Cooperation

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Cooperation

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cooperation, wrote Karl Marx (1818–1883), occurs “when numerous workers work together side by side in accordance with a plan, whether in the same process, or in different but connected processes” ([1867] 1977, p. 443). What he describes in this passage about the economic realm is the superficial appearance of cooperation rather than the diverse cultural practices, social relations, and modes of production that underwrite it. He then proceeds to point out the diversity of those forms. Marx was acutely aware that people cooperate for other reasons besides the production of goods or the satisfaction of needs defined narrowly as economic rather than more broadly as intellectual development, aesthetic stimulation, play, or the fulfillment of social functions, to name only a few.

Authors with quite different ontological standpoints have written about cooperation. On the one hand, early theorists of liberalism, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) or John Locke (1632–1704), who presupposed that individuals existed before society, sought to explain the conditions under which innately competitive, natural men came together to constitute a society in order to pursue collectively life, liberty, and property. For intellectual descendants, like neoliberal policymakers or socio-biologists, the problem is to explain the development of cooperative (altruistic) behavior; their solution resides in exchange broadly written—the market for policymakers, the transmission of genes for sociobiologists. On the other hand, critics of liberal social theory—Georg F. W. Hegel (1770–1831), for example—presupposed the existence of sociality from the beginnings of humankind and sought to explain how the actual conditions of human existence have been transformed by the collective social activity of human beings. The problem from this perspective is to account for competition in a world that exhibits enormous amounts of cooperative activity.

Recent discussions of cooperation may be further obscured by six epistemological tendencies that are frequently encountered either explicitly or implicitly: (1) a philosophical reductionism which postulates that explanations framed in terms of lower-order molecular, neurobiological, or psychological structures (e.g., a universal human nature) are preferable to those couched in terms of emergent social and cultural phenomena; (2) a denial of sociohistorical change which postulates, for example, that the structures of meaning characteristic of the Roman Republic have persisted unchanged for millennia and are effectively the same ones that exist in the West today; (3) an assertion that cultural identities and logics of difference are forged largely in the unequal power relations and oneway discourse between colonizer and colonized; (4) a largely unexamined assumption that earlier writers in the anthropological tradition did not understand what they saw or were told, especially when their accounts differ from the social relations that exist in the same region today; (5) a related assumption that, since people find it difficult to think outside the analytical categories of their own intellectual tradition, it is also difficult for them to understand other intellectual or cultural traditions; and (6) a belief that all forms of cooperation are structurally equivalent to those of Western capitalism and hence can be adequately explained in terms of capitalist models. Such epistemological presumptions need to be examined carefully and justified, especially as they underpin discussions of cooperation.

Cooperation manifests itself in diverse ways and is buttressed by a variety of social forms. Let us consider briefly a few examples: (1) the factory described by Marx where a number of workers put into motion more or less elaborate technical divisions of labor to produce commodities for the owner; (2) the long-discussed and carefully planned hunting expeditions of San men of southern Africa, which are complete with details of how and with whom meat will be shared; (3) the annual, week-long fiestas in highland Andean communities that are constructed around cleaning and repairing local irrigation canals and terraces; (4) the rotating credit associations, pooling of resources, and almost continuous swapping of goods to defray the costs of everyday needs in rural settlements along the U.S.-Mexico border; (5) the Maasai women in eastern Africa who prepare food and drink for the age-set initiation ceremonies of their sons and husbands; and (6) the improvisations of jazz musicians in a jam session. Cooperation does not always mean that the interpersonal and social relations of the participants are harmonious; frequently, they are tense, and individuals may be cajoled or feel compelled to participate. Nevertheless, not cooperating may be unavoidable, unadvisable, or even unthinkable.

SEE ALSO Altruism; Altruism and Prosocial Behavior

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Leacock, Eleanor. 1872. Relations of Production in Band Society. In Politics and History in Band Societies, eds. Eleanor Leacock and Richard Lee, pp. 159–170. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Richard. 2005. Power and Property in Twenty-first Century Foragers: A Critical Examination. In Property and Equality, eds. Thomas Widlok and Wolde Gossa Tadesse, pp. 16–31. New York: Berghahn Books.

Marx, Karl. [1867] 1977. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1. New York: Vintage.

Woodburn, James. 1998. Sharing is Not a Form of Exchange: An Analysis of Property-Sharing in Immediate-Return Hunter-Gatherer Societies. In Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition, ed. Chris Hann, pp. 48–63. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas C. Patterson

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