Fay v. Noia 372 U.S. 391 (1963)

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FAY v. NOIA 372 U.S. 391 (1963)

The Great Writ of habeas corpus allows state prisoners to seek federal court review of constitutional errors made at their trials, but the judicial code requires exhaustion of remedies in state court, in order to preserve comity between state and federal courts. Charles Noia's 1942 murder conviction was based solely on a coerced confession procured in violation of his fourteenth amendment rights to due process. He chose not to file a state appeal, however, because he feared that a new trial might end in a death sentence. Years later, he sought review of his due process claim in state courts, but they held that his original failure to appeal was a procedural default that barred further review. In Fay, a 6–3 Supreme Court held that his failure was not a "deliberate bypass" of state procedures and thus no bar to habeas corpus relief.

Justice william j. brennan, speaking for the majority, posited a "manifest federal policy" that liberty rights should not be denied without the fullest opportunity for federal judicial review. The concept of comity could not justify denying habeas corpus relief for failure to exhaust a remedy no longer available. As for the state's interests in insuring finality of criminal judgments, or exacting compliance with its procedures through default rules, these could not outweigh the "ideal of fair procedure" and the historic habeas corpus policy favoring the free exercise of federal judicial power to enforce this ideal. Finally, the state's rejection of Noia's claim could not be treated as an adequate state ground, for this jurisdictional deference would unduly burden the vindication of federal rights. Only when a defendant deliberately evaded state adjudication would federalism concerns justify the denial of habeas corpus review.

As dissenting Justice john marshall harlan noted, Fay marked a dramatic expansion of federal power to supervise state criminal justice. The concepts of exhaustion and adequate state grounds were modified to make room for a generous view that excused defendants from uncalculated waiver of constitutional rights in state proceedings. The "deliberately bypassing" defendant was a rare one, and Fay' s scope freed most defendants from forfeiting their rights through procedural defaults of every kind. Simultaneously, the warren court's application of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the states codified a Bill of Rights for criminal defendants. Fay insured a broad federal path of enforcement for these new guarantees, in an era when the state path of review was not always open or receptive to constitutional claims.

The burger court era brought a less hospitable federal climate for criminal defendants and, not surprisingly, also brought a corresponding change in the habeas corpus barometer, emerging clearly in wainright v. sykes (1977). Fay' s deliberate bypass rule did not endure as an exclusive measure of federalism interests, because a new "manifest" federal policy came to elevate the state's interest in finality above the ideal of fair procedure. With this new federalism, the whole point of habeas corpus review was transformed from the protection of constitutional rights to the protection of those with a claim to innocence.

Catherine Hancock
(1986)