LI

LI . The homophones li and li, two distinct Chinese graphs, are seminal concepts in Chinese moral philosophy and metaphysics. Although they are both pronounced the same in the modern Beijing dialect, they differed in ancient pronunciation and were originally unrelated: one li, meaning "principle," terminated in the consonant sound g, according to Karlgren's reconstruction, while the other, meaning "rites," ended in the consonant sound r. While the meaning and usage of these terms converge to some extent, they will be discussed separately in this article.

Li as Principle

The root graph for this li combines the elements "field divided into sections for planting" with "earth," and means "village." To this is added the element "jade," in consequence of a derived meaning—thought by later philosophers to be the original sense—"cut and polish jade" so as to make its inner pattern of veins visible. The original meaning as found in the Shi jing (Classic of odes), however, apparently was to mark out divisions in a field for planting, and so to organize it for agricultural work. Thus li has the senses "put in order," "govern," and the resulting (good) "order" in society, as well as "inner structure." In antiquity these senses already converge in the sense "natural order or structure."

In the Mengzi the word occurs in a moral sense in the term li yi, "order and right," which Mengzi says is what "all human hearts have in common" and what naturally "pleases" our moral sensibility (6A.7). By the early Han dynasty, the term had gone through a semantic evolution: from just "patterns observable here and now" to patterns in temporal extention; hence a pattern developing through history; hence potential or ideal as well as what is actual; hence not only patterns observed in particulars but also general patterns in types or classes; and hence also one overarching pattern through time, branching out from a simple beginning to the complexity of observables in the present; thus both one and many, both explanatory and normative. The Huainanzi (c. 130 bce) says, "As for the dao, when unity is established the myriad creatures are produced. For this reason, the li of unity permeates the entire world, and the expansion of unity reaches the bounds of Heaven and earth." This sense is further developed by Wang Bi (226–249), who speaks of zhi li ("ultimate li"), and Kuo Xiang (d. 312). However, one already finds the expression tian li ("heavenly" or "natural" li) in Zhuangzi and in the Li ji. Li thus approaches the sense of a single first "principle," intelligible but distinct from sensible phenomena, linked with dao and Heaven. It was not yet, perhaps, an object of religious awe.

The word acquired this religious sense when Buddhists, realizing its importance, appropriated it to refer to the primary object (and state) of saving contemplation. The Sūtra in Forty-two Sections (c. 100 ce) says that the saint who has cut ties to the world "attains to the deep li of Buddhahood," gaining enlightenment and nirvana. Zhi Dun (314–366) uses the word interchangeably with the Daoist wu ("nothing" or "nonbeing") and the Buddhist kong (Skt., śūnyatā ; "emptiness"), the ultimately real character ("divine li") of things. Still later, proponents of Huayan Buddhism such as Dushun (557–640), retreating from the negativistic Mādhyamika terminology of kong and se ("phenomena"), offered a dualism of li ("principle"?) and shi (things and events), in which li are both one and many, "pervading" and "pervaded by" shi, so that the one-and-many li of everything is instanced, for example, in each mote of dust.

The word next is repossessed by the Confucians of the Song and following dynasties; li is now both one and many, it becomes the object of religious veneration insofar as it is identified with their first principle, under various names and aspects—tai ji ("supreme ultimate"), dao ("way"), tian ("heaven"), and xing ("human nature"). In the dualism of Zheng Yi (1033–1108), li, "principle(s)," sometimes redescribed as dao, is "above form" (xing er shang ), while qi, "embodiments," are "within form" (xing er xia ). Different attempts were made to overcome this dualism by such thinkers as Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, and Dai Zhen; some of them (Lu, Wang, but also even Zheng Yi himself) identified li with xin ("mind"). Li is (are) both normative (dangran ) and explanatory-descriptive (so-i-jan ). As described by Zheng Yi and Zhu Xi, after long study (gewu, "investigating things") the Confucian sage attains a sudden unitary vision of all li. The concept is often illustrated by reference to natural objects; however, the Confucians usually have in mind the "principles" of social institutions and relationships.

Li as Rites

The graphic root of this li represents a type of ritual vessel (called a li), to which is added the graph for "altar stand," an element commonly marking graphs for religious objects or activities. The basic sense was "religious rite." By the time of the earliest moral-philosophical writings the term had already taken on an expanded meaning: not merely a rite in a religious ceremony, but formal, patterned behavior of any kind, from court ceremonial—and hence, the functions and duties of officials—to the ordinary forms of everyday polite behavior. In early Confucian writings great attention was paid to li in all senses; Confucius frequently complained about eminent people's use of ceremonials to which they were not by rank entitled. Some schools of his followers specialized in the study and practice of li. Of particular importance were observances for the dead, such as the three-year period of mourning for parents (Mengzi 3A.1–3).

As the meaning evolved during the first millennium bce two concurrent tendencies developed. First, there was a progressive secularization of certain originally religious concepts, not only "rite" but also Heaven (tian ). This latter term originally denoted an anthropomorphic deity, but by the third century bce it had become for many simply the physical heaven and the order of nature. The other tendency was a persisting sacralization of the concept of ordinary civilized behavior (Fingarette, 1972). Both of these developments came to fruition in the subtle moral philosophy of Xunzi, in whose writings the ubiquitous term li yi ("rites-and-right") means in effect "morality," much like renyi in Mencian thought. Xunzi was cognitively and explicitly atheist, yet attitudinally deeply religious, devoting a major chapter to the utility, beauty, and cosmic appropriateness of li. Earlier, Mengzi had taken li, in the sense of a disposition to propriety, as one of man's four natural virtues.

The different sorts and aspects of li were explained and cataloged in a group of the Confucian classics that probably date from Han times (with older material): the Zhou li, on the organization of the early Zhou state and functions of its officers; the Yi li, on ceremonies in everyday life; and the Li ji, which contains miscellaneous treatises on ritual and related moral-philosophical matters, and which was probably the cumulative product of Han court specialists on ritual.

Li has continued to have a double importance in Confucian moral thought. On the one hand, its observance is evidence of the moral health of society or of the individual. On the other hand, observing the rites is thought to develop moral character and the moral health of society (see Ouyang Xiu's Ben lun ). The li, therefore, are thought of as the patterns of behavior of a good society, a good government, or a good life.

In this sense the concept overlaps with the li meaning "pattern" or "principle." The convergence of li and li was noticed by Xunzi: "Music [i.e., the standard modes and traditional pieces] is harmonies that are unchangeable; rites [li ] are patterns [li ] that are unalterable" (Xunzi, chap. 20). That is, the rites are forms of social behavior that are valid throughout history. Much later, Wang Yangming offers a very different idea. In his Chuanxii lu (Instructions for practical living) Wang argues that "li [rites] means li [principle]," because "restraining oneself with li [rites]" means that "this mind" must become completely identified with the "principle of nature," the li of Heaven (3.9).

See Also

Confucianism; Ren and Yi; Tian.

Bibliography

Chan, Wing-tsit. "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept of Li as Principle." Tsing-hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s. 4 (February 1964): 123–148.

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Graham, A. C. Two Chinese Philosophers: Ch'êng Ming-tao and Ch'êng Yi-ch'uan. London, 1958.

Moran, Patrick Edwin. "Explorations of Chinese Metaphysical Concepts: The History of Some Key Terms from the Beginnings to Chu Hsi (1130–1200)." Ph. D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1983.

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David S. Nivison (1987)