Welfare Rights

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WELFARE RIGHTS

Is there a constitutional right of indigent people to basic survival assistance from the state? The current Supreme Court says no, but there is a strong argument that a future Supreme Court should recognize a positive constitutional right to basic subsistence.

The current Court's view was essentially settled in dandridge v. williams (1971), when the Court ruled that a state law setting a maximum grant of welfare benefits to any one family, regardless of family size, was to be categorized as economic regulation. On this assumption the law should be upheld if it were supported by a rational basis, which the Court found to be present.

For a decade and a half prior to that time, the Court had tantalized scholars and advocates with a series of holdings requiring provision of transcripts to indigent criminal defendants in griffin v. illinois (1956), outlawing the poll tax because of its impact in barring indigent people from voting in harper v. virginia state board of elections (1966), mandating a face-to-face hearing before welfare benefits could be terminated in goldberg v. kelly (1970), and invalidating durational residence requirements for welfare in shapiro v. thompson (1969).

These opinions suggested there was something particularly unacceptable or vulnerable about indigence that required special treatment of indigent people by the state. Some welfare advocates thought the Court might strike down America's patchwork income-maintenance system, in which there was no statutory obligation to help two-parent families and states could set payment levels as they chose.

Dandridge was the Court's response, followed as the decade wore on by declarations, in Lindsey v. Normet (1972), that there is no constitutional right to any minimum level of housing and, in maher v. roe (1977), that there is no right to any minimum level of health care.

Yet a kernel of doctrine remains to support the notion of a right to subsistence help. Indigence does require the state to take steps it would not otherwise have to take, at least when some other liberty or property interest is also at stake. The state, for example, has no obligation to provide a transcript to the rich, and it can impose durational residential requirements or differential fees for nonresidents applicable to a number of state benefits. But when indigence is involved, the liberty or property interests concerned become vital enough to require a different response from the state.

The Court's handling of public education provides a particularly important clue. In san antonio independent school district v. rodriquez (1973), the Court, while upholding Texas's system of school finance, noted that a refusal to provide public education altogether would present a different case, a point it reiterated in Papasan v. Allain (1986). Considering that the wealthy can purchase education for their children, these references imply some obligation to provide education for those who cannot afford it. One argument supporting such a claim is that it is difficult to exercise one's political rights effectively without education. The same commonsense argument applies more generally to the status of indigence. Lack of food and shelter impedes political participation, among other things. Insofar as families with children are involved, indigence interferes gravely with the liberty interest in family relations recognized in meyer v. nebraska (1923). The door left open in Rodriguez has important implications.

If the state has a special obligation to protect some liberty and property interests when indigence is also present, it is arguable that there is an analogous liberty interest in not being indigent. Because indigence in an extreme form represents a threat to life itself, it is arguable that the state has an obligation to provide basic subsistence.

The Supreme Court has been reluctant throughout American history to declare any positive constitutional rights—rights creating affirmative obligations for the state to act, even though it has committed no legal wrong. Nonetheless, an alternative stream of doctrine, more muted and episodic, has permitted the Court to impose on the states affirmative obligations to act. For example, the Court's strained efforts to find state action in shelley v. kraemer (1948) and marsh v. alabama (1946) might be characterized as imposing constitutional obligations on states to intervene to nullify unacceptable private arrangements or outcomes of private activities. The claim of a right to a subsistence, or "survival," income can well be said to rest on a similar state obligation to intervene to alter unacceptable market outcomes and vindicate individual liberty interests.

The argument for a right to subsistence does not need to rest solely on the idea of a positive right. For the nonelderly the current welfare system, in terms of cash and cash-equivalent assistance, consists primarily of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and food stamps. Because the states set payment levels for AFDC benefits, combined payment levels under the two programs vary from less than half the poverty level up to a point near the poverty level ($9,435 for a family of three in 1988). The states do not seek to justify this variation by reference to any regional difference in the cost of living—or, indeed, by reference to any other factor. The median state's benefits approximate two-thirds of the poverty-level income. In other words, in half the states welfare assistance brings a family with children up to less than two-thirds of what the government itself says is required to achieve a bare minimum standard of living. No substantial cash or cash-equivalent federal assistance other than food stamps is available to nondisabled nonelderly individuals or to couples without children.

It is not excessive to argue that this system lacks a rational basis. If any degree of heightened scrutiny were attached to legislation affecting the indigent, it is hard to see how the current welfare system could be justified in the face of an equal protection challenge. Surely the current Supreme Court would not respond positively to these arguments. Yet similar arguments might be taken seriously by Justices of the future.

Peter B. Edelman
(1992)

(see also: Economic Equal Protection; Welfare State.)

Bibliography

Black, Charles L., Jr. 1985 Further Reflections on the Consitutional Justice of Livelihood. Columbia Law Review 86: 1103–1117.

Edelman, Peter B. 1987 The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor. Hastings Law Journal 39:1–61.

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