Eyadéma, Gnassingbé 1937–

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Gnassingbé Eyadéma 1937

President of Togo

A Career in the Army

The Tide Turns

A Threat to Power


General Gnassingbé Eyadéma is one of the worlds longest-serving national leaders, having run the West African nation of Togo since 1967. Eyadémas hold on presidential power in Togo has been consolidated by both force and by political machination in a career that has included military coups, suspicious murders, assassination attempts on opposition leaders, and dramatic appeals to national unity at the expense of free expression.

While other self-imposed rulers in Africa have bowed to demands for multiparty democracymost often relinquishing power in the processEyadéma has retained his hold on the Togolese government in spite of national unrest and international censure. Even a 1993 general election, which Eyadéma won by a large margin, seemed nothing more than a deceptive show designed to guarantee the generals continued power. Africa Report contributor Colleen Lowe Moma characterized the government of Togo as essentially an authoritarian state, with the president dominating all branches and functions of government, and ruling by decree; but legislative elections held in February of 1994 indicate that the opposition may soon gain a voice in Togos government.

Africa Report correspondent Peter Da Costa noted that Eyadéma has shown remarkable survival skills, clawing back his powers stripped by a national conference in 1990. With his [1993] election victory, Eyadémas bully-boy tactics, which cost hundreds of lives, appear to have paid off. Although he may be poised to admit some opposition leaders to his inner circle as a gesture of conciliation, Eyadéma seems to favor the continuation of a style of autocratic rule that has led observers to call Togo one of the [African] continents most closed and repressive nations, to quote New York Times contributor Kenneth B. Noble.

A Career in the Army

Only 30 miles wide and 360 miles long, Togo is a tiny country that borders the Atlantic Ocean in West Africa. Formerly a French colony with strong ethnic ties to neighboring Ghana, the nation became independent in 1960. Most Togolese citizens are subsistence farmers, but the country does export coffee, cocoa, and phosphates. Many imports and funds for development come from

At a Glance

Born Étienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma, December 26, 1937, in Pya, Lama-Kara, Togo; son of Gnassingbé and NDanida Eyadéma.

French Army officer, 1953-61, serving in Indochina, Dahoney, Niger, and Algeria; named commander in Togolese Army, 1963; became Togolese Army chief of staff, 1965; president of Togo, chief of armed forces, and minister of defense, 1967.

Selected awards: Named chevalier du Legion dHonneur (France).

Addresses: OfficePalais présidentiel, ave de la Marina, Lomé, Togo.

France, Germany, and other Western nations, including the United States. Seagoing commerce is centered in Lomé, the capital city, which is quite close to the Ghana-Togo border.

The two principal ethnic groups in Togo are the Ewe and the Kabiye. As is the case elsewhere in Africa, tensions between the two peoples present a continuing political concern, especially since neighboring Ghana contains a sizeable population of Ewes. Gnassingbé Eyadéma is of Kabiye descent, and as head of the Togolese military virtually since 1963, he has overseen the promotion of Kabiye soldiers to all ranks in the army. Eyadémas own ascent in the Togolese army ranks was swift. He received his military training with the French Army and served with French troops in such places as Indochina and Algeria before accepting a commission in Togo in 1961. At the age of 26 he was named a commander in the Togolese Army after he led a successful revolt against then-president Sylvanus Olympio.

After engineering the coup that resulted in Olympios death in 1963, Eyadéma invited Nicolas Grunitzky, Togos first prime minister, back to head the country. (Grunitzky had lost power to Olympio in 1958.) Grunitzky attempted to institute a constitutional multiparty government in Togo, but his efforts came to naught, and the increasingly popular Eyadéma began to court support among the military and the civilian populace. In January of 1967, Eyadéma, by then army chief of staff, assumed the political leadership of Togo in a nonviolent coup. He reorganized the government, named himself president, and scheduled a referendum on a new constitution. That referendum was later canceled, and by 1969 Eyadéma had enough popular support that he was able to form and head a new political party, the Togolese Peoples Rally (RPT). The RPT became Togos only legal political party, and its simple platform rested on theories of national unity and cultural authenticity.

Eyadémas dictatorship could not entirely quell opposition, however. As early as 1970 he was forced to suppress a plot to overthrow him, and by the mid-1970s several exiled dissentersincluding the sons of ex-president Olympiowere viewed as real threats to the regime. On the other hand, foreign aid from France, Germany, and the United States introduced new industries into Togo, and a growing world market for phosphates brought improvement to the countrys economy. As the relative prosperity continued into the 1980s, Togo became known as Africas little Switzerland. The capital of Lomé, stocked with luxurious imports from Europe and America, was also a regional banking center and a bustling deepwater port.

The Tide Turns

Colleen Lowe Moma noted that the trappings of prosperity failed to cover severe problems in Togo. The casual visitor might be forgiven for concluding that Togo is at the top of the African achievement league, she wrote. Ironically, in 1982, Togo, along with a handful of other Third World countries, was officially designated by the UN General Assembly as one of theleast developed countries among developing nations.With an average GNP per capita of $300 per annum, Togos 3 million people rank among the poorest in the world. A downturn in the phosphate market late in the 1980s accelerated an economic decline, and not surprisingly, produced new hostility toward the Eyadéma regime.

A series of bomb attacks in Lomé during the summer of 1985 led to the arrest of more than a dozen people who were subsequently accused of terrorism and distributing subversive literature. The Togolese Movement for Democracy (MTD), made up of a group of exiled dissenters, claimed that members of Eyadémas government had perpetrated the bombings and then used them as an excuse to launch a wave of repression. When one of the detainees charged with the bombings died mysteriously in prisonand allegations surfaced that others may have been torturedthe human rights organization Amnesty International tried to send investigators to Togo. They were unable to enter the country, but a delegation of French observers did report evidence of torture among political prisoners. Eyadéma responded to these charges by issuing a presidential pardon to several of the detainees. A more serious coup attempt against the Eyadéma regime occurred in September of 1986. A paramilitary unit occupied the Lomé military barracks, the RPT headquarters, and the national radio station, killing about a dozen people during the attack. Eyadéma appealed to his French allies for assistance, and France sent 250 paratroopers to restore order. In December of 1986, 13 people were sentenced to death, and 14 to life imprisonment, for the attack. One of three people to receive the death sentence in absentia was Gilchrist Olympio, an exiled son of the former Togolese president.

These and other demonstrations against Eyadémas regime were the first harbingers of resistance to the dictator and his one-party rule. In an effort to silence the opposition, Eyadéma called for an election in the winter of 1986. Kenneth Noble described the voting procedure in the New York Times: Gnassingbé Eyadéma held a referendum on his reign as President of [Togo]. As soldiers stood guard, voters were obliged to hold up a card of one color for yesor another forno.Given these circumstances, there were visible few signs of discontent, and Mr. Eyadéma, the sole candidate, polled 99 percent of the vote. Eyadéma was shrewd enough to realize, however, that he could not ignore the calls for multiparty democracy. By 1989 he was assuring the United States governmentand his own peoplethat the process of democratization of Togo would begin shortly.

Opposition parties multiplied both within Togo and outside its borders, especially in Ghana, while unrest swelled in Lomé especially. After another round of politically-motivated arrests in 1990and more allegations of torture of political prisonerswidespread strikes erupted in the capital city. Eyadémas forces clashed with protesters who attacked public property; eventually almost 200 people were arrested. As in previous cases of organized unrest, Eyadéma blamed international machinations and foreign influence for the troubles, pointing a finger most notably at Ghana. Likewise, he once again resisted efforts to investigate human rights violations, issuing widespread presidential pardons to those arrested in the demonstrations.

A Threat to Power

Protests continued in Togo, gaining momentum as other African nations ousted long-standing dictators in favor of democratic governments. By the spring of 1991 Eyadéma was compelled to agree to widespread reforms. The most dramatic demonstration of his loss of power came in the summer of 1991, when an umbrella group representing ten political parties, the Collective of Democratic Opposition (COD) organized a general strike, tore down the statue of Eyadéma in Lomé, and convened a national conference to address Togos political problems.

That conference, attended by numerous opposition parties, government representatives, students, union leaders, and clergymen, became a forum from which Togos citizenry denounced the Eyadéma administration and sought to overthrow it. Four days after convening on July 8, the conference declared its sovereignty. The tide was already turning against the military regime, wrote Mark Huband in Africa Report. The countrys post-independence history was thrown into the spotlight, and very quickly the pillars of government began to crumble. Huband added that the conference highlighted both human rights abuses and cases of financial mismanagement that could be tied directly to the Eyadéma regime. Accusations by the human rights activist Me Kwami Occansey that Eyadéma was no better than [German political leader and Nazi party founder Adolf] Hitler received rapturous applause in the conference hall, the reporter stated.

The 1991 national conference in Togo effectively removed Eyadéma from power and installed an arch-rival, Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, as leader of a new provisional government. The victory was short-lived, however. Armed forces loyal to Eyadéma mounted a siege of Lomes government establishments in the winter of 1991, taking Koffigoh prisoner. By mid-1992 Koffigoh had named a number of Eyadéma deputies to his inner circle, and by years end he was little more than a figurehead. According to Da Costa, Koffigoh, a human rights lawyer elected to lead the transitional government through to the elections and threatened, even kidnapped, by Eyadéma loyalists, [became] a shadow of his former self.

The political crisis continued through 1992 and into 1993, with strikers demanding immediate elections and neutral armed forces. Hundreds of thousands of Togolese citizens fled to Ghana and Benin, and the international community was stunned by an assassination attempt on opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio. In March of 1993 Eyadémas residence in Lomé came under armed attack by dissenters within the military ranks. Eyadéma survived the coup attempt and proceeded to negotiate a timetable for presidential elections with the leaders of Togos principal political parties.

The presidential election, held late in the summer of 1993, was beset by numerous controversies. Observers from the international communityincluding ex-President Jimmy Carter from the United Statesrefused to endorse the results, citing hasty planning, the lack of a credible opposition, and question marks over voter lists and cards, to quote Da Costa. Indeed, Eyadémas principal opponentGilchrist Olympiowas not allowed to run because he would not agree to be examined by Togolese doctors to confirm his health. Olympio, who had documentation of a thorough examination by French doctors, complained that he could not safely enter Togo to undergo the examination. In Olympios stead, Eyadéma faced the leaders of three opposition parties. When the results of the August 25th election were polled, Eyadéma had received 96.42 percent of the popular vote.

Da Costa wrote: Eyadéma, with close to three decades of self-imposed autocratic rule under his belt, will find it difficult to claim that his victory in Togos presidential elections gives him an undisputed right to remain at the helm of the West African country. The context behind Eyadémas huge marginthe lack of credible opponents, as well as a paltry turnout officially put at 39.5 percentconfirmed the landmark in Togos march toward democracy as little more than a sham, an exercise in self-delusion by a man reluctant to surrender to the mass of forces ranged against him. Da Costa feels that Togo will face further violence and unrest as long as Eyadéma wields power, but other observers offer a different view. For instance, in an election day appeal to his fellow citizens, Koffigoh characterized Eyadéma as a man who could guarantee security, peace, and stability for Togo.

At least one citizen interviewed by Da Costa echoed Koffigohs optimism. I voted for Eyadéma because hes not just our patron, hes our god, a Lomé taxi driver told Africa Report. The city used to be safe, you could taxi 24 hours a day and even sleep in the streets. But now Lomé is in a mess. Its democracy thats done this. Only Eyadéma can solve our problems.



Africa South of the Sahara: 1994, 23rd edition, Europa, 1994.


Africa Report, September-October 1990, pp. 36-38; November-December 1991, pp. 18-20; November-December 1993, pp. 61-65; March-April 1994, p. 7.

Economist, April 27, 1991, p. 48;December7, 1991, p. 50; February 13, 1993, p. 48; August 21, 1993, p. 34.

New York Times, July 25, 1991, p. A-6; August 29, 1991, p. A-13; November 29, 1991, p. A-10; December 1, 1991, p. 9; December 4, 1991, p. A-8; February 2, 1992, p. A-8; February 2, 1993, p. A-6.

Anne Janette Johnson