Will
WILL
Will is a capacity (or action or product) whereby a person is psychically attracted to some object that is apprehended as good, or is psychically repelled by some object apprehended as evil. Willing is usually (but not always) distinguished from knowing, in that willing involves some sort of affective approach to what is cognitively present to consciousness. Psychic activities such as loving, intending, desiring, consenting, choosing, using, enjoying (and their contraries) are considered as examples of willing. Freedom, in the sense of the capacity for self-determination (the ability to "make up one's mind"), is associated with the meaning of will. Writers in the Thomistic tradition regard will (Lat., voluntas ) as the potency, function, or resultant of rational appetite (see faculties of the soul). On the other hand, other Catholic writers follow the usage of St. Augustine, in which human will means the whole soul as active in any manner; this usage may still be found in prayers, works of piety, and spiritual exercises. In either case, will is an important constituent of personality, for it represents the seat of an intelligent commitment to some value or of a rejection of some disvalue. God, angels, and human persons are possessed of will in this broad sense; thus the term should not be limited to merely human activities.
This article presents a systematic analysis of the concept of will, with an accent on Catholic thought, and then furnishes a historical survey of other theories of willing.
Will and Willing: Systematic Analysis
The main points treated in this analysis are the existence of the will in man, the nature of the human will, man's various acts of willing, and the role of habituation in the training of the will.
Existence of the Will. That man is capable of willing may be shown from a study of one's personal experience and from observation of the behavior of other persons. In one's own consciousness, there are moments of decision, of commitment to some ideal or principle, of conscious choosing to do or not to do some action. These critical activities can be explained only by concluding that man is endowed with a special ability, a power, to make such decisions and choices. Similarly, one sees others in the course of deliberating and coming to decisions, and then acting as a result of such volitional processes. It is not that anyone directly observes the inner working of another's will: this he cannot do. Rather, the simplest and most reasonable explanation of certain affective and appetitive features of human conduct lies in granting that each person has his own power of willing.
Actually, there is not a great deal of opposition to the contention that each man is able to will for himself. Many would deny the existence of a special "faculty" of will, if faculty were taken to mean an agency separate from the basic substance of man. Thus, the British empirical philosophers from Hobbes to the present tend to interpret human will as a function of the person rather than as a distinct power. The suggestion that will is a rational appetite is frequently criticized by those who see no difference between sense perception and reasoning (see sensism). Much of this disagreement stems from terminological misunderstandings that arise between members of different schools of philosophy. Most philosophers think that the individual man is able, at least in part, to determine his actions under his own control. This capacity for self-determination is generally admitted to be will. Yet there are many variations in the detailed philosophical theories of willing (see below).
Nature of the Will. As rational appetite, man's will is a tendential power capable of inclining toward any object that is intellectually presented as a good. The nature of the will, then, is discoverable from a study of the kind of volitional actions that are performed by man. Clearly, the will is not a bodily power, like the ability to move the body in walking or talking, for willing is directed to an intelligible object that is known on a level above that of bodily activity. The will is an incorporeal power. Since it is quite real and not a mere abstraction, this immaterial power may also be called spiritual.
Some thinkers have regarded man's will as a power superior to his intellect. In the late 13th century, for instance, peter john olivi wrote that the very possibility of understanding is due to a will act (see Bourke, 83–84). This exaltation of will over intellect is psychological voluntarism. The contrary view would be intellectualism. A reasonable position maintains that intellect and will are equally important in the psychological constitution of man.
Human freedom—the capacity for self-determination, for personally controlling some of one's actions and omissions—is intimately associated with the functioning of the will. Here again, one may argue from his personal experience of desiring, choosing, and refraining from possible actions, to freedom's being evident in some of man's volitional functions. People who deny that man is free usually do so on two bases. (1) Some philosophers (Thomas hobbes is the best example) have thought that man is nothing but a body and that he has no spiritual powers or activities. If this were true, then all human actions would be mechanically produced and man would not be free. However, Hobbes was wrong; man is able to perform immaterial actions (understanding and willing), and freedom is a prime characteristic of such functions (see soul, human; spirit). The very fact that men are held responsible, morally and at law, for certain of their actions, is enough to indicate how eccentric it is to deny personal freedom. (2) Other philosophers have interpreted "free" to mean completely uncaused; as a consequence they have asserted that no free activity is possible to man. This is not what free means. The acts of man that are free are not caused by agencies external to man; they are caused by agencies within man. In other words, man's capacity for self-determination is the root of his personal freedom. (see free will.)
Acts of the Will. Every positive willing is a tending toward a good. Negative volition is a tending away from some object that is apprehended as evil. The most basic act of will is loving; volitional love means affective approval of an intelligible good. All other positive acts of will may be regarded as variants of the fundamental action of loving. Similarly, negative acts of volition are variants of hating. (see love.)
Where the good that is cognitively presented to the will is complete and unmixed with evil, the will is powerless to withhold its love of such an object (see good, the supreme). So, the volitional response to the universal good (for example, man's ultimate happiness, or God as the perfect good) is called a natural and necessary volition. It is an act of will as nature. However, where the object is presented as a particular good of limited appeal, the volitional response is called deliberate volition and it is free.
In traditional Catholic psychology, volitional acts are divided also into elicited and commanded (or imperated) actions. The latter are activities performed in some other power of man under the direction or use of will: thus, to walk or talk in a self-controlled manner is to perform a commanded act. Elicited acts of will are functions of the will itself as a power, e.g., wishing, intending, consenting (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a2ae, 1.1 ad 2; 6 prol. ). St. Thomas described six sorts of elicited action of human will (ibid., 1a2ae, 8–17), and cajetan, in his commentary, systematized this teaching in the following outline relating the volitional acts to the respective intellectual activities (see human act).
Two points should be emphasized concerning this:(1) The analysis is not to be understood as if will and intellect were two separate agents: man is the agent who wills and understands; (2) The order in which these acts are listed is not necessarily the order of their occurrence in time.
- 1. In relation to an end.
- a. Wishing (velle ): a will act of simple affective approval of something apprehended as a good in itself; the parallel intellectual act is the apprehension of an end.
- b. Intending (intendere ): a will act of inclining toward the attainment of an end; associated with the intellectual judgment of the attainability of the end.
- 2. In relation to means.
- a. Consenting (consentire ) to means: a will act of accepting a plural number of means as possible; associated with intellectual deliberation on the available means.
- b. Choosing (eligere ): a will act of selecting the one means to be used, or of deciding to act or not to act; associated with the intellectual act of preferential judgment.
- 3. In relation to execution.
- a. Using (uti ): a will act of applying other powers of the agent to their commanded actions; associated with the intellectual act of commanding.
- b. Enjoying (frui ): a will act of taking satisfaction in the end attained; associated with the intellectual judgment of the suitability of what is accomplished.
An important feature of will activity is motivation. There is a "reason why" (propter quod ) a person wills in one way rather than another: this is the motive for willing. A positive motive is the fact that some object is viewed by the agent as good. This "goodness" may be real or apparent; as long as it is apprehended as attractive it may motivate the will. On the other hand, an object regarded as evil motivates negative volitions: acts of dislike, refusal, and disagreement. A volitional motive does not move the agent from outside, but stimulates from within his own consciousness; thus motivation does not reduce freedom.
Habituation and Training of Will. Habit formation is possible in any psychic power whose activity is capable of being improved with use. Such a potency must be open to being actuated in several ways, and not wholly determined by its nature to but one way of operating. Although this is the case in regard to certain acts of human willing, it is not so in regard to other acts. Man's will is by nature wholly in favor, as it were, of the good that is loved, desired, chosen, for the sake of the possessor of the will. No habit can be formed, or is needed, to improve such self-directed volitions. It is not so natural to will the good for another person; effort and repeated practice are required to perform acts of altruistic volition. Volitional habits enabling one to seek the good for other persons are various modifications of the moral virtue of justice. Another area of volition that is open to improvement by habit formation is that in which one tries to love other persons because they are God's creatures. This is the domain of charity, a supernatural habit of the will. In its highest sense, hope may also be a volitional habit. Many Catholic moralists, using a broad Augustinian meaning of will, would say that all moral virtues are good habits in the will. Aquinas taught that the above-mentioned moral virtues are habits in the will as subject, whereas various kinds of temperance are in the concupiscible appetite as subject, habits related to fortitude are in the irascible appetite, and habits of prudence are in the practical intellect. Of course, Aquinas thought that the will is involved in the exercise of the acts of all the moral virtues. (see virtue; habit.)
As to the notion of "training" the will, this usually implies a dynamic power interpretation. As studied by Catholic psychologists such as J. Lindworsky, this popular view that one may increase the degree of strength of will power by certain exercises has not been confirmed. So-called strength of will is mostly a matter of attentiveness, of being able to maintain concentration on some objective that is regarded as desirable. Attention is more important than "strong" will. (see will power.)
Historical Survey of Theories of Will
The wide variety of theories dealing with the will precludes an exhaustive treatment. In what follows, the main lines of development in Western thought are sketched, with summary treatments of Greek, patristic, medieval, and modern contributions to this subject.
Greek Origins. Pre-Christian Greek philosophy did not stress the function of willing. In fact, it is difficult to identify the term that means, for Plato or Aristotle, what will does today. Plato divides man's soul into three parts: rational (τὸ λογιστικόν), desiderative (τὸ ἑπιθυμητικόν), and competitive (τὸ θ[symbol omitted]μοειδής); the second and third gave rise to appetitive function that only remotely resemble willing (Rep. 435E–442; Tim. 69B–72D). In the Phaedrus (246–248) these appetites are compared to two wild horses that may be regulated by reason. Aristotle's psychology has a general theory of human desire (ὄρεξις) and some discussion of rational choice (προίρεσις) and wishing (βούλησις). The treatment of these functions (Anim. 433a 10b–30) does not lead to the postulation of a power that would be equivalent to will (voluntas ) in the scholastic sense. Rational choice is hesitantly called (Eth. Nic. 1139b 3) intellective appetition or appetitive intellection. Aristotle does not clearly describe a power of will.
Among pre-Christian philosophers, the Stoics came closest to a concept of willing as distinctive of the person. Thus, Cicero says: "Wherefore, as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where the strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the Stoics called βούλησις, and the name which we give it is will (voluntas )" [Tusc. disp. 4.6; tr. C. D. Yonge (London 1853) 403]. plotinus (3rd century a.d.) discusses some functions of willing under the term βούλησις, and also uses the word θέλησις, which is adopted by some of the Greek Fathers (Ennead. 6.8.1–21).
Patristic Teaching. With the Christian emphasis on the dignity of the human person and on the concept of personal salvation and moral responsibility stressed in the Bible and early Christian writings, more attention came to be directed to the will and its acts. The well-developed psychology of St. augustine distinguishes three main functions of the soul: knowing, remembering, and willing (Trin. 10.11.17). In this triadic view, will (voluntas ) means the whole soul as active (Retract. 1.15.3; De duab. anim. 11.15). The Augustinian will is not a faculty but the soul itself as loving: indeed, will is but love in its strongest form (Trin. 15.21.41). Nor are there powers of sensory appetition, distinct from will, for St. Augustine: cupiditas (sensual desire) and libido (lust) are simply perverse movements of will (Civ. 14.6–7). Man's will, while essentially free to turn toward the good or away from it, is not, by itself, able to accomplish man's salvation; for that, divine grace is required (Retract. 1.9.5). The Will of God, according to Augustine, is identical with God as supreme cause and ruler of all things (cf. Conf. 12.15.18).
St. john damascene (8th century) introduced into Christian psychology an analysis of volition that differs from Augustine's theory and leads to the notion of a faculty of appetition. The third part of Damascene's Source of Knowledge (Patrologia Graeca, ed. J. P. Migne, 94:944–945) describes man's power of will (θέλησις) as a natural and rational appetite whose act is willing (βούλησις) an end. Rational deliberation makes possible a judgment regarding means, from which the will makes its choice (προίρεσις). Thus are the seeds of Aristotelian and late Stoic (e.g., that of nemesius of emesa) appetitive and faculty theories combined in Damascene and transmitted to later scholasticism.
Medieval Theories. In the 12th century, St. bernard of clairvaux stressed will as the seat of spiritual love, and even knowledge, in the soul [De diligendo Deo, tr. T. Connolly, ed. A. C. Pegis, Wisdom of Catholicism (New York 1949) 230–268]. This emphasis continues in 13th-century Franciscan psychology (i.e., that of St. bon aventure, john of la rochelle, and Peter John Olivi) where the human will is not distinguished from the general power of the soul, which reaches its fulfillment in the love of God in heaven.
With the adoption of an Aristotelian psychology by St. albert the great and St. thomas aquinas, a theory of really distinct potencies of the soul was developed. It was not long before some of the views of Augustine and John Damascene were combined with this faculty psychology in such a way as to distinguish the two highest powers in man: intellect and will. The result was a new way of looking at the human will, viz, as the intellectual or rational appetite in man (see studies by Verbeke, Klubertanz, and Bourke).
Thomistic Teaching. Aquinas's explanation of human willing is central in his theory of human nature. He begins with a radical distinction between the generic functions of cognition and appetition (Summa theologiae, 1a, 80.1). To know is to take in and immanently react to information from the world of reality. To will is to incline toward, or away from, union with a known object. Cognition is ingoing; appetition is outgoing. Aquinas further distinguishes the cognition of individual aspects of bodily things (sensing) from the cognition of universal meanings. Two lower powers of sensory appetition (concupiscibility and irascibility) enable man to incline toward, or away from, sensory objects. These two sense appetites are powers that are really distinct from will. The intellectual appetite (will) is a third and higher appetitive power through which man inclines toward, or away from, universal aspects of things known as appealing or repulsive. Thus the Thomistic will is stimulated to its appetitive response through the intellectual presentation of some universal good or evil. (If one desires to eat an apple, simply because he likes the taste, then his appetitive response is not a will-act but a movement of the concupiscible appetite. If he also desires this apple because he thinks that its eating promotes good health, then his appetitive response to this universal good is an act of intellectual desire in his will.) Many of man's functions, according to Aquinas, are joint movements of sensory plus intellectual appetites.
As intellectual appetite, in the Thomistic theory, the will inclines without deliberation—an intellectual process of weighing the appeal of various apprehended goods—and so naturally, toward the good-in-general. Since such an object contains nothing repulsive, the will is naturally and wholly attracted to it (Summa theologiae, 1a, 82.1; De malo 6.1). Perfect happiness, for instance, cannot be volitionally rejected by man, although he may fail to will it by consciously rejecting all intellectual consideration of it. This first type of will movement is not free: it is a natural volition (voluntas ut natura ). Second, man may think over, take counsel with himself, and deliberate on, the respective values of several intellectually known goods. If he responds to a deliberated judgment in a movement of will—which he does not have to do, because goods that can be deliberated on must be limited in appeal—then his will act is free. This kind of volitional act is called a deliberated volition (voluntas deliberata ). It is most clearly exemplified in choices of means. Freedom of choice (liberum arbitrium ) is not a function of will alone, for Thomists, but is a joint activity pertaining formally to intellect, and materially or substantially to will (Summa theologiae, 1a, 83.1; De ver. 24.1–2). It is man who is free, not his will or his intellect as powers.
Later Scholastic Views. In the 14th century there was much diversity of teaching concerning will. Some Oxford theologians held that the will performs cognitive functions (see study by Michalski). John Duns Scotus reacted against certain features of Thomism that he regarded as intellectualistic; so, he stressed the point that nothing moves the will except will itself—God, of course, excepted (Op. Oxon. 2.24–25). While Scotus retained the distinction of natural and deliberated volition, he tended to identify will with an essentially free power [voluntas quae est potentia libera per essentiam—Ordinatio 1.17.1–2; ed. Balić, (Vatican City 1950) 5:169]. He also adopted the notion of indifference from Franciscan discussions (e.g., those of Olivi), and used it to define volitional freedom. Other features of Scotus's teaching on will are: treatment of volition under efficient rather than final causality; strong emphasis on terminology of elicited and imperated acts of will, because all moral activity (praxis ) is either immediately or mediately an action of will (Ordinatio, prol. 5.1; ed. Balić, 1:156). Much of later scholastic teaching on the human will fuses scotism with thomism.
william of ockham emphasized the essential freedom of will more than did Scotus. Ockham did not grant to the intellect any real influence on the will's activity: the human will is a wholly active power that is absolutely free [In 1 sent. 1.6 P-T (Lyons 1495)]. Ockham is very much interested in the Will of God, stressing the complete omnipotence of divine will [De sacramento altaris, ed. T. B. Birch (Burlington, Ia. 1930) 330]. Will is superior to understanding, both in man and in God (In 1 sent. 1.2 K).
There is considerable Ockhamist influence on the volitional theory of Francisco suÁrez (1548–1617), who was one of the most influential of the later schoolmen (De anima, 5; Disp. meta. 19). Final causality, for him, becomes a metaphor and volition is the work of an efficient power. The human will is completely and essentially free with the liberty of indifference (De concursu motione et auxilio Dei 1.8).
Modern Philosophy. In modern philosophy, dozens of different meanings have been given to will and volition. For purposes of convenience, these can be reduced to eight different views, according as will means (1) intellectual preference, (2) rational appetite, (3) the faculty of freedom, (4) dynamic power, (5) the seat of love, (6) popular conviction, (7) the source of law, and (8) basic reality. A brief explanation of each view follows.
Intellectual Preference. This view reduces volition to an almost purely cognitive function of judging. B. spinoza implies this when he says: "Only individual volitions exist, that is to say, this and that affirmation and this and that negation" (Ethica 1.49.2).
Rational Appetite. This is St. Thomas's view, as described above. G. W. leibniz is the modern thinker who is closest to this theory; he is very critical of Descartes's use of the liberty of indifference and of Spinoza's intellectualism.
Faculty of Freedom. This view is shared by many Catholic thinkers and is best represented in modern times by F. Suárez. It takes will as a power of self-determination whose every action is somewhat free. Perhaps maine de biran (a Catholic but not a scholastic philosopher) and later French "philosophers of the spirit" are the most prominent recent supporters of this view. Some existentialists (e.g., G. Marcel) share it.
Dynamic Power. Here will is considered as the efficient cause of activities of various sorts, either material or immaterial. Modern dynamic power theories take two forms: (1) Will power is regarded as physical energy, the capacity to move the human body (taught by Thomas Hobbes, in the 17th century, and by U.S. faculty psychologists such as Asa Burton and Jeremiah Day, in the 19th century); and (2) will power is mental energy, the capacity to generate ideas or new states of consciousness [see Josiah Royce, Conception of God (New York 1897) 187–192].
Seat of Love. According to this theory, loving is made the key act of personality, and will expresses itself in various forms of affection. Friedrich schlegel popularized this view in German romantic philosophy. Love is regarded as the highest integration of human personality and even as the bond of all that is good in reality. Much the same notion is found in F. W. J. schelling's works dealing with this subject.
Popular Conviction. This is a theory of volition as a group activity. Those with this view speak much of the "will of the people" or "general will." It was advocated by J. J. rousseau, who argued that the general will is an infallible arbiter of right and wrong. Modern democratic theory, with its reliance on popular elections, may owe something to this theory of will. Edmund burke strongly criticized this notion of will.
Source of Law. According to this interpretation, the most important product of willing is legislation. Immanuel kant identified his legislative will with practical reason and saw it as the source of moral law (see categorical imperative).
Basic Reality. In this view, all existing being is of the nature of will. This makes will a metaphysical principle. Arthur schopenhauer is the most famous metaphysical voluntarist (see pessimism).
See Also: appetite.
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[v. j. bourke]
