Comparable Worth

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COMPARABLE WORTH

The term "comparable worth" refers to the claim that workers in predominantly female occupations should be compensated at rates similar to those paid to workers in predominantly male occupations, when the labor involved in both is comparable in value to the employer. The claim assumes (1) that significant sex segregation exists in American employment; (2) that, as a result, women are disadvantaged economically; and (3) that job classifications that are different can nonetheless be compared by analyzing their component skill, effort, responsibility, working conditions, and training requirements.

The first assumption is not controversial. More than half of the jobs that fall under the most commonly used occupational designations are over eighty percent male-or female-dominated. At least part of the second claim is likewise firmly established. On average, women earn only sixty percent of what men do, and the higher the percentage of women in a particular job category, the lower the average wage tends to be.

One of the controversies over comparable worth centers on how much of the male-female wage disparity can be explained by "nondiscriminatory" factors, such as length of time in continuous employment, trade-offs between work and family responsibility, and personal choice. Although these factors may themselves be products of prior sex discrimination, they can nevertheless be distinguished from the employer's own current intentional discrimination, reliance on sex stereotypes, or use of wage-setting devices that do not measure job requirements or performance. Proponents of comparable-worth claims argue that the latter factors produce a significant part of the general wage disparity, so that the disparity is properly challenged as discriminatory under laws guaranteeing equal employment opportunity. Opponents who agree that there is a relationship between employers' undervaluation of certain kinds of work and the fact that such work is predominantly done by women, nonetheless reject comparable-worth claims as a useful strategy for improving the economic condition of women. They prefer strategies that would move large numbers of women into fields in which men are currently overrepresented.

Controversy also surrounds the questions of which jobs are comparable and how to measure comparability. Courts generally accept statistical analysis in claims of employment discrimination, but do not always agree on the validity, appropriateness, or evidentiary weight of particular statistical analyses. Neither do they agree on whether and how comparable-worth claims should fit within the framework of employment discrimination claims created by Title VII of the civil rights act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act of 1964, or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. County of Washington v. Gunther (1981), the only Supreme Court opinion to mention comparable worth, expressly declined to address the issue, although it did hold that intentional sex discrimination in wages could be challenged under Title VII, despite differences in male and female job classifications.

Most comparable worth litigation is brought against public employers, who generally employ large numbers of people in a wide variety of job classifications. Although public employers are subject to both Title VII and constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, equal protection claims are generally not raised by plaintiffs seeking comparable-worth decrees. As personnel administrator of massachusetts v. feeney (1979) illustrates, an employment practice does not violate the Constitution unless its discriminatory impact has been intentionally created. Employers are more likely to set wages on the basis of prevailing market rates for certain job classifications or even on unconscious stereotypes about the relative worth of female-dominated occupations than on an intentional desire to undercompensate women simply because they are women.

Even in the statutory arena, much uncertainty remains. For example, it is unclear whether the availability of statutory "disparate impact" claims against other types of alleged employment discrimination extends to sex-based wage discrimination. Some courts have asserted that wage-setting practices are too subjective, too multifaceted, or both, to be effectively tested by the disparate impact model of discrimination. Others have simply stated that an employer's reliance on the market in setting wages is not the kind of practice to which the model should apply. The Supreme Court has spoken only obliquely on these issues.

Given uncertainty whether equal pay for work of comparable worth is required by existing federal law, advocates of comparable worth have not confined their efforts to the courtroom. Pay equity, including comparable worth, has to date been more successfully achieved through collective bargaining, state legislation, and local ordinances than through litigation.

Christine A. Littleton
(1992)

(see also: Feminist Theory.)

Bibliography

Blumrosen, Ruth G. 1980 Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Women Workers. Women's Rights Law Reporter 6:19–57.

Dowd, Nancy E. 1986 The Metamorphosis of Comparable Worth. Suffolk University Law Review 20:833–865.

Feldstein, Hydee R. 1981 Sex-based Wage Discrimination Claims. Columbia Law Review 81:1333–1347.

Note [L ittleton, Christine ] 1981 Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality. Harvard Law Review 95:487–508.

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