PLURALISM

Pragmatism and Continental hermeneutics combined to produce a decided turn toward forms of "pluralism" in twentieth-century philosophy (Geyer 1993, B. Singer 1990). This has led to the rejection of any one favored epistemological method (e.g., the scientific method, scriptural exegesis, introspection) and any one favored basis for the reconstruction of reality (e.g., mind, matter). Neopragmatists propose to replace the notion of truth with notions such as "fitting," "useful," and "warranted." Given that what is "fitting" is relative to the problem being faced and the means at one's disposal, we are left with the possibility of a plurality of ways of conceiving the world and of achieving our aims within it.

Moral pluralism opposes the monistic view that there is any one method of determining what is morally right (e.g., the utilitarian calculus or Kantian universalizability), and it also opposes the relativistic view that all things have value only with respect to a particular cultural context. Pluralists insist that a good life typically involves the desire, not for one, but for many kinds of "goods," often of incommensurable value; moreover, the realization of certain "goods" may conflict with and even preclude the realization of others. As such, pluralists believe that moral conflicts are inevitable and that there are not one but many alternative ways of resolving such conflicts (Kekes 1993). The trend toward pluralism has also been influenced by our growing awareness of different cultures with nonequivalent conceptions of reality and "the good life."

The modern nation-state has evolved beyond the belief that it manifests the cultural orientation of a single "race," usually its majority. The reality is that every nation is composed of numerous groups with different cultural orientations. And the state is considered the primary guarantor that minority views will be presented, respected, and given a voice in determining policy (Guttman 1993). The rejection of the view that a Eurocentric male-dominated culture is the norm to be achieved universally has led to the demand that the cultures of non-Europeans, women, and minorities be recognized and granted equal voice (Taylor 1992). In this way pluralism is considered by many to be an essential part of the liberal democratic state, and this has manifested itself in terms of educational policy as the rejection of monoculturalism and the demand for a multicultural orientation.

One form of multiculturalism has focused on the need of suppressed groups to have their cultures recognized. Such a demand for recognition may motivate certain proposals—for example, to replace a Eurocentric focus with an Afrocentric focus or a male-centered orientation with a feminist-centered orientation. Some argue that because of the past harms inflicted upon such groups, ostensibly because they were different, they are justified in embracing those differences in order to cleanse them of the negative valuations imposed by the hegemonic culture. It is right for such groups to adopt a separatist posture if this is the best means of achieving a redefinition of themselves that is positive and self-affirming (Young 1990). Where members of the hegemonic culture have inflicted unjust harms on members of an oppressed group, some argue that the oppressed group has the right to cultural restitution. The domination of culture A by culture B may not be the result of culture A's not offering viable options; rather, it may be the result of unjust injuries and harms visited on culture A by culture B. In such cases groups sharing culture A have a right to "moral deference," affirmative action, and the preservation of their culture (Mosley 1990, Nickel 1994, Thomas 1992–1993).

Many have been concerned that multiculturalism might degenerate into a bedlam of different groups, each espousing its own brand of cultural authenticity. Critics argue that this would amount to merely replacing one culture's hegemony with another culture's hegemony. Multiculturalism in this sense would fail to reflect the pluralist maxim that no orientation is "fitting" for every situation and that for a given end there may be several equally "fitting" means (West 1993, Yates 1992).

An alternative form of multiculturalism, closer to pluralism, emphasizes the importance of diversity and cross-cultural communication. On this view the more cultural orientations there are for consideration, the better the likelihood of finding or constructing a "fitting" adaptation to some current problem (Rorty 1992). For this reason every culture should be allowed the opportunity of articulating itself to the public at large and of thereby influencing the manner in which individuals construct their character.

Pluralism does not end with the insistence on an equal voice for every culture but extends itself to the view that different biological species often have interests that may conflict with the interests of human beings. Some have argued that, just as racism and sexism accord special preference to white males and victimize women and non-Europeans, so speciesism accords special preference to the interests of human beings and unjustly victimizes nonhuman species (P. Singer 1990). The insistence on a plurality of interests and capacities has been extended to include the interests of other animal species, as well as trees, rivers, and ecological systems (Wenz 1990).

See also Affirmative Action; Animal Rights and Welfare; Pragmatism; Racism; Sexism; Social and Political Philosophy; Speciesism.

Bibliography

Baghramian, Maria, and Attracta Ingram, eds. Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity. London: Routledge, 2000.

Barry, Brian M. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Geyer, M. "Multiculturalism and the Politics of General Education." Critical Inquiry 19 (1993): 499–533.

Guttman, A. "The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics." Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (3) (Summer 1993): 171–206.

Kekes, J. The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Mosley, A. "Preferential Treatment and Social Justice." In Terrorism, Justice, and Social Values, edited by C. Peden and Y. Hudson. Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 1990.

Nickel, J. W. "Ethnocide and Indigenous Peoples." Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (1994): 84–98.

Okin, Susan Moller. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Edited by Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha Nussbaum. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Rorty, A. "The Advantages of Moral Diversity." Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2) (Summer 1992): 38–62.

Singer, B. "Pragmatism and Pluralism." Monist 75 (4) (October 1992): 477–491.

Singer, P. Animal Liberation. New York: New York Review of Books, 1990.

Taylor, C. Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Thomas, L. "Moral Deference." Philosophical Forum 24 (1–3) (Spring 1992–1993): 233–250.

Walzer, Michael. On Toleration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

Wenz, P. "Minimal, Moderate, and Extreme Moral Pluralism." Environmental Ethics 15 (1993): 61–74.

West, C. Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1993.

Yates, S. A. "Multiculturalism and Epistemology." Public Affairs Quarterly 6 (1992): 435–456.

Young, M. Y. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Albert Mosley (1996)

Bibliography updated by Philip Reed (2005)