Tonkin Gulf resolution
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION
In August 1964 Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (78 Stat. 384), approving and supporting President Lyndon B. Johnson's determination to repel any armed attack against U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. Johnson subsequently relied on the measure as his chief authorization for the escalation of the vietnam war.
The resolution was prompted by Johnson's report to Congress that the North Vietnamese had fired upon two U.S. destroyers in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam. Johnson requested that Congress grant him wide presidential powers to respond to the attacks of the North Vietnamese. Both houses of Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of the resolution; only two senators opposed it and no representatives. The resolution gave the president power to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." According to the resolution, its purpose was to promote international peace and security and support the defense of U.S. naval vessels lawfully present in international waters from deliberate and repeated attacks by naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam.
It was later revealed that the federal government had drafted the Tonkin Gulf Resolution fully six months before the attacks on the U.S. vessels occurred. It was also revealed that the United States provoked the attack by assisting the South Vietnamese in mounting clandestine military attacks against the North Vietnamese. Although the two U.S. vessels attacked were actually on intelligence-gathering missions, the North Vietnamese could not distinguish them from the South Vietnamese raiding ships. Johnson had also exaggerated the gravity of the attack itself, which did not harm either of the ships.
Although no formal declaration of war was ever issued for the Vietnam War, the justice department and the state department relied on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as the functional equivalent. Thus, Johnson was able to send U.S. troops to Vietnam without an official war declaration. In early 1965 the Viet Cong raided a U.S. air base in South Vietnam, killing seven Americans. In response to that action, and in accordance with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Johnson began a large-scale escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The number of U.S. soldiers in South Vietnam grew from 25,000 in early 1965 to 184,000 by the end of that year. The escalation continued, and by 1968 543,000 U.S. soldiers were in South Vietnam.
Although the war initially had widespread support, by 1968 growing numbers of Americans had begun to protest and question John-son's decisions to escalate U.S. involvement. For a number of reasons, the public felt the president had deceived them. In the 1964 presidential elections, Johnson had campaigned on a promise to keep U.S. troops out of the fighting in Vietnam. In addition, the public learned through the release of the Pentagon Papers that the Tonkin Gulf incident was actually instigated by the United States and was not as damaging as the government had suggested. Some constitutional law authorities argued that it was irrelevant whether Congress was deceived by the executive in passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution because the resolution provided that Congress could repeal it at any time. In addition, the scholars argued that Congress had the power to stop appropriating money to support the war effort.
In January 1971 Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. President richard m. nixon continued the war effort, however, by relying on the commander in chief provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Congress continued to appropriate money to support the war effort. The Vietnam War was the longest, costliest, and most controversial war in U.S. history, and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was the focal point of much of the controversy.
Moise, Edwin E. 1996. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press.
Siff, Ezra Y. 1999. Why the Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America's Vietnam War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION
TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION. On 2 August 1964, the USS Maddox, engaged in an electronic spying operation in the Tonkin Gulf, was involved in a firefight with North Vietnamese PT boats. On 4 August, the Maddox was apparently attacked again in international waters. Although that second attack was never confirmed, President Lyndon B. Johnson informed the American people that he was retaliating against North Vietnam's aggression by ordering air attacks on its military installations and that he was also asking Congress for its support in the form of a congressional resolution.
Drafted weeks earlier by the executive, this resolution was designed to grant the president the authority he desired to protect and defend American interests in Southeast Asia. Managing the Senate floor debate on behalf of the administration was Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, a respected member of that body who also was a good friend of the president. He sought to quell existing doubts about the seemingly open-ended nature of the resolution by informing several skeptical colleagues that the president sought no wider war in Southeast Asia. According to Fulbright, that was the president's intent and the nature of his policy. Thus, given the strong public support for the president's action and congressional unwillingness to challenge his authority, Congress passed the resolution on 7 August 1964 with only two dissenting votes in the Senate.
The resolution charged that North Vietnam had attacked American ships lawfully present in international waters, which was part of a systematic campaign of aggression it has been waging against its neighbors. Congress approved and supported "the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." In addition, it also authorized the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any [SEATO] member or protocol state … requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."
President Johnson believed passage of the resolution had given him the necessary legal authority to take whatever action he deemed appropriate in Vietnam. But as disillusionment with the war widened and deepened, and as more information surfaced about provocative American actions in the gulf prior to the alleged incident involving the Maddox, Congress grew increasingly unhappy with how it had been deceived by the president in August 1964. Consequently, it repealed the resolution, which became invalid in 1971. President Richard M. Nixon, disregarding Congress's action, continued to wage war in Vietnam while acting in his capacity as commander in chief.
Mirsky, Jonathan. "The Never Ending War." New York Review of Books (25 May 2000).
Tonkin Gulf resolution
Tonkin Gulf resolution, in U.S. history, Congressional resolution passed in 1964 that authorized military action in Southeast Asia. On Aug. 4, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin were alleged to have attacked without provocation U.S. destroyers that were reporting intelligence information to South Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisers decided upon immediate air attacks on North Vietnam in retaliation; he also asked Congress for a mandate for future military action. On Aug. 7, Congress passed a resolution drafted by the administration authorizing all necessary measures to repel attacks against U.S. forces and all steps necessary for the defense of U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. Although there was disagreement in Congress over the precise meaning of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, Presidents Johnson and Richard M. Nixon used it to justify later military action in Southeast Asia. The measure was repealed by Congress in 1970. Retired Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap, in a 1995 meeting with former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, categorically denied that the North Vietnamese had attacked the U.S. destroyers on Aug. 4, 1964, and in 2001 it was revealed that President Johnson, in a taped conversation with McNamara several weeks after passage of the resolution, had expressed doubt that the attack ever occurred.