Civil Religion

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Civil Religion

In 1967 Robert Bellah published an essay titled "Civil Religion in America." There followed a flurry of articles and books about civil religion, most of which, instead of analytically appraising the concept, debated whether such a thing exists. Considerable ambiguity surrounded the topic, therefore, and after a decade or so, scholarly interest in civil religion waned. It lingers, however, not just in America but in other countries as well. The result, unfortunately, is not a codified set of findings about civil religion, surrounded by a systematic theory explaining those findings.

This regrettable situation stems from the overemphasis on debating whether civil religion exists. One does not ask if, in a society, an economy exists, or a polity, or a religion. Instead, one investigates how elaborate or encompassing those institutions are. One looks at how many people are involved and what they are doing. One looks at how those institutions are stratified and how authority is distributed and maintained. And one inquires into the beliefs and practices of those involved in the economy, the polity, and the religion. Despite enormous variation in these institutions through time and space, we have no difficulty identifying them sufficiently to study them without wondering if they exist.

Why, then, is the analysis of civil religion different? It is because so many analysts are not prepared for the amorphous character of this particular institution. They fail to see that the term "civil religion" is a construct, not an objective thing. Moreover, it is a construct consisting of many elements that are objective, but they have been investigated piecemeal, and detractors can claim that a particular objective element is not itself a civil religion. Of course it is not, but that does not mean a civil religion does not exist. Bellah's analysis, for example, borrowed much from presidential inaugural addresses, which had the effect of highlighting civil religion's ritualistic element. Others have explored the religio-political thought of the major figures giving shape to American society. Fourth of July and Memorial Day celebrations—celebrations that affirm the goodness of America—have been the focus of some, while still others see in the rhetoric of the civil rights and anti–Vietnam War campaigns how American civil religion can judge and condemn the nation. In each case an objection can be raised that ritual alone, or the founders' philosophy alone, or patriotic holidays alone, do not indicate civil religion.

What, then, is a civil religion? The phrase originated with the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) in his book The Social Contract. He offered it as a solution to the dilemma of church-state relations in religiously plural societies. In his civil religion, what Rousseau called "positive dogmas" are simple and few in number: "The existence of a powerful, wise, and benevolent Divinity, who foresees and provides the life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws." The only "negative dogma," he said, is "intolerance."

However attractive such a solution might seem, it is unrealistic because for a religion—any religion, including a civil religion—to be religious, it must be thought to be not a human but a supernatural creation. In the American case, the founders, while recognizing that they, as human beings, were expressing truths about the meaning of America, believed that the truths they expressed were not of their making but were truths reflecting the natural order of things. Moreover, as Bellah says,

though much [of what the founders said and did] is selectively derived from christianity, this religion is clearly not itself christianity. . . . [rather, it] exists alongside of and . . . [is] clearly differentiated from the churches.

The result was a civil religion, which can be defined as any set of beliefs and rituals related to the past, present, and/or future of a people ("nation") that is understood to have not only political but also supernatural meaning.

By this definition, any group of people has the potential to evolve a civil religion. The chances that this will happen increase under certain conditions: if a group believes that it has a political history, if it traces that history to real or mythical founders, if it experienced a dramatic founding and/or suffered challenges to its unity, etc. The list could go on, but the point is clear: Whether a civil religion does emerge depends on many factors. And something else is just as clear: The visibility of civil religion increases and decreases with events. An inaugural address, or the assassination of a president, or an Olympic gold medal, or a Ku Klux Klan parade reminds us that we are fellow citizens of a group where political events can take on transcendent meaning.

It is not surprising, then, to find that in modern societies, the groups most likely to experience emergent civil religions are nation-states, and books have been written about not just the civil religion of America, but also that of Israel, South Africa, and others. Ethnic groups likewise may have civil religions, since so often their origins are found in a mythic past with sacred meaning.

This does not mean that because civil religions exist, all elements of them are everywhere and always in the minds of citizens. Nor does it mean that citizens cease to practice the religious tradition in which they were raised. Religions whose origins are found in one of the world's major traditions are thoroughly institutionalized, with buildings, bureaucratic administrations, budgets, membership rolls, and so forth. For the most part, these features are missing in civil religions, though temporary arrangements might exist to organize a July Fourth celebration, for example, or a civil rights rally.

There is one major exception to this claim that civil religions have little in the way of institutionalized facilities. In America at least, civil religion historically has been maintained and transmitted by a system of public schools that, among other things, rather self-consciously taught "civics" or "Americanism." Two forces in the twentieth century served to mute this effort, however. One is the increased awareness of religious pluralism in the United States. As long as nearly everyone was at least vaguely Christian or Jewish, an ethic—a civil religion—could be articulated that was believed to be a secular reflection of "Judeo-Christianity." Will Herberg, in his 1955 Protestant-Catholic-Jew, argued that this advocacy was occurring, and he also excoriated its inauthenticity and departure from the three "real" religions. The public and their schools are very mindful of how many religions get left out by this strategy, however, and, where it passes constitutional muster, how tepid it is.

The second force is similar in form, but instead of a plurality of religions it is the plurality of ethnicities that makes difficult using public schools as conduits of the doctrines and rituals of supernaturally understood unity.

Such barriers to the socialization of young Americans into their civil religion do not mean that the civil religion does not exist or is dying out. It may mean that younger generations are less knowledgeable about, less observant of, and less fervent toward their civil religion. But something of the same charge can be leveled at Methodists, for example, or Catholics, and nobody suggests that those two religions are on their way to oblivion. Civil religions, like all religions, are group properties, as Émile Durkheim showed. Their constituent elements are, therefore, always potentially present in a group. Whether they emerge and whether they cohere and form an identifiable civil religion depends on many things. Most analysts of the subject have not appreciated this amorphous quality of civil religion. They ask if it is there—whether it exists —which leaves only yes and no as possible answers. As should now be clear, however, such an approach to the topic is not very productive.