Operations Research
Operations Research. In defense analysis, operations research uses statistics and mathematics to optimize the use of a weapon.To set up a radar/fighter defense against bomber aircraft, for example, the traditional method would be to draw advice from war‐experienced experts or apply current military doctrine. An operations researcher, however, starts with a numerical measure of effectiveness—perhaps the number of bombers expected to get through, or the warning time provided, or some combination. The next step is to analyze statistics from past systems, and feed these into a mathematical model combining scanning rates, the decision‐making speed of radar operators, and the average number of operational fighters. The best design might be found by pencil and paper analysis, or a computer program that simulates the system under various attacks.
Operations research was first used widely in Britain in 1939–40 at the start of World War II. It spread to the United States, where it solved problems such as the placement of bomber‐dropped naval mines to destroy Japanese shipping. Another question involved a patrol plane coming upon a submarine on the surface—the submarine dives and the patrol plane must set an optimal detonation depth for its depth charge. Operations researchers also improved the likelihood that bombers would destroy an industrial target. They recommended reducing the size of a flight to about a dozen planes, assigning the best bombardier to the lead plane and have the rest follow his cue, and minimizing the time between successive bombs released from each plane. Photo reconnaissance showed an approximately fourfold improvement.
Sometimes operations research has exposed an important simple truth, but sometimes it has oversimplified an essentially complex situation. Starting in the late 1960s, it figured in the public debate over antimissile defenses and the survivability of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. The problem was construed as Soviet missiles destroying American missiles in their silos, but it became clear that the adversary would attack communications and control centers, and that U.S. policy was not to wait and “ride out” such an attack. The scenario of missiles attacking silos received attention partly because it was simple enough to solve.
Historically, there has been tension between the mathematical/scientific training of operations researchers and the military background of those implementing their ideas. In the early 1960s, officers generally resented Department of Defense secretary Robert S. McNamara's civilian whiz kids. Organizational savvy and the proven worth of the method have bridged this gap, and today any major campaign, such as Desert Storm, in the Persian Gulf War, would be preceded by extensive computer simulations.
[See also Disciplinary Views of War: History of Science and Technology; Disciplinary Views of War: Peace History; Game Theory; Neumann, John von; Science, Technology, War, and the Military; World War II: Military and Diplomatic Course.]
Operations research was first used widely in Britain in 1939–40 at the start of World War II. It spread to the United States, where it solved problems such as the placement of bomber‐dropped naval mines to destroy Japanese shipping. Another question involved a patrol plane coming upon a submarine on the surface—the submarine dives and the patrol plane must set an optimal detonation depth for its depth charge. Operations researchers also improved the likelihood that bombers would destroy an industrial target. They recommended reducing the size of a flight to about a dozen planes, assigning the best bombardier to the lead plane and have the rest follow his cue, and minimizing the time between successive bombs released from each plane. Photo reconnaissance showed an approximately fourfold improvement.
Sometimes operations research has exposed an important simple truth, but sometimes it has oversimplified an essentially complex situation. Starting in the late 1960s, it figured in the public debate over antimissile defenses and the survivability of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. The problem was construed as Soviet missiles destroying American missiles in their silos, but it became clear that the adversary would attack communications and control centers, and that U.S. policy was not to wait and “ride out” such an attack. The scenario of missiles attacking silos received attention partly because it was simple enough to solve.
Historically, there has been tension between the mathematical/scientific training of operations researchers and the military background of those implementing their ideas. In the early 1960s, officers generally resented Department of Defense secretary Robert S. McNamara's civilian whiz kids. Organizational savvy and the proven worth of the method have bridged this gap, and today any major campaign, such as Desert Storm, in the Persian Gulf War, would be preceded by extensive computer simulations.
[See also Disciplinary Views of War: History of Science and Technology; Disciplinary Views of War: Peace History; Game Theory; Neumann, John von; Science, Technology, War, and the Military; World War II: Military and Diplomatic Course.]
Bibliography
Philip Morse and and George Kimball , Methods of Operations Research, 1951.
Jerome Bracken,, Moshe Kress,, and and Richard Rosenthal . Warfare Modeling, 1995.
Barry O'Neill
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Operations Research