Belgrade, 1997.

Moon, Paul. The Shadow of Radovan Karadzic: An Investigation of a War Criminal. Palmerston North, New Zealand, 1998.

O'Shea, Brendan. Perception and Reality in the Modern Yugoslav Conflict: Myth, Falsehood, and Deceit 1991–1995. New York, 2005. Has a great deal of interest to say about the character and conduct of Karadži?, in the context of a survey of the war in Bosnia written by someone close to events.

United Nations. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Available at http://www.un.org/icty/.

Leslie Benson

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