Intelligence, Political and Military
Intelligence, Political and Military
Intelligence, Political and Military
Political and military intelligence refers primarily to evaluated information about the capabilities and intentions of foreign governments, about foreign areas in which a government may maintain a strategic interest, or about international relations in general. Because information in some form is required at every level of rational decision making, there are endless categories of specialized, functional information, such as economic, scientific, or biographic intelligence. Information may range from low-level “combat” or “tactical” to high-level “strategic” or “national” intelligence.
Intelligence is often used as a synonym for espionage, which is but one of many methods of collecting intelhgence data. Intelligence may also be confused with counterintelligence, a police and security function that is closely allied with and may be productive of intelligence information but is a separate function. Still further confusion results from the designation “intelhgence operations,” which refers to activities that constitute political intervention or subversion.
From the beginnings of national foreign policies, political and military intelligence has been indispensable to statesmen, diplomats, and soldiers. A body of evaluated information labeled strategic intelligence or national intelligence has come to be routinely required in the highest councils of modern governments in the process of setting national objectives, in policy making and planning, in choosing and applying policy instruments toward attaining objectives, and for evaluating results. With the increasing complexity of world politics and advancing technologies, intelhgence organizations have expanded enormously in size and have become professionalized and increasingly concerned with every field of economic, political, and social inquiry.
Few topics, however, have to be discussed with such extraordinarily limited access to and comprehension of essential facts. In all periods of history, intelligence organization, process, and product have been guarded government secrets. Those legitimately possessing facts about intelligence are sworn to secrecy. Intelligence analysts and operators are routinely organized in small compartments. Only a very few leaders are ever afforded a broad perspective of the process and substance of intelligence work. Although some intelhgence records are maintained, they are highly secret; other records are systematically destroyed. The United States Central Intelligence Agency, for example, neither confirms nor denies published reports, never explains its organization or identifies its personnel except at the highest echelons, and never publicly discusses its budget, methods of operation, or sources of information. Much that is public information is a result of intelligence failures, inadvertent disclosures, or speculation. While a growing volume of popular literature exists regarding various phases of intelhgence work, particularly espionage, systematic studies of intelligence are comparatively meager, considering the importance of the intelligence function and the fact that tens of thousands of individuals—many of them social scientists—are engaged in it. More is known about the United States intelligence system than any other because of the difficulty of maintaining secrecy in the American milieu. Even so, much of this information cannot be documented by the usual scholarly standards.
The need for knowledge of the external environment for planning and decision has been recognized since the beginnings of explicit political systems; indeed, it has always been a condition of rational political survival. Decision makers of the dynastic empires of the ancient world as well as the various governmental forms of the Middle Ages maintained intelligence systems. The medieval church utilized a complex secret intelligence apparatus for five centuries. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Mongols maintained an aggressive espionage system. But not until the advent of the great national states after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 did state intelligence bureaus begin to take modern form. During this period foreign ministers and cabinet secretaries began to devote major efforts to the acquisition by every feasible means of all knowledge of other states relevant to promoting national, particularly military, power. As Italian city-states and the larger country systems of the north began to maintain professional diplomats, create standing armies, and build colonial empires, rational foreign policies required a substantial body of political and military information.
With the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars came the period of explicitly national foreign policies, supported by citizen armies which went to war loyal to nationalistic objectives. The nature of war and military organization changed from limited class participation to involvement of the entire citizenry. Mass loyalty, morale, and degrees of identification with national policies and power became a direct object of concern to political and military leaders. Thus, the scope of the intelligence function broadened.
The creation of a systematically organized intelligence service along modern lines is widely credited to Frederick the Great. Under him, and later under Bismarck, the Prussians developed intelligence as an essential military staff function. By the late nineteenth century it had been adopted, after the Prussian model, by most other European nations. Balance-of-power politics, further advances in military technology, and the competitive war plans of the Continental powers required an increasing amount of the kind of information which sovereign nations were at greatest pains to conceal. Intelligence bureaus blossomed in Europe, and their heavy investment in espionage efforts provoked great counterintelligence activity. By the eve of World War I, Europe was covered by a complex network of espionage and counterespionage. Much of this was military rather than political intelligence activity. Most European nations developed a single military intelligence agency, which became the principal foreign intelligence arm. Even so, the available evidence suggests that leaders of the Great Powers entered the war with inefficient intelligence bureaus that supplied them with inadequate information. Not a single strategic action in the war was decisively influenced by any of the military espionage services (Rowan 1931, vol. 5, p. 595).
The political and military experiences of World War I and, more importantly, the advances in technology, particularly radio and aircraft—facilitating both information gathering and reporting—led to the growth and proliferation of intelligence agencies between the two world wars. Activity was further stimulated in the interwar years by the advent of dictatorships in Russia, Italy, Germany, and Japan, each with expansionist aims. These in turn produced defensive and counterintelligence organizations in the representative democracies.
World War II saw the creation of numerous intelligence services, military and political, and their expansion to unprecedented size and scope of operations. This was particularly so in the United States, which, in its previous isolation, had never developed large, permanent, professionalized intelligence services. With an advancing technology and particularly the advent of blitzkrieg tactics and strategic air warfare, intelligence agencies played a more crucial role than ever before. But generalizations are hazardous with regard to their over-all performance, so large was the size and so broad the scope of intelligence functions. Suffice it to say, there were great intelligence failures as well as successes on both sides in World War II. Significant techniques for intelligence analysis and prediction were developed, and social scientists in great numbers, particularly on the Allied side, were involved in these developments (Daugherty & Janowitz 1958; Jones 1947; Pettee 1946).
The major trends and patterns in world politics after World War II, particularly the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union to competitive positions of unprecedented power and great conflict and the onset of the cold war, stimulated an enormous expansion of the role and scope of intelligence activities. In the setting of nuclear power and intercontinental missiles, political and military intelligence became major government industries. Intelligence agencies came to be seen as a vital “first line of defense.” Intelligence organizations grew to be larger than foreign offices, and intelligence professionals began to compete for power and influence with diplomats and soldiers.
These developments have created major problems of organization, doctrine, and interdepartmental definition of mission. Only in the United States have such issues been extensively discussed in public, but any nation with a large-scale intelligence system is confronted with similar problems. The following treatment will emphasize the intelligence systems of the United States and the U.S.S.R., which are the world’s two largest, and about which, in the context of cold war, the most authentic information has come to light. Most other nations have been more successful in maintaining the secrecy that traditionally covers intelligence activities.
In postwar planning for United States intelligence, some advocated a single centralized agency responsible for gathering and evaluating all foreign intelligence required by the government. Others, particularly the existing armed services intelligence units, feared that a central agency would fail to serve their specialized needs. In a compromise, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495) to preside over a confederated “intelligence community” of various functional units and to perform those functions best done centrally, including foreign espionage and clandestine political action. The director of central intelligence is both head of CIA and the principal intelligence adviser to the president and the National Security Council, which provides the government’s intelligence operating directives. The “community” is composed of intelligence units in the Department of Defense, which operates the centralized Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) serving the secretary of defense and joint chiefs of staff, and the National Security Agency (NSA), charged with code making and breaking and overseas electronic surveillance and communications intelligence; separate intelligence units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State; an intelligence section of the Atomic Energy Commission; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has no overseas intelligence role but, in its domestic counterintelligence functions, cooperates with the intelligence community. The United States Intelligence Board, with representatives of each of these units, excepting the separate armed services, and with the CIA director as chairman, serves as a board of directors for the community and gives final approval to “national intelligence estimates” submitted to the National Security Council, over which the president of the United States presides (Ransom 1958, chapters 3 and 6).
The Soviet Union maintains a central intelligence organization in many ways resembling that of the United States but distinctly different in important respects. The similarity is that major intelligence functions are unified under the leadership of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (KGB), the State Security Committee. Large-scale military intelligence operations are also performed within the Defense Ministry’s main Intelligence Directorate, which has a foreign intelligence unit commonly known as Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie (GRU).
The major difference between the Russian and American systems is that KGB combines positive foreign intelligence with domestic counterintelligence and internal security functions. The precise relationship between KGB and GRU has not been made clear, but they are potential competitors for influence and power, and the chief of KGB patently outranks the head of GRU, which is but a section of the military general staff. The two agencies were combined in 1947 under single leadership for a brief period and again separated. KGB’s overseas operations emphasize political operations, while GRU concentrates on more technical military intelligence.
Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, Great Britain has no central intelligence agency, nor is there very much detailed authenticatable information about the British intelligence services. Britain maintains various functional intelligence units, the most important of which are three: (1) The Secret Intelligence Service, in popular usage termed the “British Secret Service” or “MI-6.” The latter label derives from its origins as the espionage section of military intelligence in World War I, but today it is a civilian agency under general Foreign Office and Cabinet policy controls. The Government barely acknowledges the existence of this service, its director’s name (the anonymous “C” in government usage) is never published, and no details of its organization, personnel, or activities are intentionally revealed, even to Parliament. The Secret Service is the government’s principal arm for secret foreign operations, including espionage and covert political intervention. (2) The Security Service, which is commonly referred to as “MI-5” but which is today also a civilian force of largely secret counterintelligence agents, concerned primarily with domestic internal security. Its director-general is also an anonymous figure who reports to the prime minister through the Home Secretary, with additional supervision provided by the permanent head of the British Civil Service. (3) A Defence Intelligence Staff is located in the Ministry of Defence, where formerly separate Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence units have been increasingly centralized in recent years. In 1965 separate service intelligence directors were eliminated and replaced by an integrated, all-service military intelligence staff within the Defence Ministry.
The British intelligence system is coordinated and supervised in the upper echelons of government by a Defence subcommittee of the Cabinet. Here are represented the major functional subdivisions of the intelligence community. Chairmanship is normally held by a Foreign Office representative. Ultimate responsibility for the system is the prime minister’s.
Even less precise information is available on the political and military intelligence organizations of other major nations, such as France, Italy, China, Japan, and Canada. Each is known to have its functional intelligence organizations at various levels, but none operates a single central intelligence agency.
The intelligence process
The intelligence process is traditionally described as various procedural “steps” in a cycle, outlined here in simplified form. First comes collection, the procuring of all data believed to be pertinent to requirements previously set. These are normally termed “raw” intelligence. Second is evaluation and production, sorting and assessing the reliability of the information, drawing inferences from its analysis, and the interpretation of such inferences with reference to questions posed by planners, policy makers, and operators. Finally comes the communication of findings in the most suitable form to appropriate consumers.
Requirements are set on the basis of various functional categories, which Kent has described as “basic descriptive,” “current reportorial,” and “speculative-evaluative” (Kent 1949, pp. 11-65). The basic descriptive (“storage”) requirement is that of maintaining an up-to-date encyclopedic survey of all the world’s geographic and political areas or simply having available any fact which a decision maker may call for at some future date, such as “What is the adequacy of the water supply at Addis Ababa?” The current reportorial mission is that of supplying the policy maker or operator with the best possible daily digest of information pertinent to his role. The speculative-evaluative assignment is the most difficult of all tasks, since it involves forecasting the future, providing forewarning of events, and predicting the intentions of foreign decision makers.
While it is possible to identify “steps” in the process and to categorize requirements, the process in reality is immensely complex and highly interrelated because of the scale and scope of contemporary intelligence requirements and activities. The consequent problem can be illustrated by a military example.
At the lowest level of military intelligence there is the manageable job of setting requirements, analyzing results, and taking decisions while observing reactions to them. When a low-level military commander directs a soldier to observe and report to him directly certain types of information, the commander knows the capability of his collector and can set requirements accordingly. The commander in this case is also the interpreter of the information supplied and the decision maker. But upon ascending to higher levels, to battalion, division, army, and finally to the highest general staff councils or responsible political leadership, major problems result from the hierarchical distance of collector, analyst, and decision maker. At the highest level of the intelligence organization the sources of information are far more varied and inclusive than at the lowest level. Here more can be known of foreign capabilities and intentions. Yet at these upper levels a division of labor among evaluators, analysts, interpreters, and communicators is required, producing formidable problems of communication among specialists and ultimately between specialists and decision makers.
Sources of intelligence
Although sources of modern intelligence are boundless, there are two standard categories: overt and covert.
The overt, nonsecret sources are those theoretically available to any scholar. By far the greatest amount of effort and allocation of resources go toward the undramatic, painstaking search for relevant data from open sources, and the problem ultimately becomes one of efficient management of a mountainous mass of data. This has called for improved systems and machinery for documentation, indexing, and retrieval of essential information. Among the features of modern systems are specialized microphotography, facsimile-printing machines, punch cards, and translation computers capable, for example, of rendering Russian texts into rough English at 30,000 words per hour. As a result, the physical scientist and technician have come to the fore in recent years to challenge the once dominant role of the social scientist as intelligence collector and analyst.
While the classical spy in his covert activity normally contributes but a tiny percentage of the massive amount of information gathered, great advantage has been taken of advancing technology in seeking information which sovereign governments try to conceal. Modern espionage methods have included high-altitude aerial photography, the use of infrared sensing devices to penetrate camouflage, electronic recording devices and radar, and many new techniques for automated espionage in the space age. Such techniques become identifiable as espionage when they violate sovereign territorial integrity.
Wartime espionage has been seen in international law to be but one of several forms of belligerency, practiced outside of any obligation of a belligerent to respect the territory or government of an enemy nation. Espionage in peacetime is, however, without status in an international law that imposes a duty upon states to respect the territorial integrity of other states. Each state has the right to define espionage according to its lights (Stanger 1962). The problem of cold-war espionage has not been resolved by international lawyers, who must develop new concepts for an age in which technology challenges traditional concepts of sovereignty.
The final step in the intelligence process is dissemination. A continuing problem exists as to who is to be privy to the various types of intelligence reports. Levels of privilege exist. Too narrow a circle of dissemination can be self-defeating. Prior to the 1941 Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, American officers, attempting to keep from the Japanese the information that the United States had broken their secret code, were equally successful in withholding crucial information from their own decision makers (Wohlstetter 1962, p. 394 and passim). The costs of too much secrecy in disseminating intelligence information may be greater than the risks of fuller distribution.
Principal doctrinal issues concern the role of the intelligence professional and intelligence information in policy making and the closely related issue of proper organization. A broader issue is that of responsible political control of a secret intelligence system. Briefly stated, prevailing United States doctrines are based upon the premises that if a policy maker has all the facts the correct decision is likely to follow, that intelligence and policy functions are best organized in separate compartments, and that a high degree of secrecy is required for all intelligence activities. Major observers on these issues include George S. Pettee, Sherman Kent, Willmoore Kendall, Roger Hilsman, and Allen Dulles.
Pettee saw intelligence as a specialized, large-scale task of analysis, essentially distinct from policy making. He saw, however, the need to keep policy makers and intelligence analysts in continuous liaison for mutual guidance. He favored decentralizing intelligence functions, with each government department serving its own informational needs but with a central agency supplying strategic intelligence for top decision makers (Pettee 1946, passim).
Kent saw two basic categories of foreign policy. For positive policy, decision makers need information on the nature of a foreign nation’s society, its ideology, power, and vulnerabilities, and its probable reaction to various contingencies. For defensive policy, information is needed on the capabilities and intentions of other nations. For either, a nation needs a body of information which cannot be adequately developed by the same individuals who plan or decide policy. Kent’s main point is that intelligence is a staff or service function and that analysts ought not to be involved directly in setting national objectives, determining plans and policy, or conducting operations (1949, pp. 180-206).
Kendall disagreed with prevailing doctrine, characterized by a wartime conception, a compulsive concern with prediction, and an overly bureaucratic definition of the intelligence role, which had intelligence analysts communicating with other bureaucrats and not sufficiently with responsible decision makers (1949, pp. 547-552). He criticized intelligence analysts for their “crassly empirical” conception of social science research and for assigning too little weight to theory, to analysis of basic policy objectives and alternatives, and to contingent predictions.
After a survey of producers and consumers of strategic intelligence in Washington, D.C., Hilsman (1956, pp. 37-122) reported a common acceptance of a “report the facts only” doctrine among policy makers and operators, intelligence administrators, and intelligence analysts. Policy making and intelligence production were seen to call for sharply separate skills, with the proper role of the intelligence officer that of inducing facts without bias in a separate organizational compartment. Hilsman saw in this an unwise subordination of intelligence to policy, with the intelligence system producing vast amounts of information of little relevance to the real problems. Other consequences are the inability of intelligence personnel to comprehend the conceptual frameworks of policy makers, failure to explore adequately in advance the possible results of alternative policies, and suppression of or inattention to information that challenges or conflicts with an existing policy framework.
More recently there has been little systematic, openly available academic writing on intelligence doctrine. Ransom, although emphasizing organization, questioned the adequacy of a narrowly empirical intelligence doctrine (1958, pp. 210-215). Wasserman, analyzing the failures of intelligence prediction, suggested that intelligence failures may be avoided by proper interaction between policy and intelligence functions. He attributed major failures in intelligence predictions to inadequate understanding of the conceptual frameworks of foreign states (1960, pp. 166-169).
Dulles expressed an early view that intelligence and policy functions should be sharply separated (1947, pp. 525-528). Writing in 1963, Dulles again stressed the forewarning and current reportorial functions of intelligence. His rationale for the existence of a separate, central agency was that information ought to be collected, processed, and interpreted by an agency “which has no responsibility for policy” (1963, p. 51).
The issue of control of secret agencies confronts both constitutional democracies and dictatorships. A secret agency of any government, claiming to possess secret knowledge and skilled in the techniques of acquiring, communicating, and using information secretly, is a source of potential power. Secret knowledge is secret power. A democratic society is confronted with the problem that some intelligence activities require maximum secrecy and that its missions may be spoiled by publicity, whereas democratic government requires publicity. Totalitarian regimes, with ability to control the formal media of communications and to suppress opposition groups and with a highly centralized hierarchy of authority, have fewer problems of disclosure and control than do democracies. But dictatorships have their problems. Not only may disclosures come from defection of loyalty to the regime, but interpretation of information is in continual danger of distortion by ideological dogma. From earliest times the intelligence apparatus has sometimes served as a vehicle for internal political conspiracy. Power that is invisible is a potential threat to constituted authority, whatever the form of government (Ransom 1963, chapter 7).
In establishing the United States Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, Congress delegated the responsibility for secrecy to a director of central intelligence and stipulated that the agency’s budget, plans, and programs should not be subjected to the normal Congressional reviews. Congress has established special appropriations and armed services subcommittees in the Senate and House of Representatives for periodic surveillance of central intelligence, but these committees have functioned sporadically. In addition, a presidentially appointed Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities has been in existence since 1956, composed of private citizens with distinguished public service who conduct periodic inspections of intelligence activities.
To meet the problem of surveillance and invisible power, two basic reforms in U.S. intelligence organization have been proposed. One is the creation of a joint Congressional committee on central intelligence, equipped with a permanent professional staff and charged with maintaining routine legislative surveillance over intelligence activities. Such a proposal reached a vote in the Senate in 1956 but was defeated 59 to 27; it has remained routinely before Congress.
The other proposed reform involves a reorganization of the intelligence system and reassignment of its multiple functions. Such reform is based upon the argument that it is unwise to combine under one roof the functions of intelligence collection, its analysis and interpretation, and the conduct of clandestine political action in foreign areas.
Current and potential research activities are inhibited and hampered by secrecy. Social scientists have written in considerable volume on the role of intelligence in psychological warfare activities during World War II (Daugherty & Janowitz 1958, chapter 7). Contemporary intelligence is too crucial a variable in foreign-policy decision making to permit it to remain relatively unexplored by social scientists. Studies falling into three categories may prove fruitful. Some examples follow.
First, further research is needed on information as a variable in the foreign-policy decision process; on the international law of espionage and other secret intelligence activities, including the impact of man’s exploration of space on the traditional legal status of espionage; conceptual studies of the role and control of secret intelligence activities in a disarmed or disarming world; philosophical inquiries into moral problems in the use of secret operations as instruments of policy; and studies dealing more generally with the problem of secrecy in various governmental forms, particularly democratic societies.
Second, historical studies are needed on the organization and role of political and military intelligence from earliest times; case studies that attempt to identify the function of intelligence information, its perception and use in historically significant political decisions of the past; and comparative studies of the evolution of intelligence services and their relationship to national political development.
Finally, useful technical studies could deal with automation in the collection, processing, and communication of information, including information storage and retrieval systems and machine translation of documents; with information and its communication in military and diplomatic command and control; and with man’s capability in space as it pertains to intelligence collection and communication.
The relationship of knowledge and action is of fundamental importance to the understanding of human behavior. Thus the institutions, doctrines, and practices by which man tries to integrate external information with foreign-policy action ought, in spite of formidable barriers to the collection of data, to provoke the continuing interest of social scientists.
Harry Howe Ransom
blackstock, paul W. 1964 The Strategy of Subversion. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. → A scholarly, descriptive analysis of the interrelationship of intelligence and political warfare.
Dallin, David J. 1955 Soviet Espionage. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. → The most scholarly of many books on Soviet espionage.
Daugherty, William E.; and Janowitz, Morris (compilers) 1958 A Psychological Warfare Casebook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. → Chapter 7 contains selections by social scientists on the role of intelligence in psychological warfare, with principal reference to World War II.
Dulles, Allen W. 1947 Memorandum Respecting …Central Intelligence Agency …April 25, 1947. Part 1, pages 525-528 in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Establishment: …Hearings Before the Committee…. Washington: Government Printing Office. → Reprinted in Ransom 1958, pages 217-224.
Dulles, Allen W. 1963 The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper. → A general survey of modern intelligence, counterintelligence, and political warfare, with emphasis on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, of which Allen Dulles was director, 1953-1962.
Hilsman, Roger 1956 Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Glencoe III.: Free Press. → An analysis and critical survey of intelligence doctrines in the United States, based upon interviews with officials.
Jones, R. V. 1947 Scientific Intelligence. Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92:352-369. → An incisive account of the work of physical scientists in World War II intelligence.
Kendall, Willmoore 1949 The Function of Intelligence. World Politics 1:542-552. → A critical review of Kent 1949.
Kent, Sherman 1949 Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton Univ. Press. → An influential treatise on the role and functions of the American intelligence services.
Knorr, Klaus 1964a Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences. Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 17. Princeton Univ. Press.
Knorr, Klaus 1964b Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles. World Politics 16:455-467.
Millikan, Max F. 1959 Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action. Pages 158-180 in Daniel Lerner (editor), The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences. New York: Meridian.
Pettee, George S. 1946 The Future of American Secret Intelligence. Washington: Infantry Journal. → A pioneering book on modern intelligence based on the lessons of World War II.
Ransom, Harry Howe 1958 Central Intelligence and National Security. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> A detailed study of the organization of the intelligence community of the United States; contains a bibliography.
Ransom, Harry Howe 1963 Can American Democracy Survive Cold War? Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. → Intelligence failures in the Korean conflict and the problems of control of secret intelligence in the American democratic framework are dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7.
Rowan, Richard W. 1931 Espionage. Volume 5, pages 594-596 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. → A concise history by a leading authority.
Rowan, Richard W. 1937 The Story of Secret Service. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. → The best general survey of espionage in all major periods of world history to the mid-1930s.
Stanger, Roland J. (editor) 1962 Essays on Espionage and International Law. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press. -> Contains commentaries by Quincy Wright, Julius Stone, Richard A. Falk, and Roland J. Stanger.
Wasserman, Benno 1960 The Failure of Intelligence Prediction. Political Studies 8:156-169. → A conceptual analysis of the deficiencies in modern intelligence doctrines.
Wohlstetter, Roberta 1962 Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford Univ. Press. → A detailed and authoritative analysis of the reasons for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.