Asilomar Conference

views updated

ASILOMAR CONFERENCE

In February 1975 an international group of scientists met at the Asilomar Conference Grounds in Pacific Grove, California, to discuss the potential biohazards posed by recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology. The official title of the meeting was the International Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, but it is remembered simply as the Asilomar Conference. It established guidelines concerning the physical and biological containment of rDNA organisms that served as the model for the current guidelines used by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Although the Asilomar Conference marks a watershed moment in the regulation of rDNA technology, its broader implications remain controversial (Barinaga 2000, Davatelis 2000). Some claim that it was an example of self-promotion by a small but powerful interest group. Others argue that the process was too alarmist and generated unfounded fears in the public. Still others contend that it was an instance of scientists successfully regulating their own work.


The Events Preceding Asilomar

The first successful trial of rDNA technology (a type of genetic engineering that involves splicing genes into organisms) was performed by Paul Berg and other researchers at Stanford University in the early 1970s. It quickly raised concerns about "playing God" and the potential biohazards posed by recombinant microorganisms. In an unprecedented call for self-restraint, prominent scientists sent letters to the journal Science calling for a temporary moratorium on rDNA research (Singer and Söll 1973, Berg et al. 1974). Concerns included the development of biological weapons and the potential for genetically engineered organisms to develop resistance to antibiotics or to escape control.

Singer and Söll's letter was the result of a June 1973 meeting of the Gordon Conference on Nucleic Acids. In response, Berg led a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in April 1974 to formulate policy recommendations for the use of rDNA technologies. The Berg committee, which met at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was composed of leading molecular biologists and biochemists involved in the emerging rDNA field.

This committee produced three recommendations addressed at the scientific community and the NIH: (1) instituting a temporary moratorium on the most dangerous experiments; (2) establishing an NIH advisory committee to develop procedures for minimizing hazards and to draft guidelines for research (which became the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee [RAC]); and (3) convening the Asilomar Conference. All three recommendations were implemented.


The Conference Itself

Participation in the NIH-sponsored Asilomar Conference was by invitation only. It was attended by 153 participants. Outside of sixteen members of the press and four lawyers, it was composed entirely of scientists, mostly molecular biologists from the United States. There were no representatives from ethics, social science, ecology, epidemiology, or public-interest organizations.

The formal task of the conference was to identify the potential biohazard risks involved with rDNA technology and design measures to minimize them. Yet there was also a more important informal task faced by the participants. The emerging rDNA technology presented novel problems of regulation characterized by vast uncertainties concerning potential environmental and public health threats. The conference was set within a cultural and political context marked by a growing awareness of these threats and an increasing suspicion of new technologies. Therefore, the informal task faced by the scientists was to regulate rDNA technology in such a way that satisfied the public and, most importantly, allowed the science to be self-governing.

A comment made by Berg, cochair of the conference, illustrates this mind-set:

If our recommendations look self-serving, we will run the risk of having standards imposed. We must start high and work down. We can't say that 150 scientists spent four days at Asilomar and all of them agreed that there was a hazard—and they still couldn't come up with a single suggestion. That's telling the government to do it for us. (Wright 2001 [Internet source])

In order to achieve the goal of self-governance, the participating scientists narrowed the agenda such that the issue was defined as a technical problem. The organizers decided not to address ethical concerns but to focus on biohazard issues (Wright 1994). Defining the problem in technical terms legitimated the model of self-government by scientists, because they were the only group that could solve such problems.

The conference organizers shaped a consensus around this technical problem definition. There were, however, threats to consensus from both sides. Some participants were opposed to any type of regulation, because it would compromise their freedom of inquiry. Others wanted a broader agenda that included public input on ethical considerations and explicit bans on the development of biological weapons.

In the end, guidelines with respect to physical and biological containment of rDNA organisms were drafted that allowed the scientific community to police itself under the auspices of the NIH-RAC mechanism. The guidelines involved working with disabled bacteria that could not survive outside the lab and classifying experiments according to the level of containment necessary. They also called for an end to experimentation using known carcinogens, genes that produce toxins, and genes that determine antibiotic resistance. The Asilomar Conference established a general sense that the burden of proof rested with scientists and that they must proceed cautiously until they can show that their research is safe.

The laboratory guidelines also became the international standard for rDNA research (see Löw 1985, Wright 1994). In the United States, the system of self-policing avoided both the chaotic patchwork of local legislation established by community decision-making forums and the legal rigidity, yet political changeability, of federal legislation.


Conference Legacy

There have been changes to the guidelines drafted at Asilomar. The membership and role of the NIH-RAC have been expanded, and containment levels have been lowered for many experiments. More public involvement has been incorporated into decision-making processes, and subsequent Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules have ensured that the private sector complies with rDNA guidelines as biotechnology has experienced an increasing corporatization. Despite such developments, the Asilomar Conference established the fundamental institutional mechanisms for decisions about rDNA technologies in the United States. It also heavily influenced rDNA research guidelines developed by other countries. In this sense, the legacy of Asilomar is unequivocal.

Yet in another sense its legacy remains controversial. Participants at Asilomar wrestled with two basic questions: How should the protection of scientific freedom of inquiry be balanced with the protection of the public good? How should decisions about scientific research and its technological applications in society be made, especially in climates of uncertainty? Evaluating the legacy in light of these questions points toward three possible conclusions.

First, it has been argued that the conference represented the use of covert power by special interest groups (Oei 1997). According to this claim, scientists marginalized social and ethical questions in order to legitimize the new rDNA technology and persuade the public that control of this technology is best left to scientists (Wright 1994). The Asilomar Conference is portrayed by external critics as an elitist process with a narrow agenda designed to justify the self-government of science.

Second, there is an internal criticism voiced by some within the scientific community. According to this conclusion, the process of the Asilomar Conference and the controversies over regulation were too alarmist. The conference set the precedent for debates that focus on worst-case scenarios and largely ignore a growing scientific consensus about the safety of many rDNA applications. Increasing public opposition to many types of genetic engineering may prevent beneficial uses of these technologies in agriculture and medicine.

The third conclusion is that, despite its shortcomings, the Asilomar Conference represents an unprecedented exercise of the social conscience of science. For the first time, scientists voluntarily halted their own work until the potential hazards could be assessed (Mitcham 1987). This made it one of the first instances of what came to be known as the "precautionary principle." The Asilomar Conference was a novel attempt to balance scientific self-interest with self-restraint. It has left a legacy that transcends rDNA technology by taking an important step in the process of integrating scientific progress into its environmental and social contexts.


ADAM BRIGGLE

SEE ALSO Genetic Research and Technology;Governance of Science.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barinaga, Marcia. (2000). "Asilomar Revisited: Lessons for Today?" Science 287: 1584–1585. Covers a meeting that examined the Asilomar Process twenty-five years later and its implications for contemporary societal issues surrounding rDNA and other technologies.

Berg, Paul; David Baltimore; Herbert Boyer, et al. (1974). "Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules." Science 185: 303. One of the letters that sparked the temporary moratorium.

Davatelis, George N. (2000). "The Asilomar Process: Is It Valid?" Scientist 14(7): 51. Examines a meeting held on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Asilomar Conference and interprets the usefulness of the Asilomar process for the social regulation of current and future scientific research.

Grobstein, Clifford. (1979). A Double Image of the Double Helix: The Recombinant DNA Debate. San Francisco: Freeman. Surveys the main political and social issues surrounding rDNA science in its infancy.

Löw, Reinhard. (1985). Leben aus dem Labor: Gentechnologie und Verantwortung—Biologie und Moral [Life from the laboratory: Gene technology and responsibility, biology and morality]. Munich: C. Bertelsmann. An introduction to the German discussion on recombinant DNA technology.

Mitcham, Carl. (1987). "Responsibility and Technology: The Expanding Relationship." In Technology and Responsibility, ed. Paul T. Durbin. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Reidel Publishing. A broad treatment of the ethics of science and technology, which covers rDNA and Asilomar on pp. 11–13.

Oei, Hong Lim. (1997). Genes and Politics: The Recombinant DNA Debate. Burke, VA: Chatelaine Press. Explores policy-making processes in the early years of rDNA debates. Outlines three alternative policy processes: technocratic, democratic, and legislative. Offers recommendations for emerging controversies.

Richards, John, ed. (1978). Recombinant DNA: Science, Ethics, and Politics. New York: Academic Press. Contains a good annotated bibliography of primary, first-hand accounts of the Asilomar Conference.

Rogers, Michael. (1977). Biohazard. New York: Knopf. Explores the moral and ethical confrontations over rDNA research. Includes three full sections on the Asilomar Conference with detailed quotations from many top participants.

Singer, Maxine, and Dieter Söll. (1973). "Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules." Science 181: 1114. Outlines the potential benefits and hazards of rDNA technology and propose an NAS committee to study the issue and "recommend specific actions or guidelines should that seem appropriate."

Wade, Nicholas. (1975). "Genetics: Conference Sets Strict Controls to Replace Moratorium." Science 187: 931–935. An eyewitness account of the Asilomar Conference.

Wright, Susan. (1994). Molecular Politics: Developing American and British Regulatory Policy for Genetic Engineering, 1972–1982. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chronicles the response of various groups in the United States and Britain to the emerging genetic engineering technologies, traces the evolution of policies and discourses, and includes a section on the Asilomar Conference and its legacy.


INTERNET RESOURCE

Wright, Susan. (2001). "Legitimating Genetic Engineering," Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas. Available from http://www.biotech-info.net/legitimating.html. Examines the problem definition and the consensus forged at Asilomar and the process of persuading the public. A somewhat cynical interpretation of the self-governance of science.

More From encyclopedia.com