STEVENSON, Adlai Ewing

(b. 5 February 1900 in Los Angeles, California; d. 14 July 1965 in London, England), politician and diplomat who made an unsuccessful bid for a third Democratic nomination for president in 1960 and, as United Nations ambassador during the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations, worked to advance the causes of nuclear disarmament, international peace, and Third World development.

Stevenson grew up in Bloomington, Illinois, one of two children of two prominent families. His paternal grandfather and namesake was a veteran Democratic officeholder who served under Grover Cleveland as vice president from 1893 to 1897. His maternal great-grandfather, Jesse Fell, was a close friend and supporter of Abraham Lincoln. Stevenson's father, Lewis Green Stevenson, mixed farming with politics, while his mother, Helen Louise Davis Stevenson, raised her son with a love of learning. Despite this, he was only a fair student and entered Princeton University in 1918 after failing its entrance examination three times. Following a short stint in the navy during World War I, he worked for his mother's family's Bloomington-based newspaper before earning a law degree from Northwestern University. Stevenson married Ellen Borden in Chicago in 1928. The couple had three sons, one of whom, his father's namesake, represented Illinois in the U.S. Senate from 1970 to 1981. The couple divorced in 1949.

Stevenson began his career in government as a lawyer for the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s. In 1941 he became special assistant to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, which in turn led to service under the secretaries of state Edward Stettinius and James Byrnes. Most notably, he was a key U.S. representative to the formative sessions of the United Nations (UN) from 1945 to 1947. Returning to Illinois, he was elected the state's governor on the Democratic ticket in 1948.

After resisting calls to run, Stevenson finally accepted the Democratic nomination for president in 1952. Vowing to "talk sense to the American people," he conducted a gallant campaign against his highly popular opponent, the Republican Dwight Eisenhower. Stevenson inspired millions through his ready wit, eloquent speeches, and idealistic approach to politics. Although he lost to Eisenhower by a landslide, he retained his stature as the leader of the Democratic Party's liberal wing. He remained a public figure after his defeat, decrying anti-Communist extremism and advocating a less confrontational foreign policy. After a bruising primary campaign, he won a second Democratic nomination against Eisenhower in 1956. During the fall campaign, he came out in favor of a nuclear test ban, federal aid to education, and a Medicare-like health program. Stevenson suffered a crushing second defeat that November; still, he lived to see many of his proposals become law in the following decade. Moreover, his attack on the conservative complacency of the Eisenhower administration anticipated John F. Kennedy's call to "get this country moving again" during the 1960 presidential campaign.

Many urged Stevenson to try for a third nomination in 1960. Though tempted, he recognized Kennedy's strength and hesitated to mount a campaign against him. Even on the sidelines, he continued to retain the support of many liberal party activists, who worked on his behalf. At the 1960 Democratic convention in Los Angeles, his supporters packed the galleries and loudly cheered his name, proclaiming themselves "Madly for Adlai." Delivering a memorable and dramatic speech, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy nominated Stevenson to be the Democratic nominee for president, eliciting a wild demonstration. Although Stevenson actively made a last-minute bid for delegate support, the party nominated Kennedy on the first ballot. Stevenson campaigned for Kennedy and held expectations of being chosen as secretary of state. After his narrow victory, though, Kennedy picked Dean Rusk for the post instead and asked Stevenson to become the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, a cabinet-level position. Disappointed, Stevenson took his time in agreeing to accept the appointment.

The relationship between Kennedy and Stevenson proved to be less than comfortable. The president and his closest advisers found Stevenson long-winded and unrealistic at cabinet meetings; Stevenson in turn found Kennedy and his inner circle to be overconfident and sometimes ruthless. On a number of issues, such as representation of Communist China at the UN, Stevenson was more forward-looking than most of Kennedy's advisers. Despite these differences, Kennedy benefited from his UN ambassador's worldwide prestige, even if he gave his old rival little decision-making authority. He grew to respect Stevenson's coolness under pressure and willingness to defend policies he did not always fully support. For his part, Stevenson loyally supported Kennedy in public, though old friends detected frustration and unhappiness under the surface. He continued to surround himself with a loyal band of longtime aides and supporters, turning particularly to the planning expert Barbara Ward for advice on Third World issues.

In April 1961 Stevenson's diplomatic credibility was put to the test during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Continuing plans set in motion by Eisenhower, Kennedy agreed to support military action by Cuban exiles against Fidel Castro's regime. Briefing Stevenson shortly before the operation began, Kennedy's aides misled him as to the extent of U.S. involvement. On 14 April, during UN Security Council meetings called by Cuba, Stevenson passed on this deception to the world, claiming that "there will not be under any conditions … any intervention in Cuba by the United States armed forces." Events proved otherwise—the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency played an active part in the exiles' assault on Cuba, which was routed by Castro's forces at the Bay of Pigs on 16 April. Stevenson also had spread the false story that Castro's air force was in revolt, displaying photos at the Security Council of "Cuban" planes (actually repainted U.S. aircraft) supposedly flown to Miami by defecting pilots. When it became clear that the administration had misled him, he felt humiliated. "Now my credibility has been compromised, and therefore my usefulness," he told one friend. "Yet how can I resign at this moment and make things worse for the president?" In the end, he swallowed his misgivings and stayed on.

In late 1961 Kennedy helped persuade Stevenson to forgo a bid for the U.S. Senate and remain at his UN post. Simmering conflicts in India (involving the Portuguese colony of Goa) and what was then the Belgian Congo kept him occupied into the early months of 1962. Many of these issues had cold war implications, and Stevenson frequently was opposed by his Soviet counterpart, Valerian Zorin, at Security Council meetings.

Tensions between the two superpowers escalated dramatically in October of that year, when the Kennedy administration learned that Soviet missiles armed with nuclear warheads were en route to Cuba. Stevenson participated in cabinet discussions about how to respond to this threat, arguing in favor of a diplomatic rather than a military response. While supporting the idea of a Cuban blockade, he also advocated making conciliatory gestures, including the removal of obsolete American missiles from Turkey and Italy and the evacuation of the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Stevenson's overall goal was to link the solution of the Cuban crisis to larger arms control issues with the Soviets. Kennedy's inclination, though, was to take a harder line. On 22 October the president made the crisis public, announcing a "quarantine" of Cuba and harshly warning the Soviets of the risk of nuclear war.

Stevenson vigorously advanced this position at UN Security Council meetings that followed. Mindful of the tainted evidence presented by the U.S. during the Bay of Pigs affair, he still presented a convincing case to the world that the Soviets were equipping bases in Cuba for offensive missile capability against the American mainland. In measured but firm language, tinged at times with anger, he submitted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of all missiles from Cuba. Angered by evasive answers from Zorin during a Security Council session, he stated that he would wait for a clear-cut response "until Hell freezes over." Ultimately, the missiles were withdrawn. Stevenson's performance during the crisis won considerable praise, including personal thanks from Kennedy.

Despite his tough talk to the Russians, Stevenson still drew criticism from some quarters as an "appeaser" who was soft on Communism. Reports that he had favored trading "U.S. bases for Cuban weapons" during cabinet meetings appeared in the press, causing Stevenson to doubt Kennedy's continued support. Loathed by the extreme Right, he was spat upon during a visit to Dallas, Texas, in the fall of 1963. The incident was ugly enough for him to consider warning Kennedy to postpone his own visit to the city. (Three weeks later, the president was assassinated in Dallas.)

Remaining at his UN post under President Lyndon B. Johnson, Stevenson grew increasingly isolated from foreign policy decision-making. Although he was a believer in the containment of Communism, he felt uneasy with the direction of Johnson's policies in Vietnam. In late 1964 he attempted to initiate negotiations between North Vietnam and the United States; these efforts were stymied by the Johnson administration, which then blamed Stevenson for not keeping diplomatic channels open. Once again, the UN ambassador considered quitting and then elected to stay. His doubts about American involvement in Southeast Asia increased during early 1965, though he refrained from speaking out publicly.

On 14 July 1965 Stevenson collapsed from a massive heart attack during a visit to London. His body was taken to the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C., and placed in the Bethlehem Chapel, where thousands of mourners came to pay their respects. His body also lay in state in Springfield, Illinois, under the capitol dome, before burial at Evergreen Cemetery in Bloomington, Illinois. Five days before his death, he had delivered a memorable speech in Geneva at a UN conference. Pleading for world unity, he spoke of Earth as "a little space ship … preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, and, I will say, the love we give our fragile craft." It proved a fitting epitaph to a career largely dedicated to promoting international peace. Stevenson was mourned as a brilliant, inspiring statesman who, despite being denied the presidency, exemplified the highest ideals in public service.

Stevenson's papers are available in Walter Johnson, The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, 8 vols. (1972–1979). Manuscript material is held by the Princeton University Library. Papers from Stevenson's term as governor of Illinois are at the Illinois State Historical Library. Among Stevenson biographies, John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson of Illinois (1976) and Adlai Stevenson and the World (1977), are the most thorough. Jean H. Baker, The Stevensons: A Biography of an American Family (1996), offers a more critical, revisionist view. Also valuable are Kenneth S. Davis, The Politics of Honor (1967), and Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Legacy (1989). The events of the 1960 Democratic convention are detailed in Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 (1961). An obituary is in the New York Times (15 July 1965).

Barry Alfonso