Chesapeake Bay

CHESAPEAKE BAY. By 1780, the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, lancing deep into the American countryside, seemed to fix the attention of Sir Henry Clinton, commander of the army that was attempting to subjugate Britain's thirteen rebellious colonies. Immediately following the conflict's eruption, skirmishes ashore and afloat had dotted the region, while a major British amphibious force raided the bay for two weeks with near impunity in 1779. As Clinton's southern campaign developed, especially following the capture of Charleston, South Carolina, the need for a deepwater port midway between the northern bastion of New York and the newly captured city seemed obvious. If such a port could serve as an enclave for recruiting local Tories, raiding rebel farms and plantations, or even regaining control of the colony, so much the better.

In late October 1780, the Royal Navy landed Major General Alexander Leslie and 2,500 men on the Elizabeth River with orders to establish a fortified harbor after raiding as far inland as Petersburg and Richmond, sites of major rebel supply depots. Leslie, finding virtually no support from local Loyalists, opted to seize the harbor at Portsmouth, Virginia, and to begin raiding only after fortifying it as his base. Before his entrenchments could be completed, General Charles Cornwallis, directly commanding British operations in the south, ordered Leslie to the Cape Fear region of North Carolina and then to Charleston to serve as a garrison force. By late November, the British presence in the Chesapeake Bay evaporated. Somewhat frustrated by Cornwallis's decision, Clinton immediately began planning another expedition to the region, issuing orders which would lead to the first of two major naval engagements and, eventually, to a world turned upside down.

PRELUDE TO BATTLE

On 11 July 1780, a French squadron of seven ships of the line, transports carrying around five thousand French soldiers, and supporting vessels anchored at Newport, Rhode Island. It posed little immediate threat to Clinton's strongly defended base at New York. Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, commanding the British fleet, did not fear to engage the French at sea, especially after reinforcements under Rear Admiral Thomas Graves arrived hard on the heels of the enemy force. The inherent strength of the British defensive positions at New York and the numerical superiority of Arbuthnot's ships of the line eliminated an immediate tactical threat, but the strategic location of Newport, with its difficult-to-blockade approaches, threatened to allow French interference with other British operations, especially in the south.

In truth, a quick amphibious assault against the French position may well have resulted in the utter destruction of the French forces, but their arrival found Clinton and Arbuthnot in the midst of an ongoing dispute over prize money dating to the capture of Charleston. Bitter feeling plagued their relationship, and neither was willing to give ground or full support to the other. In September, Admiral Sir George Rodney brought in the bulk of his fleet from the West Indies to avoid the hurricane season in the Caribbean. This worsened the rivalry, because Rodney refused to support either man and further alienated Arbuthnot by claiming overall naval command while in New York. Despite the tremendous naval superiority in American waters gained by Rodney's arrival, nothing had been accomplished by the time his fleet sailed back to the West Indies in mid-November except the stripping of spars, cables, and naval stores from New York.

With the departure of Rodney and the apparent return of Georgia and South Carolina to British control, Clinton determined to establish a permanent presence in Virginia. Brigadier General Benedict Arnold, late of the Continental army, landed at Westover, on the Chesapeake, on 4 January 1781. Within a matter of days, his forces had burned most of Richmond, Virginia, along with cannon foundries, supply depots, and anything else of value in the region. He then moved to Portsmouth, settling into the lines begun by Leslie the previous year. In late January, Arnold requested an additional 2,000 men, bringing his detachment to more than 3,500, for defense against the numerous rebels gathering around Portsmouth and to keep a raiding force active in the region. If he could not be reinforced, he suggested withdrawal to New York.

The danger posed by the French lodgment at Newport became evident in late January, when the 64-gun Eveille and two frigates escaped British blockaders. Graves, commanding the squadron on blockade, dispatched three ships of the line in pursuit. Caught by a harsh winter storm, the seventy-four gun HMS Bedford lost its masts, while HMS Culloden, another seventy-four gun ship, drove ashore on Long Island. Through heroic efforts its masts and rigging were saved to refit Bedford. The sixty-four gun HMS America was damaged in spars and hull and eventually returned to its anchorage. Meanwhile, the French raiders reached the Chesapeake, capturing a few merchantmen and the fourth-rate, 44-gun HMS Romulus. Without troops, however, the French could accomplish little against Arnold before returning to Newport.

Yet, the raid set forces in motion. The loss of Culloden and the addition of Romulus to the French squadron gave its commander, Captain Charles-Rene-Dominique Gochet Destouches (serving as commodore of the squadron since the loss of his admiral to fever), equality in hulls, if not in armament. It also encouraged General George Washington to dispatch Major General Marquis de Lafayette to the Chesapeake with 1,200 Continentals. By 3 March Lafayette's force rested on the Elk River, waiting hopefully for French naval transport to arrive. Meanwhile, as Arbuthnot worked feverishly to repair his ships from the same dockyard that had been stripped a few months previously by Rodney's vessels, Clinton organized men and transports to reinforce Arnold. Captain Destouches worked just as feverishly, cramming 1,120 soldiers with their equipment and supplies aboard his warships.

Destouches and his squadron—seven ships of the line, the fourth-rate Romulus, the sixty-four gun Fantasque armed en flute and two frigates—sailed on 8 March. Their disappearance was discovered by the British the following day. Arbuthnot's squadron—seven ships of the line, the fourth-rate Adamant, and three frigates—completed its repairs and upped anchor on 12 March. Clinton's transports, filled with over 2,000 men and their supplies and escorted by eight warships, followed on 20 March.

THE ENGAGEMENT

Heavy seas, strong wind, and variable visibility marked 16 March 1781 in the Atlantic waters off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. Around 0600 hours, the frigate Iris, covering the rear of the British squadron, signaled the presence of the French force astern. The coppered bottoms of the British ships, which retarded the growth of weed and other sea life that could reduce ship speed, had allowed them to outpace the French ships, many of which lacked this maritime innovation. With the wind from the west, Arbuthnot immediately maneuvered to seek the weather gauge (a ship standing between the wind and an enemy ship is said to have the weather gauge, because it can determine the pace of the subsequent engagement). By 7 a.m., both squadrons had moved from their loose sailing formations to lines of battle (see table).

In each squadron's case, the line of battle would stretch for a mile on a day when visibility often fell below that distance. As to the lesser ships in the action, Iris maintained watch over the French, while Arbuthnot stationed his remaining frigates as repeaters (flag officers often stationed ships too small to stand in the line of battle on the side of the squadron away from the enemy in order to repeat flag hoists to the squadron). The French frigates apparently covered the Fantasque during the action. As usual in such affairs, all stood clear of enemy broadsides that could shatter or sink them in an instant.

Initially, Destouches, his ability to work or fight his ships impaired by the soldiers crowding their decks, sought to avoid action by fleeing northeastward. As the faster British fleet steadily reduced his lead and the wind began to veer to the north then to the northeast, Destouches surrendered to the inevitable and wore his ships to face the British. By noon both fleets bore southeastward, with the French holding the weather gauge and Robust rapidly drawing abreast of Romulus.

Usually, holding the weather gauge provided a strong advantage. However, with heavy seas and strong winds, as on 16 March, a ship heeling to the wind buried its lower-deck gunports on the leeward side (the side away from the wind) in the waves, rendering those guns unusable. Destouches, realizing that the weather gauge merely increased British superiority in guns, decided to surrender it to the enemy. At 1: 30 p.m. hours he ordered his ships to wear in succession around the head of the British line to a roughly westerly course. Arbuthnot, his line already extended from the morning's maneuvers, wore his ships as well and gained the weather gauge at the price of losing his advantage in number of guns. By 1400 hours, both fleets sailed a parallel course toward the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay. Arbuthnot kept his signal for "Line Ahead" flying, (a flag hoist instructing all ships to sail in a single column) apparently waiting for the ships at the rear of his line to resume station and intervals before hoisting "Engage the Enemy Closely."

But shortly after 2. p.m., and for reasons unknown, Captain Phillips Cosby steered his Robust directly toward the Neptune. As French fire concentrated on the Robust, the Europe and Prudent turned out of line to support it. Very quickly, the British flagship and the London entered the fray as well, clouds of smoke obscuring ships and signals. Unfortunately, Arbuthnot neglected to change his signal flag, and the remaining three British vessels, unaware of his desires, maintained their current course rather than closing in on the French rear.

Five British and eight French ships fought a chaotic battle inside the great cloud of smoke arising from their broadsides. British ships tended to fire at an enemy's hull, reducing their foe's firepower and weakening the ship's crew for eventual boarding. French doctrine called for the destruction of an enemy's rigging and masts, allowing French captains to eventually achieve a raking position, thus forcing the surrender of a drifting hulk. In this engagement, the upper-deck guns of Arbuthnot's ships fired with telling effect, as evidenced by the steady flow of blood from the scuppers of Conquerant, but French practice triumphed as the Robust, Europe, and Prudent soon drifted from the action with their rigging, spars, and even masts shot away.

Less than an hour after the first shot, Destouches decided to preserve his squadron and broke off southward. Arbuthnot, with damage to spars and sails on the Royal Oak and London almost as severe as that of his three lead ships, could not pursue. Instead he limped into Chesapeake Bay, securing it for the reinforcement convoy's eventual arrival.

CONCLUSIONS

Although Destouches clearly outperformed Arbuthnot in what came to be known as the battle of Cape Henry, he failed to secure the Chesapeake Bay for the Franco-American cause. Yet, Destouches's decision to abandon the action even after his maneuvers and British confusion provided a decided advantage is understandable. His ships, though in no danger of foundering, had been roughly handled by British broadsides. A continuation of the action may have resulted in a major victory, but the French navy lacked a dockyard in North America to repair damage to the squadron, much less any prizes captured. A Pyrrhic victory would have left the reduced and damaged French squadron blockaded, whether at an anchorage in the Chesapeake or at Newport. The soldiers packed between the decks of the French ships also weighed heavily on Destouches's mind. A protracted battle would have seen even more of them dead, perhaps in their hundreds, when delivering those same troops actually formed the core of his mission.

By denying the Chesapeake to the French, Arbuthnot won a tactical victory despite his poor performance in the battle. An admiral exists to control squadron and fleet operations. By failing to engage his entire fleet against the French line, Arbuthnot came very close to defeat. Even so, his tactical victory contributed to a strategic fallacy. By securing the Chesapeake, Arbuthnot validated Clinton's enclave strategy. That validation ultimately led directly to the British defeat at Yorktown, wherein another British fleet failed to gain control of the bay. In the final analysis, neither side lost ships during the engagement. The British suffered 30 killed and 73 wounded. The French, because of crowded conditions and the British concentration on hull damage, lost 72 killed and 112 wounded.

SEE ALSO Arbuthnot, Marriot; Destouches, Charles René Dominique Sochet; Graves, Thomas; Naval Operations, British; Naval Operations, French; Rodney, George Bridges.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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                             revised by Wade G. Dudley