Bay of Pigs Invasion

Known in Cuba as Batalla de Girón, the Bay of Pigs Invasion was a U.S.-sponsored military venture of Cuban exiles against revolutionary Cuba in mid-April 1961. Launched with a force of about 1,500 Cuban exiles, the invasion was the result of growing antagonism between exiled Cubans and Fidel Castro's increasingly radical regime as well as U.S. desire to topple Castro against the backdrop of the cold war. The failed invasion stands as a pivotal moment both for the Cuban revolution and Cuba-U.S. relations.

Training of Cuban exiles began in March 1960. Led by José Pérez San Román, the exile force eventually came to be known as Brigade 2506. Manuel Artime served as the brigade's political chief. The invasion's primary goal was to secure a beachhead for the establishment of a temporary government by the Cuban Revolutionary Council under the leadership of centrist former prime minister José Miró Cardona. While not enthusiastic about the plans, newly elected president John F. Kennedy agreed to go forward but was adamant about limiting and concealing U.S. involvement.

The attack began on 15 April, when U.S. planes bearing Cuban marks bombarded several military installations. Air raids scheduled for 16 April, however, were canceled by direct orders from Kennedy. On 17 April approximately 1,300 brigade troops landed on the southern coast locations of Girón Beach and the Bay of Pigs; the landing sites proved to be inauspicious owing to swampy conditions, isolation, and reefs that surrounded the area. After two-and-a-half days of intense fighting, Cuban militia and army troops under Castro's command defeated Brigade 2506. Instrumental in the Cuban army's victory were elite cadet troops led by Captain José Ramón Fernández as well as successful air strikes by Cuban fighter planes. The final death toll on the brigade's side was somewhere around 125; another 1,197 were taken prisoner, ten of whom died while being transported to Havana in an overcrowded and airtight truck container. According to Cuban official statistics, 157 Cuban army and militia troops were killed in action. Most other sources, however, place the estimate much higher, between 1,800 and 2,200. After months of intense negotiation, brigade captives were released in exchange for $53 million in medicine and food.

The causes of the Bay of Pigs defeat have been the subject of much reflection and study. Among the most salient ones stand the failure of the Kennedy administration to provide adequate air and naval support and the CIA's overestimation of discontent of the Cuban people toward the revolution. CIA agents and operatives also alienated the exile force.

The Bay of Pigs invasion turned out to be a fiasco for the U.S. government. Kennedy later reminisced that it had been "the worst experience of [his] life." For the exiles, the defeat represented a major setback in the struggle against Castro, but many continue to commemorate the battle as a heroic attack against a much larger and better-equipped force. Castro, for his part, took credit for having stopped the imperial aggression of the world's mightiest military power. The Bay of Pigs not only demonstrated revolutionary Cuba's military effectiveness but also demonstrated the extent of popular support for the revolution. The failed invasion allowed Castro to consolidate his power over the island and to declare openly the socialist nature of the revolution. In terms of U.S.-Cuba relations, the invasion marked the end of any possible rapprochement and pushed Cuba deeper into the Soviet orbit.

See alsoCastro Ruz, Fidel; Cuban Missile Crisis; United States-Latin American Relations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Johnson, Haynes. The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. New York: Norton, 1964.

Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New York: New Press, 1998.

Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980.

                              Luis MartÍnez-FernÁndez