SUPREME COURT

The War for Independence created a new nation, which the Supreme Court helped to shape. Authorized by the federal Constitution (ratified in 1788) and formed by the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court was expected by some to be the weakest of the three branches of government. In the next forty years, however, as it dealt with the legacies of the Revolutionary War, the nation's territorial expansion, and issues of diplomacy, war, trade, and economic development, the Court played a key role in establishing the foundations for American society and culture.

legacies of the revolution

One of the tasks resulting from the War for Independence and facing the Supreme Court was the definition of American citizenship, which was essential for resolving litigation involving the prosecution of treason and the confiscation of property during that war. Looking to state procedures, the Court determined the date at which residents of a state were required to choose between loyalty to Great Britain and adherence to their revolutionary state government. After that date, individuals who remained in the state and accepted its protection would be considered citizens and thus subject to prosecution for treason if they joined in warfare against their state. However, some property rights, such as a married woman's right to dower in her husband's real estate, were not affected by a spouse's treasonable or disloyal actions.

During the American Revolution, most state governments enacted laws seizing the real or personal property of inhabitants who remained loyal to the British crown, and other state legislation canceled the debts Americans owed to British mercantile firms, but the Peace Treaty of 1783, as subsequently strengthened by the Jay Treaty of 1794, raised serious questions about the validity of these state actions. The debt cancellation issue was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1796, when it held that the states could not impede the collection of debts owed to British merchants when the federal government had by treaty guaranteed that these obligations would be paid (Ware v. Hylton, 1796). However, for over thirty years after the end of the Revolution the seizure of real property and the attempted forfeiture of land by state inheritance laws remained in litigation until the Supreme Court's decisions in 1812 and 1816 (Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 1812; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1816). After closely examining the treaty provisions and state confiscation procedures, the Court held that when the transfer of title had been completed prior to the ratification of the peace treaty the state's action would be irrevocable; however, if the seizure was still in process at the time the treaty came into effect, the state's action was contrary to international law and hence invalid.

expansion, war, and federal authority

During John Marshall's tenure as chief justice of the Supreme Court (1801–1835), the United States embarked on what was then often described as its Manifest Destiny: to expand across the North American continent through the acquisition of new territories by purchase and conquest. The most notable and largest acquisition before 1824 was the Louisiana Purchase (1803). Although the Constitution authorized Congress to make rules for the administration of federal territories, it was silent concerning the legal and constitutional requirements for annexation except to the extent that treaties were perhaps authorized for this purpose. Although the Louisiana Purchase's constitutionality was never presented to the Court, the 1819 treaty acquiring Florida from Spain required the Court to rule on the issue. In American and Ocean Insurance v. Canter (1829), the Court indirectly approved of the annexation of Florida, giving judicial sanction to the purchase. Increasingly, the duty to protect settlers, maintain order, and govern territories fell to the military and naval departments of the federal government.

In the first three decades after the Constitution was ratified, the Napoleonic Wars resulted in American commercial ships being seized by both England and France, triggering a quasi-war with France (1797–1800) and outright war with Britain (1812–1815). The Supreme Court became heavily involved in establishing an American law concerning prize cases—the capture and forfeiture of enemy vessels as a result of economic warfare between warring nations. Under international law, the existence of hostilities justified the capture of enemy vessels. Hostilities also validated the seizure of neutral merchant ships that violated international law by trading illegally or violating an established naval blockade. Admiralty courts could declare both the goods in the ship and the ship itself forfeit to the capturing vessel and

its crew. The practice was expanded by governmental commissions authorizing private ship owners to capture enemy ships and bring them into port for trial in admiralty courts. These entrepreneurs were called privateers, and wartime provided an excellent opportunity to establish a fortune through privateering.

An appeal caused Chief Justice John Marshall and his colleagues to review the prize cases decisions of lower federal courts. This jurisdiction in federal tribunals predated the Constitution's ratification (1788), and during the Confederation period had been exercised by a committee of the Continental Congress and after 1781 by a federal Court of Appeals in Cases a of Prize and Capture. It was a decision of the old federal court of appeals that almost resulted in military conflict between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the U.S. government; however, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict by its decision in U.S. v. Peters (1809). In its decree, the Marshall Court held that under the Articles of Confederation the federal court of appeals was empowered to review the decisions of the state admiralty courts. Furthermore, under the Constitution the new federal courts were required to enforce the decrees of the old federal court of appeals. This ruling confirmed the supremacy of the federal government in admiralty and maritime matters and validated the authority of the central government in the adjudication of prize cases.

Prior to the Civil War (1861–1865), the federal government maintained an extremely small military establishment, a situation based in part upon a distrust of standing armies inherited from the seventeenth-century English experience of government by Oliver Cromwell's major generals. The U.S. Constitution and supplementary legislation provided for state militia units, which under specified circumstances might be called into federal service to repel invasion or suppress riots. A 1795 congressional statute began the process of training militia units to meet federal standards, but the division of state and federal authority remained unclear. Some of the difficulties are shown by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Houston v. Moore (1820), which dealt with a Pennsylvania militia private who refused to appear for his unit's rendezvous during the War of 1812. For this offense he was court-martialed, convicted, and fined by the state. Houston argued that the state court-martial did not have jurisdiction because under the U.S. Constitution he was part of the military forces of the United States. The Supreme Court reasoned that the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this situation and that an offense might be subject to punishment by both the federal and state governments. The Houston case represents the beginning of a long line of cases that grew out of the dual and interconnected authority of the federal government and the states in militia command, training, and administration.

In its constitutional decisions, the Marshall Court made a major contribution in delineating the central government's authority. Foremost in this regard is the opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), which advanced the principle that although the federal government was limited in its scope it was supreme in areas where it exercised constitutional authority. Furthermore, Marshall pointed out that in addition to its enumerated powers the central government had all the constitutional authority that was "necessary and proper" to effectuate its exercise of the Constitution's enumerated powers. In the areas of war powers and the conduct of international diplomacy, the Marshall Court and its successors have tended to be deferential to the policy decisions made by the president and Congress.

economic growth and property rights

The decisions of the Marshall Court made significant changes in the nation's economic life. Essentially, the Court laid the legal and constitutional basis for a stable capitalist economy through the contract clause decisions (Fletcher v. Peck, 1810; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1819), thereby encouraging foreign investment. Stability and respect for private property rights were critical to the prosperity of the new nation. The Constitution's introduction of a nationwide common market, greatly advanced by the Marshall Court's broad construction of interstate commerce (Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824), lessened dependence upon foreign imports and also made the United States a desirable trading partner in the Atlantic world. Economic growth based on commerce and industrialization began the process of America's rise to world power and increased the need for military and naval organizations to defend expanding territorial limits and protect American national interests throughout the world.

The magnitude of the Marshall Court's achievements made the court an important branch of the federal government. At the same time that the Court grew in stature, it also enhanced federal power in matters of military, naval, and international concern. Although most of the legal and constitutional aspects of waging war were left for future Supreme Courts to resolve, the Court under Marshall made it clear that issues of federalism and separation of powers were to be resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States. As the military and naval forces of the United States grew in size and function, the Court would exercise growing authority concerning the war powers of the United States government.

bibliography

Currie, David P. The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789–1888. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Hawkins, George L., and Johnson, Herbert A. Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801–1815, vol. 2: History of the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1981.

Hobson, Charles F. The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996.

Johnson, Herbert A. The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801–1835. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997.

Kuttner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1970. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978.

White, G. Edward. The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–1835, vols. 3 and 4 in one: History of the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1988.

Herbert A. Johnson

See also:Supreme Court and War Powers; War of 1812.