Occasionalism
OCCASIONALISM
A philosophical doctrine with implications in both metaphysics and epistemology. In metaphysics, occasionalism teaches that there is no causal interaction between beings—their contiguity merely serves as the occasion for the causal influx of God; He is the only true cause. In epistemology, occasionalism teaches that the senses perceive regular sequences of events but that they do not perceive any causal interaction between these events. Thus the intellect, whose truth is measured by the evidence of the senses, can draw the conclusion that event B follows event A, but not that event B is caused by event A. One cannot, therefore, say with certitude whether there is present in nature a causal influx among beings. One cannot know whether things are causes. A metaphysical occasionalist denies that there are true causes; an epistemological occasionalist denies that man can know them. It is as a metaphysics that occasionalism is usually treated (see causality).
History. The main points in the historical development of occasionalism can be discussed in terms of its role in Arabian philosophy and in the teachings of William of Ockham, Nicolas Malebranche, and David Hume.
Arabian Philosophy. When the Muslims were introduced to the of philosophy of Aristotle during the 9th century, there soon arose a conflict between this philosophy and some of their basic religious beliefs (see arabian philosophy). Aristotle taught that natures are self-contained centers of activity with substantial stability and permanence. This view seemed irreconcilable with the Islamic religious belief in the absolute power and creative activity of God. For the universe of Aristotle was sealed off from the direct, immediate, and all-pervasive power of God. Rejecting Aristotle, some Muslims fashioned a world more in keeping with their religious beliefs. According to these thinkers, known as Mutakallims, the universe is composed of discontinuous atoms; these are indivisible particles devoid of magnitude but completely homogeneous, and they are continuously created by God, who can create or annihilate them at will. No atom endures for two moments of time; each is created at every instant. God's causal efficacy as regards these atoms, and therefore all created things, is both absolute and exclusive. Atoms do nothing. But God wills the regular patterns man observes in the universe. For example, when a white garment is placed in black dye, God creates the corresponding atoms of blackness in the garment. And the same is true of all apparent human activity. Thus when a man is said to move a pen, this is the result of the direct intervention of God who creates four simultaneous accidents: the will-act of the man to move the pen; the power to move it; the movement of the hand; and the actual movement of the pen. The regular sequence of events are merely the willed occasions for God's causality.
Ockham. The occasionalism in the thought of william of ockham may be summed up as follows. By the very fact that it is, an individual can be only itself and nothing more. Each existent is absolutely and irreducibly singular. Thus there are no relations among things. For a relation would be something that two things had in common. And since causality, as an objective factor of nature, would be a relation of dependence of one thing upon another, man can never demonstrate that one thing is the cause of another. He has only the empirical presence of sequenced events, and these he calls causes and effects. The only thing that he can affirm with certitude is that, on the occasion of this regular and repetitive sequence, the mind acquires the habit of thinking that one event really causes another. The irreducible singularity and self-identity of Ockham's existent makes any inferential transfer by the intellect to the supreme, uncaused being of God philosophically impossible. (see nominalism; ockhamism.)
Malebranche. Like the Muslim Mutakallims before him, it was in defense of religion and the divine power that Nicolas malebranche, a Catholic priest and member of the French Oratory, taught that there is only one true cause, and it is God. This fervent and pious philosopher was convinced that the chief cause of idolatry was man's tendency to attribute to natural powers, like the sun or the rivers, the causal source of the life and fertility in the world. Malebranche held that a true cause must know not only what it does but how it does it. When a man moves his hand, he cannot tell how he does it. So he cannot be the true cause of this motion. He is only, says Malebranche, the occasional cause; the true cause, and only true cause, is God.
The occasionalism of Malebranche seems often more nominal than real. In traditional doctrine, God is said to be the first uncaused cause; it is maintained also that all other causes can cause only in actual and continued dependence upon the divine power (see causality, divine). At times it seems that Malebranche's occasional causes fit the definition of a true finite cause, in the sense that they are not mere passive occasions. For example, Malebranche will admit that, when one moves one's hand, one does something. This is especially true in his treatment of an act of free choice. The act is personal, and the one placing it is responsible for it; this could not be the case if one were merely a passive occasion for God to make (cause) the choice. But Malebranche's definition of a true cause is unacceptable, as demanding too much. (see cartesianism.)
Hume. The doctrine of David hume is similar to Ockham's. Ockham denied relations, and hence the relation of being a cause, because of his teaching on the irreducible singularity and self-identity of the existent. Hume denied causality because it is an unknowable fact. Nothing is in the intellect unless it is also somehow in the senses. Hume interpreted this to mean that what a man cannot sense has no meaning for his intellect. All that a man senses is a regular and repetitive sequence of events; he does not sense any causal power affecting these events. Causality is simply the anticipation of this sequence by the mind, an anticipation that has been engendered by habit. Hume was an occasionalist in the sense that he considered sequences of events to be the occasion for the engendering of the habit of anticipating their regularity, which man calls causality. (see empiricism.)
Philosophical Implications. The principal philosophical implications of occasionalism are those relating to the existence of God and the freedom of the human will.
Existence of God. The only valid demonstration in philosophy for the existence of God would be an intellectually seen inference from the beings of man's experience to their causal source. To deny the possibility of man's ever knowing whether causality is an objective truth actually bearing upon the being of things is to deny the possibility of an inference, intellectually grasped, of a causal source. To deny the principle of causality is to cut off any way to demonstrate the knowability of the existence of a First Cause. Occasionalism in epistemology means agnosticism in natural theology.
Freedom of the Will. If one holds in his metaphysics that only God is a true cause and creatures only the occasions on which God exercises His causality, the consequences are logically devastating for created beings. For if creatures do nothing (and what else could a mere occasion mean?), they have no end; they are not for anything, and so have no reason for being. In a word, occasionalism makes of a being a contradiction in terms. It also logically destroys free will; for if a person is not the true cause of his free actions, he can hardly be said to be the cause of why they are free. In a word, causality and being are so closely connected (causality is the exercise of being), that to empty creatures of their causality is to empty them of their being.
See Also: efficient causality; instrumental causality; metaphysics, validity of.
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[m. r. holloway]
