Theft
THEFT
Theft was defined for English law by H. Bracton, who followed the definition of Roman law, as "the fraudulent handling of another man's thing, without his agreement, and with the intention of stealing it." In presentday usage theft means the actual taking away of something belonging to another. Moral theology defines it as the secret taking away of another's property with the intention of keeping or disposing of it as one's own, against the reasonable will of its owner. Stealing, embezzling, cheating in buying and selling, the falsifying of weights and measures, and larceny come under the same condemnation as theft.
If theft is taken to mean the secret taking or keeping of what belongs to another it must be presupposed that a thing can belong to another, and that he can reasonably object to being deprived of it. The lawfulness of private ownership is taken by St. Thomas Aquinas as the point of departure for his treatise on theft (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, 66). Only when he has established the truth that it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own does he ask whether theft, the secret taking of another man's property, is always a sin.
The word secret is introduced into the definition of theft to distinguish it from robbery, and the assigning of "another man's thing" as its object distinguishes it from other sins forbidden by the Decalogue. Whereas the Fifth Commandment forbids the taking of another's life, and the Sixth the taking of his wife, the Seventh forbids the taking of his property, his things.
There are circumstances in which what belongs to a man can be taken from him without injustice, and such taking must not be called theft. Theft is the unjust taking of what belongs to another. To signify this, the phrase "against the owner's reasonable will" is added to the definition. An individual's objection to having food belonging to him taken by a starving man to save himself from death would be unreasonable. In a case that occurs more often, a husband would not be reasonably unwilling that his wife should help herself to his money to meet the expenses of housekeeping or to provide moderate recreation for herself or their children. She might, by her surreptitious way of acting, offend against prudence, humility, or graciousness, but she would not be a thief. A thief is one who takes what belongs to another who has a strict right to withhold it from him and who reasonably maintains his right.
Gravity . Theologians are agreed that, generally speaking, theft is a mortal sin. That property rights should be respected is a matter of grave concern of any ordered society, whose very existence depends upon it. As St. Thomas puts it: "If men were to rob one another habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore, theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin" (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, 66.6). Theft, therefore, is not only an injustice but an offense against the common good, and against the friendship that keeps men united in the bond of peace.
Against this conclusion, it can be reasonably urged that it is absurd to call the theft of something of little value a mortal sin. It would seem altogether repugnant that for the theft of a pen or a pin a person should suffer eternal damnation. To this objection St. Thomas replied: "Reason accounts as nothing that which is little; so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters; and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not against the will of the owner. For that reason, if a person takes very little things, he may be excused from mortal sin. Yet if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a mortal sin even in these very little things" (ibid. ad 3).
All theologians agree with St. Thomas here that if a thief should set out with the intention of taking a sufficiently large sum of money by small installments he is guilty of grievous sin from the start, even before he actually steals anything. They find it difficult to determine precisely what amount is sufficiently large to make an act of theft, or the intention to commit such an act, a mortal sin.
This is too complicated a question to consider here in detail. It must suffice to say that the mathematical computation of what constitutes grave matter is not really possible in the form of a rule applicable to all cases. Often it will be less a question of whether a mortal sin has been committed—for as to that, much will depend upon the particular circumstances and the conscience of the thief—than a question of the gravity of the obligation to make restitution. If grave matter is involved, a confessor must insist that the penitent restore what he has taken, or at least have the intention of restoring it, as a condition for absolution.
Relative and Absolute Standard. There is a general consensus that the theft of a relatively small amount from a poor man may be a grievous sin, although the theft of a larger sum from a wealthy person might still be venial. In all cases where it is meaningful, the so-called relative standard should be applied, i.e., the gravity of the matter depends upon the gravity of the injury actually suffered by the person who is wronged. To do a notable or serious injury to another is gravely sinful. In some cases, however, the relative standard is incapable of measuring the actual malice of an act of theft. Either the extent of the injury suffered by the one whose property is stolen is indeterminable, or the actual injury is slight, although the act is obviously, by reason of the amount stolen, a grievous violation of social order; for example, when a sum, fairly large by ordinary standards, is stolen from an extremely wealthy man, or a large corporation, or from the government. In these cases, according to the common teaching of theologians, the malice of the act is measured according to an absolute standard. By this standard that sum is grave that could not be regarded as trivial without damage to the general good of society.
Bibliography: thomas aquinas, Summa theologiae 2a2ae, 66. sister therese, "Malice and Gravity of Injustice," The Irish Ecclesiatical Record 87 (Dublin 1957) 47–50. h. davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology (New York 1958) 2:298–310.
[a. doolan]
