Idealism

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IDEALISM

In philosophy, the family of doctrines revolving around the contention that the object is dependent on, and constituted by, the experiencing subject. In objective idealism the relation of interdependence holds mutually between subject and object in experience; in subjective idealism the dependence is one-way, upon the subject. Idealism is opposed to materialism, denying that mind originates from or is reducible to matter. It is equally opposed to all types of realism holding that either the objects of experience, or at least noumenal things-in-themselves, exist apart from being experienced. Idealisms may be either rationalistic, as with Leibniz, or empiricistic, as with Berkeley. Historical examples of both pluralistic and monistic-pantheistic idealisms can be found, although the post-Kantian systems of absolute idealism are monistic.

This article is divided into three parts: the first surveys the development of idealism from its earliest origins to its classical statement by Hegel; the second concentrates on post-Hegelianism idealism in Europe; and the third, on post-Hegelian idealism in the United States.

Origins and Development

Idealism as above described strictly speaking is found only in modern philosophy, and pure examples of this position cannot be found in either ancient or medieval philosophy.

Ancient Thought. The famous remark of parmeni des in frg. 3 (H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und Deutsch, ed. W. Kranz) equating thinking and being has sometimes been understood as idealistic; but Parmenides seems rather to have meant by it that thought has to be explained in terms of being as its object rather than being by thought. The pre-Socratic philosophers seem to have been materialists. For the Sophists, the assertion that the object of perception exists only in relation to a perceiving subject led not to idealism but to skepticism, or to a pragmatic concern with the utility, rather than truth, of opinions.

Plato's famous theory of transcendent Ideas, or Forms, has often been denominated as idealism. Certainly plato is in agreement with modern idealists in holding, as he does in Laws (book 10), that soul is the eldest of all things and that the physical is the product of the spiritual. The order of nature is due to divine mind, as the Demiurge of the Timaeus, but there is an underived material principle, and the archetypal Ideas, or Forms, to which the Demiurge looks are not thoughts in any mind, as the Parmenides explicitly states. The Platonic Ideas are the ultimate objective realities apprehended by knowledge in the soul, which has for Plato an intermediate grade of reality between the Ideas and the changing sensibles.

Curiously it is in Aristotle rather than in Plato that a certain anticipation of modern idealistic doctrine is to be found. The being qua being of metaphysics is identified by Aristotle with the divine entities separated in existence and definition from matter and motion; and these entities in turn, with perfect intelligences, "thinking upon thinking," in whom knowing subject and known object are identical. But such divine minds do not creatively produce lesser realities, nor are they even cognizant of them. No one is more uncompromisingly realistic than Aristotle in his account of physical nature and of human knowledge, and his theory has often been regarded, with some plausibility, as tending to naturalism.

plotinus, and the Neoplatonic tradition, contributed perhaps more to the formation of modern idealism than any other ancient or medieval thinkers. The Aristotelian identification of contemplative mind and divine being was taken over, and an effort was made to account for soul and physical nature by a process of emanation out of divine mind, which precontains in a higher, more unified mode all that exists in exile here below. But divine mind itself, although inclusive of the fullness of being, was seen as derived from a higher principle that is not intelligence or being.

Medieval Thought. No medieval thinker can be regarded as an idealist in the modern sense, although there were developments in the Middle Ages that helped to prepare the ground. The Augustinian tradition of interiorism, with its insistence that the road to truth and being lies within, was one such development. Augustine's doctrines of the spiritual autonomy of the soul and the active production by the soul of its own sense data, on the occasion of bodily changes, were others. Avicenna's famous "floating man," who still knows himself and his own mental operations even though all channels of physical sensation are blocked off, epitomized a long tradition, opposed by thomas aquinas, that extended to Descartes. There is even a sense in which medieval "realism" concerning universals—as found in such thinkers as bo ethius, william of champeaux, and duns scotus, who attributed to physical objects the identical forms or essences found in abstract thought—constituted a remote preparation for modern idealism.

Lastly, there was a little-noted medieval background for the 17th-century assumption that man experiences only his own ideas—an assumption that came to be crucial for the subjective, empirical idealism of Berkeley. This was to be found in the "formal object" analysis of sensation, common to much medieval and late medieval scholasticism. The ultimate "given" of sensation, for this theory, becomes a congeries of atomic colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and tactile sensations. Sensation experiences, in this view, only the sensible accidents, not substance or the "This man Callias" of Aristotle's account; and the intellectual inference to underlying realities was opened to the critical attacks later to be launched by the British empiricists. When such "data" (themselves the product of formal intellectual abstraction) were made into the direct objects of sensation, contrary to St. Thomas's injunction against making sensible species objects, the characteristic modern epistemological situation was produced—within which modern idealism came to flower. It is remarkable that solipsism seems to have become a serious philosophical problem only in the modern era.

Modern Thought. The egocentric predicament has typified most of modern philosophy since R. descartes, for if one directly experiences only one's own ideas, problems of extramental reference and reality become crucial. The very existence of physical entities outside of and independent of mind thus became a significant question for modern philosophers.

Berkeley. G. berkeley initiated the empiricist variety of modern idealism by answering in the negative. J. locke had made the famous distinction of primary and secondary qualities, the former being regarded as properties of physical substances, the latter being dismissed as subjective and relative. Berkeley was able to show that the so-called primary qualities are just as dependent on their being perceived as the secondary ones. As an empiricist, he held that all of man's knowledge is derived from the ideas of sense experience, and cannot reach to anything different from ideas, apart from minds in which ideas exist. The very being of ideas, for him, is their being experienced. Consequently, the very existence of independent material substances was denied; in this step Berkeley believed be had refuted not only materialism but also atheism and skepticism. Skepticism is overcome since man is certain of his own existence and of the ideas in his mind. The insuperable problems of representational theories of knowledge need not be faced, for there are no real physical entities beyond such ideas. Atheism is refuted by showing that it is impossible for the whole or any part of the visible world to exist without a mind. Since collections of ideas (trees, rocks, etc.) exist independently of human will, and appear in regular order, they are results of divine will, and exist in God's mind when not perceived by creatures.

Leibniz. In the works of G. W. leibniz, idealistic conclusions were reached by a purely rationalistic method. Taking as a premise that every complex is analyzable into simples, a proposition he considers self-evident, Leibniz shows that the simple units or monads of reality cannot be material, since everything material is infinitely divisible. Leibniz's system is summarized in his Monadology (1720).

Kant. While Berkeley had attempted to found idealism on empirical grounds, D. hume held that the empiri cism of ideas led rather to skepticism. The impact of Hume on the great German philosopher I. kant led to the central crisis of modern philosophy. Kant saw that if a radical empiricism entails skepticism, a radical rationalism in its turn leads to sterility. The empirical critique had made the supposed primary data of experience into a manifold of sense in itself unordered and unintelligible, incapable by itself of constituting scientifically knowable objects or even experiential objects. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1st ed. 1781; 2d ed. 1787), Kant maintains that the objective world of experience that founds mathematics and physics must be constituted by the organizing forms and categories of mind out of the materials of the sensuous manifold. Such a scientifically meaningful objective realm of experience is, however, only phenomenal, not noumenal. The mind determines only the forms in which things appear, but man's mentality is devoid of intellectual intuition and real "things-in-themselves" are unknowable to him. The attempt by pure reason to attain metaphysical knowledge is doomed to founder in illusion and antinomy. There is, however, a practical use of reason that establishes, over against deterministic physical nature, the spiritual world of moral duty and freedom. Confidence in the reality of this moral universe is an affair of faith, not of pure speculative reason.

Post-Kantian Idealism. Post-Kantian German philosophers sought to restore authentic metaphysical knowledge by insisting on the fact of intellectual intu ition and by abandoning the unknowable Kantian Ding ansich. J. G. fichte thus sought to advance beyond Kant's transcendental idealism to a new form of subjective idealism. In particular, Fichte (and Schelling and Hegel after him) desired to overcome the Kantian dualisms: the form and matter of experience, physical necessity and spiritual freedom, theoretical and practical uses of reason, and phenomenal and noumenal worlds. To do so, they evolved a general idealistic premise that philosophy must begin with the unconditioned absolute met with in human consciousness. For Fichte, this is the ego or self, and its unity is the ground of the systematic inter-connection of the antithetic principles of experience. The entire body of knowledge is to be deduced starting with the first three principles that the self posits. In the thesis, the ego posits its own being; in the antithesis, the nonego is "op-posited" to the ego; in the synthesis within the absolute ego there is "op-posited" a divisible, finite nonego to the divisible, finite ego. "Being," for Fichte, is this self-positing process. The nonself is irreducible only from the point of view of the theoretical ego, but not in relation to the practical ego, which posits this barrier to force the theoretical ego to reflect back upon itself. The realms of morality and right are deduced from the infinite striving of the practical ego.

In the works of F. W. J. von schelling, nature is given more than a moralistic significance in relation to the practical ego. The identical activity of the absolute is manifested unconsciously in nature and consciously in human mind. The absolute, which is the source of both, was originally conceived as a point of indifference, in which the oppositions characterizing finite perspectives are overcome. Hegel's ridicule of this position forced Schelling to attempt to explain how such opposites can be radicated in God, or the absolute, and distinctions borrowed from the theosophist J. bÖhme were employed.

Post-Kantian absolute idealism culminated in the great system of G. W. F. hegel. Absolute spirit is identified by Hegel with the concrete universal, the absolute concept whose self-development is traced through the dialectical phases of logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit, and is finally consummated not in religion but in philosophical thought. The object in finite understanding is other than mind, but philosophic reason manifests their dialectical identity in the union of absolute mind. Schelling rejected Hegel's dialectic of absolute concept as neglecting the existential factor.

Post-Hegelian Idealism in Europe

Idealism, as described in the preceding section, continued as a living philosophical movement beyond Hegel into the 19th and 20th centuries although it was somewhat in eclipse by the middle of the 20th century. This part of the article considers post-Hegelian thinkers in Germany (Schopenhauer), England, France, and Italy.

Germany. The voluntaristic, pessimistic idealism of A. schopenhauer grew out of Kant more than Hegel, whose dialectic of rational concepts was rejected. A nonrational metaphysical intuition was sought to attain the noumenal order; this was identified with a blind, irrational will to live, a unitary principle manifesting itself in the pluralistic phenomena. As for Kant, objects of knowledge for Schopenhauer are phenomena constituted by forms organizing the inchoate sensuous manifold. But sufficient reason applies only to phenomena, not to the world as a whole or to its noumenal basis. There cannot be a plurality of things-in-themselves, since the forms of space and time that individuate objects apply only to phenomena. Human experiences of the self and of one's own body as striving expressions and manifestations of will and freedom, combined with an inference extended to all perceived objects, point to a unitary cosmic will. Although man's knowledge of this cosmic willl is interior and privileged it is known by him only through the form of time and, indirectly, in the acts of the body. In its own nature, the thing-in-itself, or will, is not a knowing subject, but is nonrational, even irrational, since that which is the ultimate ground of every kind of sufficient reason cannot be proportionate to any cognitive power. The will-to-live incarnates itself at every level of nature, according to Platonic ideas, but such archetypal patterns do not imply intelligent planning. The higher and lower levels of will's embodiment are incessantly at war, objectively manifesting will's own internal hostilities and essential need, deficiency, and consequent pain. This is the source of Schopenhauer's famous pessimism. Schopenhauer considers three ways of escape from the egoism and hatred stemming from the will-to-live, viz, suicide, art, and morality. Suicide is futile, since it destroys not the will but only the phenomenal individual. Art, in contemplating disinterestedly the "Platonic Ideas," is only temporary release. Moral sympathy and renunciation in an ascetic denial of the will-to-live constitute the only cure. There is a final suggestion that perhaps such a renunciation might lead to a positive union with the thing-in-itself in a character transcending its aspect of pain-bearing will.

England. The definitive entrance of German idealism into England was signalized by the publication (1865) of J. H. Stirling's Secret of Hegel. Thomas Hill Green (1836–82) is the first important figure in the British idealistic school of the late 19th century. Green accepted the main tendencies of post-Kantian German idealism, and on this basis attacked the traditional British empirical and utilitarian positions, as well as the evolutionism of Herbert spencer. Man could not, according to Green, be a product of natural forces or a member of the phenomenal series since such a product could not know and explain himself, and thereby possess moral significance. It is the spiritual that produces the order and unity of nature, which is radicated finally in self-consciousness, an alluniting consciousness that is eternal mind. Biological evolution itself, culminating in human mentality and self-consciousness, manifests the eternal, universal spirit. Human free activity is not in time and has no antecedents, just as self-consciousness has no origin. Human conduct, to be distinctively human, involves the conscious presentation of a want to a subject who identifies himself with it, transforming natural desire into will. Green's ethical theory is based on self-realization, the self being understood as the ideal self whose good includes the perfection of all rational agents.

The greatest of the English post-Hegelian idealists is F. H. bradley, whose metaphysical masterwork is Appearance and Reality (London 1893). Bradley is not a Hegelian; he rejects the dialectical unfolding of the Idea. Rather, Bradley is a modern Eleatic, a disciple of Parmenides who employs, like his ancient predecessors, sharp dialectical instruments of refutation to convict the pluralistic phenomenal world of contradiction and unreality. The German realist J. F. Herbart also had held that nothing can be real that is contradictory, maintaining that reality must be an absolutely self-consistent system. Using this test, Herbart had found contradictions in such supposedly clear concepts as thing, change, becoming, matter, and self-consciousness. The Herbartian critique had been aimed at establishing the reality of many unchanging reals only externally related to each other. The Bradleyan dialectic, more powerful and subtle than Herbart's, proposed to show the internal contradictions of all realistic or pluralistic hypotheses. As opposed to Hegel, the Absolute Reality that is a coherent whole is not identified with dialectical reason; reason itself, in its discursive movement, deals only with appearances and can never be consummated in a union of identity with the Absolute. Thinking is essentially relational. External relations, which make no difference to their terms, require in turn new relations to bond them with their terms and an infinite regression arises. Even internal relations, where the relations bite into the being of the terms, only import into the interior of such entities the same disjunction and residual externality. Reason, in its effort to judge truly that A is B, must expand A beyond its naked isolation (in which state it cannot be a subject of judgment at all, even of identical predication) until it becomes the totality of the real, which is "such that" the predicate B can be truly asserted of it. But reason can never achieve this final synthesis or reunion of concrete existence and separated abstract content. Even if, per impossibile, reason could complete its infinite task, it would not be the Absolute, although the Absolute is a unity of experience, a seamless whole beyond all disrupting relationships, which mysteriously includes reason and all else. Man's experience begins with an immediate unity of feeling that is below the level of rational analysis, although it is somehow pregnant with such structures and contrasts. It is by a remote analogy with this original felt unity that man forms his notion of the Absolute Reality. It is an experience having for its sole materials feeling, thought, and volition—there are no others—but uniting them in a harmonious whole above the relations of the many appearances dealt with by reason. Thought cannot give man any intuitive vision of this ultimate harmony of experience, nor does Bradley posit any mystical union with the Absolute.

Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), whose most important work is The Principle of Individuality and Value (London 1912), followed Bradley in many respects but was more akin to Hegel than his famous contemporary had been. As for Hegel, for Bosanquet the notion of the concrete universal, of a universal which determines its own particularization, is central. Individuality is a striving toward completion and fulfillment, and may be exemplified in a logical system, a work of art, the moral self, a social institution. In all cases the fulfillment of individuality is in the whole, so that the goal of knowledge, moral conduct, and artistic creation is always the Absolute. Reality and value are inseparably one. In the sphere of knowledge, truth is the ideal completed totality of the system of knowledge; thus Bosanquet affirms the characteristic idealistic theory of degrees of truth and reality and the coherence theory of truth. Ethically, the moral value of an action is judged by coherence with a more inclusive scheme, and ultimately with the Absolute itself. In art, the ideal of beauty is the harmony of the completed whole.

A more minor figure in post-Hegelian British idealism is John Ellis McTaggart (1866–1925), who did commentaries on Hegel's logic and dialectic and developed, in The Nature of Existence (2 v. Cambridge, Eng. 1921–27), a pluralistic, personalistic idealism more akin to that of the American personal idealists Bowne and Brightman than to that of Hegel. All beings are spiritual persons, including God, if He exists. Such a God, however, would be finite, and is not to be identified either with the infinite personal God of traditional Christianity or with the Absolute of Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. Others who contributed to the development of British idealism are Edward Caird (1835–1908), who wrote The Critical Philosophy of Kant (2 v. Glasgow 1889); John Caird (1820–98); and the great Platonic scholar Alfred Edward Taylor (1869–1945), whose early work, the Elements of Metaphysics (London 1903), was heavily influenced by Bradley.

France. French idealism was less a development out of German and Hegelian idealism than was the case in England. Negatively, it developed as a reaction against the positivism of Auguste Comte. The activistic or dynamistic philosophy of maine de biran, which opposed positivism, became one of the native sources of French idealism. Maine de Biran organized his philosophy around the notion of the active force or effort of which one is conscious in overcoming obstacles, a concept having some kinship with Fichte's active ego that requires the nonego for its fulfillment. But Kant lay in back of the French idealistic development, as did native sources. C.B. Renouvier named his philosophy neocriticism to indicate its Kantian source. However, like McTaggart later in England and the American personalists, Renouvier moved beyond Kantian criticism to the construction of a pluralistic and personalistic idealistic metaphysics. The thing-in-itself was abandoned. Unlike Royce in America, Renouvier regarded actual infinity as self-contradictory, and his world is a finite sum of finite beings. Infinite transition is impossible, so that real discontinuity in nature must be admitted, and to Renouvier this provides an opening for uncaused beginnings and consequently for free will.

The emphasis on the reality of contingency and freedom is characteristic of French idealism. A. A. cournot, in terms of mathematical probability theory, had opposed the reigning dogma of the certitude and necessity of scientific laws, and with É. boutroux this dogma received its definitive challenge in The Contingency of the Laws of Nature (1874, 4th ed. 1902, tr. F. Rothwell, London 1916). Real indeterminacy was taken as the foundation for freedom, and God was regarded as the maximal point in the hierarchy of beings in terms of freedom and indeterminacy.

One more figure in French idealism deserves mention. Alfred Jules Emile Fouillée (1838–1912) was not, to be sure, an idealist strictly speaking, since he sought to synthesize idealism and materialism in an evolutionistic and voluntaristic philosophy that makes mind and matter aspects of one and the same thing. Neverrtheless, for him only psychi phenomena are directly experienced by man, and consequently the primary analogate for man's understanding of reality must be active mind and its idées-forces.

Italy. Italian idealism derived from Hegel but chiefly from the historical side of hegelianism, the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Mind, where the dialectical advance of the human spirit in history, art, religion, and philosophy is described. The absolutism of Hegel's thought, which made such a strong appeal in England, was regarded in Italy as static and alien to the dynamic, temporal, and progressive movement of the human spirit. It was the latter that B. croce understood as reality, rather than some transcendent absolute experience. Reality is focused on the present, and past and future are real only in relation to present experience. One of Croce's most influential contributions was in the area of aesthetics. Sense perception and artistic creation differ only in degree; intuition is creative of the data of both.

The other prominent modern Italian idealist was G. gentile, who, unlike Croce, made common cause with the fascism of his day. The dualisms engendered by the subject-object contrast are synthesized in the unity of self-consciousness, which is manifested at its peak in philosophy. Art is one-sidedly subjective, religion onesidedly objective, but philosophy alone achieves perfect synthesis; it not merely knows reality, it is reality. But since philosophical reflection develops through history, philosophy is history.

Critique. From the point of view of Catholic Christian theism, two variants of modern idealism appear clearly unacceptable. The absolute monism of post-Kantian German idealism is certainly one. But even the pluralistic, personalistic idealisms cannot be reconciled with Christian theism if they are regarded as implying divine finitude.

Bibliography: j. d. collins, A History of Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee 1954). f. c. copleston, History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md. 1946–), esp. v.7, Fichte to Nietzsche (1963). j. marÉchal, Le Point de départ de la métaphysique, v.4 Le Système idéaliste chez Kant et les postkantiens (3d ed. Paris 1947). r. jolivet, Les Sources de l'idéalisme (Paris 1936). h. d. gardeil, Les Étages de la philosophie idéaliste (Paris 1935). a. carlini, Enciclopedia filosofica, 4 v. (Venice-Rome 1957) 2:1189–1201. j. mÖller, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, ed. j. hofer and k. rahner, 10 v. (2d, new ed. Freiburg 1957–65) 5:601–02. w. wieland, Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 7 v. (3d ed. Tübingen 1957–65) 3:556–62. r. eisler, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, 3 v. (4th ed. Berlin 1927–30) 1:672–81.

[l. j. eslick]

American Idealism

Although American idealism reflects the many varieties of its British and German antecedents, most American idealists fall into one of two groups, personal or absolute. Personal idealists conceive reality as a self or as belonging to a self; they are indebted to Berkeley, whom they consider to have shown conclusively that matter does not exist, and are usually theistic. Absolute idealists, on the other hand, tend to be monistic and pantheistic; they hold that reality is included within one complete system, present to an all-comprehensive Mind called the absolute. They believe that Berkeley went too far in denying the existence of matter altogether, although they credit him with rightly insisting that everything in reality is dependent on mind. They are convinced also that personal idealism places too much emphasis on the separateness of persons from one another and from God.

The history of idealism in America is largely a record of protest by religious-orientated thinkers against various forms of materialism, naturalism, and positivism that tend to deny the intelligible order of the universe and its dependence on mind. Most American idealists have been led to their position in search of a rational basis for morality and religion. This is true equally of the early idealists of New England, of the St. Louis Group, of B. P. Bowne and J. Royce, and most recently of Errol Harris.

Early Idealists. American idealism finds its earliest representatives in Jonathan edwards and Samuel Johnson (1696–1772), both of Connecticut. Although Edwards is known primarily as a Calvinist theologian and preacher, he developed from a critical reading of Newton and Locke a personal idealism that was to parallel in many respects the work of Berkeley, although he was probably ignorant of the fact that the British philosopher had reached similar conclusions. Johnson, who was the founder and first president of King's College, was directly influenced by Berkeley, with whom he became personally acquainted during Berkeley's visit to America (1729–31). Johnson retained enough of his earlier acquaintance with scholasticism, however, to prevent him from accepting outright Berkeley's nominalism. Neither Johnson's idealism nor Edwards', however, were to make a permanent impression on American thought.

Idealism in the U.S. was to receive its major impetus through the efforts of a group of influential teachers and professional men who met regularly in St. Louis during the years immediately following the Civil War. This group met at first informally in the home of William Harris, the future U.S. commissioner of education, for the study of German philosophy. Later, owing to the influence of Henry Conrad Brockmeyer (1828–1906), it undertook the serious study of Hegel, methodically analyzing Brockmeyer's translation of one of Hegel's works. It eventually founded the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the first philosophical periodical in the English language, in which it published translations and commentaries on German philosophy. Other members included G. H. Howison, Thomas Davidson, and Joseph Pulitzer. Bronson Alcott was so impressed with the St. Louis Hegelians, as they came to be known, that he resolved to make their Hegelianism known in the East, which he did by inviting various representatives of it to the Concord Summer School of Philosophy.

Howison and Bowne. George Holmes Howison (1834–1916), who later taught for man years at the University of California, Berkeley, became one of the betterknown members of the St. Louis group. A personal idealist, he devoted much of his effort to combating the evolutionary agnosticism of Herbert Spencer. He also attacked the pantheistic and solipsistic tendencies of absolute idealism. He suggested that cosmic evolution, as a judgment about nature, is essentially a teleological idea. Science must rest upon the assumption of an allpervading rationality in things. This implies, he thought, a self-conscious intelligence underlying, and responsible for the connectedness of, all phenomena.

The cause of personal idealism was simultaneously advanced, and perhaps with greater success because he was a more systematic thinker than Howison, by Borden Parker Bowne (1847–1910) of Boston University. In his major work, Personalism (New York 1908), Bowne discloses himself as at once indebted to and critical of Kant. He believed that Kant and his followers paid so much attention to the forms by which the mind organizes experience that they had all but forgotten the self whose characteristic activity is to know by means of the organization of experience. Bowne taught that man's cognitive powers are in general reliable. "Intelligence is simply a bottom fact which explains everything but accepts itself." Persons and the external world exist, but they exist as objectified or realized ideas. Bowne's epistemology is dualistic insofar as he holds that the idea and its object are numerically distinct. He accepts the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, identifying the latter with the personal. A Supreme Person is the ground for both the system of nature and the community of persons. Bowne's personalism is also voluntaristic. To be is to act, and to act is to will. Attacking a mechanistic sense-bound naturalism on the one hand, Bowne criticizes an idealistic impersonalism on the other.

Royce and Others. Of American idealists, Josiah royce is probably the most outstanding. His principal work, The World and the Individual, the Gifford lectures of 1899–1900 (2 v. New York 1900–01), earned him a lasting place in the history of American philosophy. In these lectures Royce argued that "the whole universe including the physical world is essentially one living thing, a mind, one great spirit." This conclusion, Royce believed, was not only in accord with the demands of reason but also with the facts of human experience and the assumptions of science. Since the universe is one great allinclusive mind, the best method of acquiring an understanding of its nature is by an examination of one's own conscious experience. Just as the human mind is the sum total of fleeting conscious experience, so the Absolute is composed of all the conscious selves into which he has differentiated himself and whose conscious experiences are embraced in his own universal Mind. Royce believes it impossible to think of the world in a realistic or materialistic sense, as first having existence independent of human minds and later producing them. Like Howison and Bowne, he attacks materialistic conceptions of evolution. For Royce, the world and the mind are organically related; neither can be taken apart from the other; there can be no object without a subject that knows it.

The cause of idealism was advanced also by James E. Creighton (1861–1924), for many years the editor (from 1893 until his death) of the Philosophical Review; by W. E. Hocking (1873–1966), an absolute idealist; by E. S. brightman, whose idealism is best described as personalism; and most recently by E. E. Harris, who in his Nature, Mind and Modern Science (New York 1954), attempts to show that classical empiricism and logical positivism are dead ends, reopening the idealistic examination of evolution.

Although between 1875, and 1900 almost every professor of philosophy in the U.S. was an idealist, and idealists remained in the majority for a decade or two later, idealism could not maintain itself on the American scene. Bowne and Royce bequeathed to America a host of inspired religious teachers, ministers, and administrators; but their influence was to give way before the criticism of realism and naturalism. This trend from idealism to naturalism is strikingly reflected in the intellectual development of John Dewey as he moved from an early defense of idealism to an outright naturalism. In general, idealism came to be regarded as unscientific or as insufficiently imbued with the scientific spirit.

Critique. From the viewpoint of moderate realism, American idealism begins not with experience but with the problems bequeathed to it by the erroneous epistemologies of Locke and Hume, whose empiricism, in turn, has its origin in the exaggerated realism of Descartes. A moderate realism, offered as an alternative explanation, would insist that things exist independently of the human mind, which is capable of discovering not only their phenomenal but also their essential aspects. The intelligibility of the universe is accounted for in terms of a personal, creator God, distinct in essence from His creatures, who is at once their origin and their goal, as well as continually responsible for their existence.

See Also: transcendentalism.

Bibliography: c. m. perry, ed., The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy (Norman, Okla. 1931). w. g. muelder and l. sears, eds., The Development of American Philosophy (New York 1940). h. g. townsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United States (New York 1934).

[j. p. dougherty]

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