Hedonism

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HEDONISM

Hedonism (Greek, ἡδονή, "pleasure") is a term that refers to either of two distinct but related views, one a thesis in normative ethics, the other a generalization about human psychology.

Ethical Hedonism

The first view, called "ethical hedonism," affirms that only pleasure is intrinsically desirable and that only displeasure (or pain) is intrinsically undesirable. More fully stated, it is the thesis that only pleasant states of mind are desirable in themselves; that only unpleasant states of mind are undesirable in themselves; and that one state of affairs is more desirable in itself than another state of affairs if and only if it contains more (in some sense) pleasant states of mind than the other (the quantity of value in a state of affairs being measured by the quantity of pleasure in it).

This thesis has been defended by a distinguished line of philosophers from the early Greeks to the present, including Aristippus, Epicurus, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. Other philosophers have thought that happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically desirable; and if saying that a man is happy at a given time is the same as saying that he is experiencing pleasure at the time, then their names could be added to this roster. Many philosophers, however, have thought that happiness is different from pleasure, and there has been disagreement and confusion about what "happy" and "pleasant" mean.

The hedonist thesis was a part of traditional utilitarianism, as represented, for instance, by Bentham and Mill, with their "greatest happiness principle." These writers combined the generic principle of utilitarianism—namely, that an act is morally right if performing it would produce, or could reasonably be expected by the agent to produce, at least as much intrinsic goodness in the world as any other act the agent could perform at the time—with the thesis of hedonism about what is intrinsically good. Traditional utilitarianism is thus a species of utilitarianism that is defined as asserting just the "generic thesis"; other kinds of utilitarianism (for example, that of G. E. Moore) reject hedonism. Unlike utilitarianism, ethical hedonism is not at all a proposal about which acts are morally right; it is only an affirmation about which states of affairs are intrinsically good or desirable.

What is meant by saying that a state of affairs is intrinsically desirable, as opposed to simply desirable, is that it is desirable, good, worthwhile, worthy of choice, when taken by itself, viewed abstractly, and in particular considered without reference to consequences. Many things (for example, a visit to the dentist) are worthwhile in view of their consequences, which nobody would say are intrinsically desirable. The hedonist does not deny that other things are desirable; he denies only that they are intrinsically worthwhile. He agrees that something can be desirable instrumentally—as a means to an end—even when it is not intrinsically desirable. (A thing can, of course, be both intrinsically and instrumentally desirable: pleasant experiences can be good in themselves and also instrumentally good, if, for example, they are relaxing and enable one to work better on the following day.) He does add, however, that something is instrumentally desirable only to the extent that it is a means to later pleasure, since a thing can be instrumentally desirable only if it is a means to attaining the intrinsically desirable.

When consequences are taken into account, the hedonist's view about what states of affairs are desirable is apt to differ very little from the view of the nonhedonist. In fact, if one reads various writers' accounts of the "good life," one finds that they are pretty much alike, whether the author professes to be a hedonist or a nonhedonist. Thus, Epicurus, for instance, advocated a simple life devoted to philosophical reflection, with a diet of bread, cheese, and milk, and with its tranquility unendangered by surging bodily passions. And J. S. Mill affirmed that having a good character is "part" of a person's happiness, so that according to him, character is intrinsically good after all by virtue of the fact that it is a part of happiness. Some hedonists, however, have advocated a more distinctive ideal for living: the Greek Aristippus thought that physical enjoyments are the richest source of pleasure and should be fully cultivated.

The meaning of the hedonist's thesis, of course, depends on what is meant by "pleasure." It is true that the associations of the word pleasure are such that if an English-speaking person says he favors a "life of pleasure," he is naturally taken to be advocating a life dedicated to the sensory enjoyments—wine, women, and song. Hedonists have not intended the term to carry this implication, however, and the strict meaning of the term does not. It is perfectly correct for a student to say, "I got a great deal of pleasure out of writing that paper." To say that an experience is pleasant (for example, "a pleasant evening"), is, in a strict sense, simply to say that one enjoyed it, or that one enjoyed himself during it. Thus, hedonism is done least injustice if it is taken as simply saying that an intrinsically desirable state of affairs is always a state of consciousness in which the person is enjoying himself in one way or another. Since reflection, reading, and creation are activities that people often enjoy, the hedonist means to include these activities, or states of mind, in the category of "pleasures," just as much as the so-called passive enjoyments, such as eating, drinking, and sex.

Hedonists have often disagreed about the proper analysis of "pleasure" or "enjoyment." Epicurus, for instance, said that pleasure is simply the absence of painful want or longing. Moreover, since the early 1900s, psychologists have also disagreed substantially on this point, some holding that pleasure is a special kind of sensation, others that it is a quality of certain kinds of feeling, and so forth. In recent years a considerable body of philosophical literature has accumulated on the subject of the analysis of "pleasant." While a generally accepted conclusion has not yet been reached, it is plausible to say that a person is enjoying himself (that is, his state of mind is pleasant) if and only if at the time he likes his experience or activity for itself, in the sense that, aside from moral considerations or considerations of consequences or of the possibility that something he likes even better could be substituted, he does not wish to change it and in fact would wish to avoid changing it if such a change impended. If this interpretation is accepted, the thesis of hedonism becomes the affirmation that a state of affairs is intrinsically desirable if and only if it is, or contains, an activity or experience which, at the time, the person likes for itself; and one state of affairs is more desirable intrinsically than another if it is, or contains, an experience or activity which, at the time, is liked better for itself. States of affairs which the hedonist thesis apparently rules as being only instrumentally rather than intrinsically desirable, from the point of view of a particular person, are such things as fame after his death and states of knowledge and character (since the latter are not experiences or activities at all, but capacities or dispositions).

Psychological Hedonism

Many (but not all) ethical hedonists have supported their ethical affirmation of hedonism by an appeal to a psychological doctrine known as "psychological hedonism." This theory historically has taken rather different forms; the significance of each for ethical hedonism must be assessed separately. The element common to them is the assertion that actions or desires are determined by pleasures or displeasures, whether prospective, actual, or past. The importance of the theory, however, transcends its relation to ethical hedonism: certain psychologists today are inclined to accept some form of it as a correct account of human motivation.

goal is pleasure

The first and historically most important form of the theory of psychological hedonism may be called the "goal is pleasure" theory, according to which a person is motivated to produce one state of affairs in preference to another if and only if he thinks it will be more pleasant, or less unpleasant, for himself. This thesis, of course, is not intended to be a generalization about simple reflex or habitual behavior. The "belief" in question need not be explicit in the sense of having been verbally formulated before action; it may be an unformulated assumption. The theory is not simply about purposive action; it is also a theory about desire: a person is asserted to want one thing more than another if and only if he thinks its occurrence will be more pleasant for him.

The relation of this form of psychological hedonism to ethical hedonism may be explained by the following argument, often used by ethical hedonists. It is assumed as a major premise that something is intrinsically desirable if and only if it is something that people desire for itself. The minor premise is the "goal is pleasure" theory—namely, that people want only pleasure for itself. It is therefore concluded that pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically desirable. The third-century writer Diogenes Laërtius said of Epicurus that "as proof that pleasure is the end he adduces the fact that living things, so soon as they are born, are well content with pleasure and are at enmity with pain, by the prompting of nature and apart from reason."

Contemporary ethical hedonists seldom appeal to the "goal is pleasure" theory to support their views, partly because the theory seems incompatible with obvious facts. For instance, political figures seem to take a strong interest in securing favorable notice in books on history that will appear after their death. This motivation obviously does not depend on the belief that the future event will be pleasant for them personally. Again, individuals often appear to risk personal loss for some moral principle or in order not to forsake a friend (this is illustrated by Dean Acheson's famous remark, "I will never turn my back on Alger Hiss"). Adherents of the "goal is pleasure" theory tend to explain such facts by saying that the individual would be unhappy in the future—and knows he would be—if he failed to live by his principle or forsook his friend; hence, the action is motivated by a calculation of personal pleasure after all. What the theory must hold, though, is that a belief to this effect, at least vaguely espoused by the agent, is a necessary condition of the motivation; and this seems implausible. Adherents of the theory may be confusing two things: the agent's belief that a certain future situation will be relatively more pleasant for him, and the agent's thought of that future situation being attractive or repugnant now. A person may say, "I am unhappy with the idea of dropping my friendship with X, in whose integrity I believe." This statement may be true and also an important clue to understanding his behavior. But this is very different from saying, "I'll continue my friendship with Mr. X because I think I'll be less happy if I don't," a kind of statement that would ordinarily be taken as proof that the person did not care about his friend. Adherents of the theory may always argue that the reasoning required by their theory takes place unconsciously, but the postulation of this is ad hoc, the only reason for it being that it saves the theory from conflict with observation.

motivation by pleasant thoughts

As suggested above, adherents of the "goal is pleasure" form of psychological hedonism sometimes confuse it with a different thesis which we may call the "motivation by pleasant thoughts" theory. This theory is the assertion that a person will choose to do A rather than B or will prefer A to B (whether an action or a situation), if and only if the thought of A (with its expected consequences) is more attractive, or less repugnant, than the thought of B (with its expected consequences). This theory is not obviously false: indeed, as a proposal about preference it could be an analytic proposition that sets forth one test we use to decide whether a person prefers one thing to another. As a proposal about action it is clearly a synthetic proposition. As such, it may not be able to explain the fact (if it is a fact) that sometimes the thought of doing A is not more attractive or less repugnant than the thought of doing B, but the agent simply decides to do A (perhaps he is required to make up his mind between the two).

Even if this form of psychological hedonism is true, however, it gives no support to ethical hedonism, since it sets no restrictions on the kind of goal which may be attractive or repulsive to a person. If support of ethical hedonism requires a demonstration that people desire only pleasure, then the present theory does not provide such support. For assuming that desiring a thing means finding the idea of it pleasant or attractive, it does not follow that only the idea of pleasure itself is attractive. Hence, it does not follow that only pleasure is desired, and it is therefore no part of the "motivation by pleasant thoughts" theory to assert that only pleasure is desired.

conditioning by pleasant experiences

The third form of psychological hedonism, the "conditioning by pleasant experiences" theory, is a theory about the causal conditions of a person's wants or values. Roughly, it asserts that at least one's fundamental values can be correlated with past enjoyments or rewards, that these enjoyments are at least part of the causal explanation of the values, and that a person's values can be controlled by manipulating his enjoyments. If a person values ice cream, it is because in the past he has enjoyed ice cream (and not been made sick by it). The truth of this theory is hardly open to question insofar as it merely affirms that past enjoyments have some influence on likes and values; but its truth can be widely questioned if the theory is claimed to give a complete account of likes and values, which, according to experimental evidence, seem to be influenced by numerous factors. Acceptance of the theory, however, does not commit one to assert that persons desire only pleasure. The theory is consistent with saying that people want and value things such as posthumous fame or being a generous or courageous person. All the theory claims is that whatever values one has have been acquired because of past enjoyments or punishments of one sort or another—perhaps the enjoyment of parental praise or the punishment of parental reproaches.

Further Arguments in Support of Ethical Hedonism

Acceptable psychological theory, as we have seen, does not indicate that people desire only pleasure or things they think will be pleasant for them, or that people prefer A to B if and only if they think A will be more pleasant to them than B. Ethical hedonism, therefore, cannot appeal to psychological theory in support of its thesis.

Ethical hedonists sometimes rely on one or more of three other lines of argument in support of their view. The first line of reasoning is simply that ethical hedonism is an analytic truth that is true by definition. Locke, for instance, defined "good" as that "which is apt to cause or increase pleasure," and Benedict Spinoza defined it as "every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces thereto." The flaw in this contention, however, is that many people have at least thought either that some things other than pleasure are intrinsically good or that some kinds of pleasure are intrinsically bad. In the face of this, it is not easily claimed that "intrinsically good" simply means pleasant.

The second line of reasoning, which is more substantial, starts from the premise that it is usually agreed that at least some forms of pleasure are intrinsically good and proceeds by contesting the claim that anything else is intrinsically good. If the claims on behalf of other things are successfully refuted, it is concluded that ethical hedonism is left holding the field. The assessment of this line of reasoning is obviously a complex matter, since it presupposes conclusions about how to adjudicate ethical disputes. There is space here only to mention some examples frequently debated by hedonists and their opponents.

Critics of hedonism often urge that some kinds of pleasure are intrinsically bad—for example, malicious pleasure in the suffering of another person. And, they say, some unpleasant experiences are intrinsically good—for example, the punishment of one who has been cruel to another. Furthermore, it may be claimed that various things in addition to pleasure are intrinsically good: knowledge, certain traits of character, kindly or courageous deeds, life itself (at least the survival of mind with memory) even if it is not positively pleasant, being the object of respect or love on the part of other persons, being remembered after death, achievement, whether intellectual or aesthetic. Anyone who accepts any of these points cannot, strictly speaking, be an ethical hedonist.

A third, more practical, line of reasoning by hedonists has been the contention that their view makes possible scientific and objective evaluations of social planning which other views do not. For instance, if the question arises whether a certain tariff should be raised, the hedonist may say that his theory enables us (in principle at least) to decide objectively whether the tariff will do good, for we have only to decide whether a greater net sum of pleasures will be produced with or without the tariff.

This conception has come in for a great deal of criticism in recent decades, some of it unfair. One criticism, which appears repeatedly in the writings of economists, makes the point that we can know nothing about the mental states of other persons, since there is no way of observing them directly; hence, the whole idea that theoretically an individual could determine the effects of a tariff on the happiness of anyone but himself is absurd. This criticism probably goes too far, but questions concerning other minds cannot be evaluated here. A more forcible objection is the following. If "is pleasant" is analyzed as meaning "is an experience liked at the time by the person, for itself," then presumably A 's experience can be said to be pleasanter than B 's, if A likes his experience more intensely. In theory, then, we might show that a tariff on bicycles would do more harm than good, if we could match every pleasant experience it would produce with an experience at least equally pleasant (one liked at least equally as intensely) and of at least equal duration, which the tariff prevents, and if in addition it costs us pleasures that are not matched with those it produces, or if some of the pleasures it costs us are more intense than the matching pleasures it produces, and the reverse is not the case. So far a decision could be reached, in principle at least. But it is possible that things might be too complex to permit such a simple matching. It might be that we would be forced to compare a more intense but brief pleasure with a less intense pleasure of greater duration; and it is not clear what would be meant by saying that one such experience "contains more pleasure" than the other. Thus, it is not clear that in principle the comparison could be made, except in special favorable situations. In this respect, however, the hedonist seems correct on one point: there is no other theory of the intrinsically desirable which makes such evaluations more scientific or more objective.