Deconstruction
DECONSTRUCTION
DECONSTRUCTION . The word deconstruction was coined by French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), with whom the movement of that same name is identified. Derrida rejects the classical anthropological model of language, according to which the speaking subject gives verbal expression to inner thoughts that are subsequently written down. In such a model, writing is a sign of speaking; speaking is a sign of thinking; and thinking is a sign of being. Instead, Derrida follows the structuralist thesis of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), which posits that language is to be understood scientifically as a purely formal system of signs (langue) internally related to one another (like a dictionary in which one word is defined by other words) and underlying the utterances of speaking subjects (parole), thus eliminating both the subjective-psychological and objective-metaphysical factors. In Saussure's model, signifiers are arbitrary (the word king has no natural likeness to a real king) and differential (they differ by the "space" between, say, king and ring ). The signified is the effect produced by the rule-governed use of signifiers. Derrida's thought is post-structuralist; it criticizes Saussure for privileging speech over writing, in violation of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, and for treating linguistic strings as closed systems of fixed structures. Metaphors and wordplay illustrate the uncontainable capacity of linguistic chains to network out indefinitely in new directions, pushing endlessly against the limits imposed by the rules. Derrida encapsulated his adaptation of Saussure in the neologism différance, French philosophy's most famous misspelling. The idea is to keep networks open-ended, to resist their tendencies to closure, in order to allow new and unforeseen effects.
Deconstruction is not a settled body of substantive theses or positions but a style of thinking that applies in any field of inquiry, theoretical or practical, by virtue of which any present set of beliefs or practices is held to be indefinitely revisable (deconstructible) in the light of something unrevisable (undeconstructible). Inasmuch as the undeconstructible is never actually present or realized, the undeconstructible is also said to be "the impossible." According to Derrida, the least bad definition of deconstruction is the "experience of the impossible." "Least bad" because, in deconstruction, which is resolutely anti-essentialist (nominalistic), words have only a relatively stable unity of meaning, shifting histories of use, and no fixed or defined borders. Derrida uses the word experience in the sense not of empirical data gathering but of running up against something unexpected, even traumatic. "The impossible" does not mean a simple logical contradiction, such as (p & ~p ), but something that shatters the horizon of expectation, that is not accountable (or possible) under prevailing presuppositions.
The same sense is conveyed when Derrida describes deconstruction as the "invention of the other." Invention has the more literal sense of "coming upon" and even of "incoming" (Latin, in-veniens ), running up against something that comes in upon or comes over us, overwhelming our powers of anticipation. By the "other," Derrida means not the relatively other—that is, new evidence confirming an existing horizon—but the "wholly other" (tout autre), a phrase he borrows from the Jewish ethicist Emmanuel Levinas, meaning something unforeseeable, unrepresentable, for which we have no concept. A deconstructive analysis thus prepares the way for or explores "the possibility of the impossible." Jean-François Lyotard makes a comparable distinction between making a new move in an old game (the possible or relatively other) and inventing a new game altogether (the impossible or wholly other). That, in turn, invites comparison with Thomas Kuhn's distinction between normal science, which makes new discoveries within an existing paradigm, and revolutionary science, when an anomaly forces a fundamental reconfiguration of the current schema, resulting in a "paradigm shift."
Derrida has recourse to a family of venir ("to come") words picked up in English in both Latinate (invention) and Anglo-Saxon forms (coming). Deconstruction is turned to the "incoming," the invention, or the advent, of the "event," which is a unique and "singular" happening, not an instance or example of a universal (Derrida's idea of "singularity" is derived from Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Levinas). The event defies convention, where everything is regularized and routinized. Deconstructive thinking is guided by the invocation "come" (viens), which Derrida has not hesitated to call a certain "prayer," by which he means a deep desire or love of the event to come, which is not without anxiety since the future is also an absolute risk. The motif of the "come" clearly has messianic overtones that Derrida acknowledged in later, more autobiographical, essays like "Circumfession," where he reflects on his birth as a Jew and on his early life in a Jewish family in French Algeria. The motifs of love and desire have overtones of Augustine's cor inquietum, of what Derrida calls the "prayers and tears of Augustine," which also surface in these same essays about his life in the Franco-Christian colony that is the historic land of Augustine.
The word deconstruction, which has the predominantly negative sense of disassembling something, is clearly not the best word for this deeply affirmative mode of thinking. Coined by Derrida as a translation of Heidegger's Destruktion, and used by him to characterize his own work, it owes its currency just as much to commentators who seized upon it. Heidegger himself was likely referring to Martin Luther's use of destructio, which itself goes back to 1 Corinthians 1:19. Just as for Luther, destroying the wisdom of the wise meant nothing destructive, but rather the recovery of the original sense of scripture by breaking through the crust of Scholastic theology. And just as Heidegger did not mean anything negative but rather the recovery of the unthought sense of "being" that was hidden in the history of metaphysics, so Derrida does not mean anything negative, but rather the releasing of the possibility of the impossible, or the coming of the event, that threatens to be closed off by conventional interpretation and practices. While the word has entered the general vocabulary (e.g., "deconstructing Woody Allen") with the negative sense of knocking down and exposing faults, to deconstruct something in Derrida's sense is not to ruin it but to give it a history, to open it up to a future. Something that is insulated from deconstruction is not protected but petrified, having hardened over into a dogma, like a law that could never be reformed or repealed. The word enjoyed, or suffered from, a succès de scandale, particularly in American literary theory circles in the 1970s, where it seemed to invite a kind of interpretive anarchy that licensed any interpretation, however bizarre. When Derrida protested against such interpretations, critics thought him involved in the self-contradiction of insisting that his own texts should be interpreted carefully, thus refuting his own theory that anything goes.
In fact, careful reading is what deconstruction is all about. A philosophical theory with wider implications, deconstruction first gained ascendancy in the 1960s and 1970s as a literary theory. A deconstructive reading settles deeply into the grain of a text, sensitizing itself to its tropes and metaphors, its choice of words, the chains in which those words are caught up, and the complex and even anonymous operations of the linguistic system in which the author is working, in order to show that the text contains an unmasterable complexity—dissemination —that cannot be contained by the author's own intentions or conscious logic. Thus, Derrida's well-known critique of "logo-centrism." Derrida's frequent use of puns and wordplay is not a substitute for an argument but an exemplification of a theory about wordplay, which illustrates the unmasterable, unintended dimension of language, the semantic, graphic, and phonic chains that no intentional agent can contain. James Joyce, an early hero of Derrida's, embodies this point about language almost perfectly. This disseminative effect is not something that a clever writer or reader is doing to the text, exerting a kind of violence or mastery over it, but an auto-deconstructive operation going on within the linguistic network itself.
That this is not interpretive anarchy but responsible work, Derrida thinks, is clear to anyone who reads carefully. Anyone who reads Greek philosophy carefully knows that there is all the difference between "Plato," a shorthand for a cluster of condensed philosophical theses, summarized and passed along in prepackaged histories of philosophy, and a close, careful reading of or immersion into Plato's writings, which reveals multiple voices, dramatic devices, conflicting and suggestive counter-motifs, and loose threads—in short, a "text," a highly woven and interwoven complex, not a neatly argued "book" under the absolute conscious control of an "author." We might add that anyone who has studied the Jewish or Christian scriptures carefully will understand that these are "texts" in just this sense; that is, a complex weave (or "palimpsest") of many voices, competing theological and political agendas, redactive layerings, anonymous interventions, lost stories, liturgies, and multiple extra-textual references or reinscriptions of earlier texts, texts without fixed "margins." In the same way, conservative critics charge deconstruction with being out to destroy "tradition," but Derrida would respond that he only wants to show its immense complexity and competing voices; there is no such thing as "tradition" in the singular but rather an interweaving of many traditions and counter-traditions, of dominant and recessive voices, and even of chance mutations in manuscripts. Close readings of the past—the uncovering of forgotten women, for example—opens up hitherto closed possibilities for the future. Deconstruction is very conservative, Derrida once quipped, because the only way to love and be loyal to the past is to deconstruct it.
Although Derrida's avant-garde style of writing, especially early on, lent superficial credibility to the misinterpretation of deconstruction as a form of relativism or even nihilism, no one today can mistake the sustained seriousness of the later writings, whose ethical, political, and even religious character is beyond doubt. Reading his account of the "gift without return" or "forgiving the unforgivable," more informed critics today will accuse him of a Kantian rigorism or unrealistic ethical purism, an accusation that he also rejects. From the early 1980s on, Derrida has written not only about the gift and forgiveness, but about justice and the law, hospitality, friendship, democracy, capital punishment, and international human rights. In 2003 he published Voyous, a book about the denunciation of "rogue states" by the Western democracies.
Religious thinkers are fascinated by a distinction Derrida introduced in the 1990s between the concrete "messianisms"—the three great monotheistic religions of the book, as well as the philosophical eschatologies of G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and Heidegger—and the pure "messianic" or "messianicity." The pure messianic means the formal structure of desire, expectancy, or openness, the pure structure of the "to come" (à venir) —like the hospitality to come, the justice to come, and, most famously, the "democracy to come"—that is concretized in the historical messianisms. In virtue of the pure messianic, one can speak of a "religion without religion," a religious desire without confessional dogma or institutional ties. The "democracy to come" is not a Kantian regulative ideal, which brings a concept to ideal completion beyond its empirical limits, because, for Derrida, democracy is not a concept or an essence on which we are making asymptotic progress, but a moment in the open-endedness of history that makes possible an event, whose coming cannot be foreseen and whose name is not known, and where nothing guarantees that it will not bring forth a monster instead of a messiah. "Secular" political theory, and philosophy generally, is always transcribing an "unavowed theologeme," like the messianic promise, thus skewing any rigorous distinction between the religious and secular, faith and reason, religion and the nonreligious, prayer and social hope, theism and atheism.
This is not to say that religious thinkers were not interested in deconstruction from the start. The early essay "Differance" (1967) started a discussion with negative theology that dominated the dialogue between deconstruction and theology until the late 1990s. As Derrida says, he loves the syntax, semantics, and the tropes of negative theology, which is a self-effacing discourse, a discourse that attempts to erase its own traces. Beyond matters of style, the critique of the metaphysics of presence in deconstruction (what is present is deconstructible; the undeconstructible is never present) bears a substantive analogy to the critique of idols in apophatic theology (if you comprehend it, it is not God; if it is God, you cannot comprehend it). Nonetheless, while negative theology clearly uses deconstructive techniques, deconstruction is not negative theology, because it has no commitment to a hyperousios, to a Godhead beyond God or a God beyond being. The exchange between Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion is the most important in this regard.
In the 1980s, deconstruction was appropriated by the theology of the "death of God," most notably in Mark C. Taylor's Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (1984). Taylor argued that the first wave of death-of-God thinking in the nineteenth century left the old God standing under the new name of Humanity. Deconstruction is the true hermeneutics of the death of God because it has displaced any absolute center, human or divine, with the free play of signifiers. God has descended into the world without remainder, even as scripture has descended into écriture without remainder, a reading that reflected the Nietzschean understanding of Derrida then dominant in American departments of literature. Since then a different appreciation of the religious dimension of deconstruction has emerged in thinkers such as John Caputo, Kevin Hart, and Hent de Vries, for whom deconstruction is the hermeneutics not of the death but of the desire for God.
See Also
Heidegger, Martin; Literature, article on Critical Theory and Religious Studies; Structuralism.
Bibliography
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Caputo, John D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion. Bloomington, Ind., 1997.
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Derrida, Jacques. "Circumfession: Fifty-nine Periods and Periphrases." In Jacques Derrida, by Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, translated by Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago, 1993.
Derrida, Jacques. On the Name. Edited by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford, Calif., 1995.
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Derrida, Jacques. "On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida." In Questioning God, edited by Mark Dooley, Michael Scanlon, and John D. Caputo. Bloomington, Ind., 2001.
Derrida, Jacques. Acts of Religion. Edited by Gil Anidjar. London and New York, 2002.
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Derrida, Jacques, and Jean-Luc Marion. "On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion." In God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, edited by John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon. Bloomington, Ind., 1999.
de Vries, Hent. Philosophy and the Turn to Religion. Baltimore, 1999.
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John D. Caputo (2005)
