Berlin Airlift
Berlin Airlift (1948–49).The Soviet blockade of Berlin was triggered by Allied currency reforms opposed by Josef Stalin as a step toward unification and reindustrialization of the American, British, and French occupation zones of Germany. The blockade started on 22 June 1948, when the Soviets shut off ground access from the west to the occupation zones in Berlin. It triggered a vast airlift to supply the estimated 4,500 tons needed daily to maintain the West Berlin industry and population of 2 million.
An ad hoc effort by the USAF, using C‐47 transport planes, and aided by the RAF, developed into an armada of service and civilian planes, two‐thirds U.S. and one‐third British. The backbone of the movement became four‐engined American C‐54s, and British Yorks and Hermes manned by World War II–qualified aircrews. U.S. operations began under Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Europe commander, but he was succeeded by Maj. Gen. William N. Tunner, who had commanded the American airlift over “the Hump” between India and China in World War II. To keep the planes and supplies moving, loading was cut to 1 hour 25 minutes, while unloading in Berlin took a mere 49 minutes. Soviet fighters harassed the cargo planes, but did not shoot. Most hazardous was the weather; this was overcome by ground‐controlled approaches handled by radar operators who reduced landing gaps to three minutes rain or shine, and by the use of Rebecca/Eureka homing radar, as well as new Calvert sodium approach lights. With a roundtrip distance of 274–565 miles, depending upon the base and corridor used, planes did not have to refuel in Berlin.
By September 1948, the American effort was handled by 319 C‐54 Skymasters—225 in service and the rest undergoing maintenance or repair. The British No. 46 Group operated a more mixed force, including Sunderland flying boats, from eight airfields and one water base. The Americans operated out of Frankfurt and Wiesbaden; both Gatow and Tempelhof in Berlin, as well as bases in the west, had to be rapidly expanded. By 12 May 1949, when the Soviets lifted the blockade, 1,783,000 tons had been flown with a loss of thirty‐one U.S. lives in twelve fatal accidents. Flights totaling 250,000 continued on into October to build up stocks for the coming winter.
The Berlin Airlift proved the West would maintain its position in Berlin even at the risk of war. The airlift was a public relations victory for the peaceful use of airpower, heightening the reputation of the U.S. Military Airlift Command and of Generals LeMay and Tunner.
[See also Berlin Crises; Cold War: External Course; Germany, U.S. Military Involvement in.]
An ad hoc effort by the USAF, using C‐47 transport planes, and aided by the RAF, developed into an armada of service and civilian planes, two‐thirds U.S. and one‐third British. The backbone of the movement became four‐engined American C‐54s, and British Yorks and Hermes manned by World War II–qualified aircrews. U.S. operations began under Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Europe commander, but he was succeeded by Maj. Gen. William N. Tunner, who had commanded the American airlift over “the Hump” between India and China in World War II. To keep the planes and supplies moving, loading was cut to 1 hour 25 minutes, while unloading in Berlin took a mere 49 minutes. Soviet fighters harassed the cargo planes, but did not shoot. Most hazardous was the weather; this was overcome by ground‐controlled approaches handled by radar operators who reduced landing gaps to three minutes rain or shine, and by the use of Rebecca/Eureka homing radar, as well as new Calvert sodium approach lights. With a roundtrip distance of 274–565 miles, depending upon the base and corridor used, planes did not have to refuel in Berlin.
By September 1948, the American effort was handled by 319 C‐54 Skymasters—225 in service and the rest undergoing maintenance or repair. The British No. 46 Group operated a more mixed force, including Sunderland flying boats, from eight airfields and one water base. The Americans operated out of Frankfurt and Wiesbaden; both Gatow and Tempelhof in Berlin, as well as bases in the west, had to be rapidly expanded. By 12 May 1949, when the Soviets lifted the blockade, 1,783,000 tons had been flown with a loss of thirty‐one U.S. lives in twelve fatal accidents. Flights totaling 250,000 continued on into October to build up stocks for the coming winter.
The Berlin Airlift proved the West would maintain its position in Berlin even at the risk of war. The airlift was a public relations victory for the peaceful use of airpower, heightening the reputation of the U.S. Military Airlift Command and of Generals LeMay and Tunner.
[See also Berlin Crises; Cold War: External Course; Germany, U.S. Military Involvement in.]
Bibliography
Charles D. Bright , Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Air Force, 1992.
Robin Higham
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Berlin Airlift