Solipsism
SOLIPSISM
Solipsism is a term that seems to have been first used by G. W. leibniz; derived from the Latin solus (alone) and ipse (self), it designates the philosophical teaching that a person can know only himself and that there are no grounds for acknowledging the existence of anything apart from self. The general theory of knowledge that overemphasizes the subject of knowledge while depreciating its object is idealism; most types of idealism also imply subjectivism, either total or partial. Solipsism is the ultimate reach of total subjectivism, for it shuts man up within himself and equates his personal experience with the totality of existence.
The idealistic thesis that knowing is an immanent action within man and therefore that man cannot transcend his own mind has dominated modern philosophy. It has led many to the conclusion, unwarranted though it may be, that man cannot know things in themselves. The logical conclusion of such thinking is solipsism, however much its proponents deny this. It is not in any sense a new insight into the problem of knowledge, but simply an old mistake revived. Implicit in the view of the early Greek sophists, it is later found in the skepticism of the Platonic academies. aristotle was aware of it and deals with it in his Metaphysics, where he complains that men who think this way reduce themselves to the level of plants (1006a 15). In modern thought, the faulty definition of the idea by J. locke reintroduced it; G. berkeley applied it to man's knowledge of matter; and D. hume applied it finally to all things, turning it into a corrosive skepticism that seemed insane even to its author. Hume can hardly be called a conscious solipsist, but he would have become one had he carried his thought to its logical outcome.
The obvious difficulties of such an extreme position preclude any general support on the part of philosophers, even among idealists; and the term solipsism, rarely if ever self-applied or willingly acknowledged, is usually pejorative. Solipsism, moreover, being hardly defensible in itself, is attributed to the extreme varieties of subjective idealism less as a primary position than as an inevitable consequence of these doctrines if pursued to their logical conclusion. It is thus held up as the absurd situation to which subjective idealism must be driven by its own principles: the ultimate reductio ad absurdum of extreme idealism.
See Also: knowledge; knowledge, theories of; epistemology.
Bibliography: p. coffey, Epistemology, 2 v. (New York 1917; repr. Gloucester, Mass. 1958). l. m. rÉgis, Epistemology, tr. i. c. byrne (New York 1959). j. maritain, Distinguish to Unite, or the Degrees of Knowledge, tr. g. b. phelan (New York 1959). r. houde and j. p. mullaly, eds., Philosophy of Knowledge (Philadelphia 1960).
[g. c. reilly]
