Egypt

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EGYPT

Previously a semiautonomous Ottoman province, Egypt was from 1882 to the early 1950s essentially, though never formally, a British colony whose control the British considered crucial because of the Suez Canal. In 1914, when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Germans, Britain declared Egypt a protectorate, and in 1922 a form of home rule under the Ottoman/Egyptian monarchy (the royal family was Albanian in origin). Hostility to foreign rule (which had been building since European interventions over Egypt's foreign debt in the 1870s and British occupation in 1882), dissatisfaction with social conditions, and later outrage at the ongoing establishment of a European/Zionist settler state in Palestine under imperial protection led to a widespread, although divided, nationalist movement with both religious and secular components.

From the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, Egyptian political parties—ranging from the Wafd, the largest secular nationalist party between the wars, to the Communists, to the Muslim Brotherhood—rallied their followers over the cause of the Palestinians. Some, especially the Muslim Brothers, supplied money and volunteers for anti-Zionist actions in Palestine, including strikes, the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, and the Arab-Israel War of 1948–1949. Egypt was the main advocate for the Palestinians in the League of Arab States after its creation in 1945.

The disaster of the 1948 war, which left the Gaza Strip, with roughly a quarter of a million Palestinian refugees, under Egyptian control, severely weakened the government and discredited most of the existing political parties. A coup d'état in 1952 by a group of young military officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser led to the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of a republic in 1953. Political parties, except for an officially approved group, were disbanded, and a thorough program of social, economic, and political reform was undertaken. In 1956, under a new constitution, Nasser became president.

After 1949, under both monarchy and republic, Egypt formally supported the Palestinian cause but in practice refrained from conflict with Israel and even participated in secret negotiations for a compromise settlement; resources were devoted mainly to the domestic economy. But the Lavon Affair in 1954 and Israeli attacks on Gaza in 1954 and 1955 convinced Nasser that the Egyptian armed forces had to be built up. His refusal to join the Baghdad Pact or take sides in the Cold War—in 1955 Egypt joined the Nonaligned Movement—as well as Egyptian aid to the Algerian nationalists then in revolt against French rule, made it impossible to obtain Western arms and prevented an agreement in ongoing negotiations with Britain over its occupation of the Suez Canal zone, which continued under a 1936 treaty. Nasser concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, then a Soviet satellite; the United States withdrew its offer to finance the Aswan High Dam, an important economic project. Nasser's response was to seize and nationalize the Suez Canal. Although he offered financial compensation, the British and French attempted to break him militarily and colluded with Israel to provoke the Suez-Sinai War of October 1956, which ended, mostly because of American pressure, in humiliation for the British and French; in their withdrawal; and in the increased status of Egypt in the world, especially among Arabs. Also under American pressure, the Israelis withdrew from the Sinai, destroying roads and military installations as they left.

In 1958, partly as a result of the popularity of Nasser's Arab nationalism, Syria and Egypt created the United Arab Republic (UAR), with Nasser at its head. Political differences with the Syrians led to the dissolution of the UAR in 1961. In 1962, Egypt also became involved in a civil war in North Yemen, where a coup d'état had overthrown the Saudi-supported monarchy. This conflict was a drain on Egyptian resources for several years.

In 1964, Egypt, along with Syria and Iraq, sponsored the Arab League's creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a means to channel—and keep under control—the activities of Palestinian nationalists. Under its leader Ahmad Shuqayri, it was largely beholden to Egypt for material support. Shuqayri, however, indulged in extremely belligerent rhetoric, to the detriment of Palestinian as well as Egyptian interests, particularly in the months before the 1967 war with Israel. In 1966, Egypt entered into a mutual defense treaty with Syria.

In the spring of 1967, the Israelis began massing troops along the Egyptian border. Nasser moved troops into the area, requested the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force, which had guarded the border since 1956, and blockaded the Straits of Tiran. Egypt and Jordan then signed a mutual defense treaty. These acts were the culmination of a long period of tension and provocation that led to the Arab-Israel War of 1967, which ended disastrously for all the Arab state participants and for the Palestinians. The Arab armies were routed and Israel was left in possession of the Syrian Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, as well as the remainder of what had been Palestine under the British Mandate, including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; hundreds of thousands of new Palestinian refugees were created. Nasser's government and international prestige were undermined, and the PLO began to distance itself from Egypt, beginning with the resignation of Shuqayri. Nasser resigned, but his resignation was refused by the National Assembly. He negotiated a ceasefire in the Black September conflict between Jordan and the PLO shortly before he died in 1970.

His successor, Anwar al-Sadat, was less interested in pan-Arab unity than Nasser and worked to reorient Egypt toward the United States. He signed the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Treaty, which originated during the Nasser regime, but expelled Soviet military advisors in 1972. (He reconciled with the Soviet Union early in 1973 and military aid resumed.) Frustrated by the Israeli refusal to negotiate the return of Israeli-occupied territory, Egypt and Syria launched the Arab-Israel War of 1973, in which Sadat achieved two objectives: showing that Egyptian armed forces were capable of fighting well against the Israelis and provoking the Americans to step in to mediate a peace settlement. Sadat agreed to an Israeli proposal to seek a treaty under U.S., rather than UN, auspices, and concluded agreements in 1974 and 1975 dealing with disengagement in the Sinai. He sought American aid and investment and abrogated the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1976, when the Soviets refused to delay repayment of Egyptian debts. These moves toward a separate peace constituted a break with the Arab world. Sadat signed the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the subsequent peace treaty in 1979. These agreements proved extremely unpopular both with Egyptians and with other Arabs. Members of the Arab League severed diplomatic relations; Egypt was suspended from the League and from the Organization of the Islamic Conference. There was immense popular opposition to the treaty, with its perceived capitulation on the Palestinian issue, as well as to Sadat's economic liberalization, which brought great hardship to the lower and middle classes (he reduced food subsidies and abolished price controls, largely at the behest of the World Bank; there were riots in 1977, which the army suppressed violently). To retain political control, Sadat governed in an increasingly autocratic and repressive manner, largely by decree and through rigged referenda. He outlawed strikes, imposed censorship, tolerated corruption, repressed Palestinian political and economic activity in Egypt, attempted to undermine the PLO, and jailed political opponents. When Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by a group belonging to Eyptian Islamic Jihad, he was barely mourned; indeed his death was celebrated throughout the Arab world.

His successor, Husni Mubarak, sought to placate popular discontent, but without losing political control. He moderated Sadat's most repressive measures and harshest economic policies, legalized political parties, and loosened censorship. He did not repudiate the peace treaty and he maintained good relations with the United States. Like Sadat, he aided Iraq (also being helped by the United States) in the Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980. In April 1982, in accord with the peace treaty, Israel withdrew from the Sinai. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee, a move that might not have been possible without the treaty, which limited Egypt's military presence in the Sinai and inserted a multinational force between Egypt and the Israelis. Mubarak withdrew Egypt's ambassador from Israel but did not break relations. When the PLO was expelled from Lebanon in 1983, however, Mubarak did assist it (although he did not accept any PLO fighters into Egypt) and publicly met with its leader, Yasir Arafat; Mubarak was subsequently a frequent intermediary between the PLO and the United States. This was the beginning of Egypt's reacceptance into the Arab World. In 1984, Jordan, another ally of Iraq and the United States, resumed diplomatic relations. In 1989, Egypt joined the Arab Cooperation Council, a group of Arab countries that had aided Iraq during its war with Iran, and later the same year was allowed to rejoin the League of Arab States. In 1990, with a majority of the League, Egypt condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the next year joined the American-led coalition in the Gulf War, although Mubarak would not allow Egyptian troops to be used inside Iraq.

The Palestinian cause remained popular in Egypt, and after the Intifada broke out in late 1987 large public demonstrations took place, some of which became violent. These were organized by student, labor, political, and religious groups. Islamist groups particularly condemned both the Egyptian government and the PLO for compromising with the Israelis, and increasingly unpopular government economic policies contributed to the opposition. Through the 1990s, militant groups like Islamic Jihad and al-Jami?a al-Islamiyya campaigned against the government; they attempted to assassinate Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995 and for several years carried on a violent campaign aimed at foreign residents and tourists, which resulted in many deaths and elicited armed repression.

Mubarak condemned the harsh Israeli response to the Intifada but at no time threatened to abandon the peace treaty. He recognized the Proclamation of the State of Palestine in 1988, but his opposition to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait strained relations with the PLO, which supported Iraq. After the Gulf War, however, Mubarak continued to advocate negotiations and supported both the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords.

In the opening years of the twenty-first century, Mubarak's government remains in power through undemocratic means, and its main fear is the political strength of the Islamists. Although the more violent groups of the 1990s have subsided, the officially outlawed Muslim Brotherhood is increasingly popular, especially since the start of the Palestinians' al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. With the increasing radicalization of the Israeli and American policies and of organized Palestinian responses to them, Egyptian influence in the Palestinian-Israeli dispute has waned. Constrained by his determination to maintain Egypt's relation with the United States (Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world; Israel is the first), there is little Mubarak can do either to help the Palestinians or to restrain the Israelis. Although he offered Egypt's support after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, his opposition to the American war in Iraq in 2003 was ignored, as was his urging that the Bush administration become more involved in seeking a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian issue.