Neoliberalism

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NEOLIBERALISM.

GLOBAL STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION SINCE THE 1970S
CONSEQUENCES OF NEOLIBERAL CONSOLIDATION
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Neoliberalism is a set of economic policies that have become widespread since the last quarter of the twentieth century. However neoliberalism is not just about economics; it is a social and moral philosophy too. It is, in brief, the desire to intensify and expand the market mechanism to all areas of life. The emergence of neoliberalism is associated with the way in which a new social formation has arisen out of the liberal international order established by the Bretton Woods Conference near the end of World War II. This will be done here, first, by establishing the key features of global structural transformation as they have taken shape since the late 1970s, and second, by identifying the political consequences of this transformation. For many, neoliberalism is often seen as the driving force behind, if not directly synonymous with, the effects of contemporary globalization. Thus contemporary globalization is characterized by two interlinked processes: the material transnationalization of finance and production; and the ideological movement toward neoliberalism. Changes in material factors have been mirrored by a transformation in ideas and thinking with neoliberalism replacing Keynesianism as the dominant paradigm of economic policy. This is driving, and driven by, what Stephen Gill has termed disciplinary neoliberalism, illustrated through the interplay among the international and domestic structures and institutions of the global political economy. This interaction among ideas, institutions, and material capabilities is crucial in attempting to understand the changes that have occurred since the 1970s as a distinct constellation of neoliberal practices, techniques, and modes of organization in the global economy.

GLOBAL STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION SINCE THE 1970S

To begin to make sense of the emergence of neoliberalism, we must go back at least to the 1970s. The crises of Fordism, the Keynesian welfare state, and the oil price rises of the 1970s, in tandem with new transport, communication, and information technologies, were the catalysts for the rapid internationalization of financial and production capital. Successive state-led liberalizations and deregulations have subordinated national economies to the discipline of the market and the global economy. The process that emerged in response to the crisis resulted in the triumph of neoliberalism. The key feature of the postwar order was the compromise between economic liberalism and national intervention that John G. Ruggie terms embedded liberalism. Embedded liberalism consisted of two main characteristics: first, broad agreement on multilateralism and tariff reduction that, through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, encouraged free trade; and second, national governments maintaining capital controls and the right to intervene to ensure domestic stability. Embedded liberal hegemony was based on a Fordist regime of accumulation that rested on the organization of social relations of production at a national level, characterized by mass production of consumer goods and mass consumption. The architects of this system were critical of money capital and sought articles in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements to reduce the role of cross-border capital flows to lubricants of international trade and the movement of factors of production. Speculative movements of capital were considered to be profoundly destabilizing. Finance was, according to the U.S. Treasury, to be the servant rather than the master of production. However, the original intentions for imposing state control on international finance were diluted by financial interests associated with Wall Street and their counterparts in Europe.

The embedded liberal world order, based on compromise, corporatism, and Keynesian macroeconomic management, was hegemonic at its core, with left- and right-wing extremism marginalized and the political center consolidated. The balance between these forces began to break up during the 1970s in response to the recessions of the late 1970s and early 1980s that provoked a mercantilist reaction throughout the capitalist world. The recessions helped to activate a reappraisal of the role of the public sector and of the correct mix of intervention and market in the economy. The relationship between developed and developing states was recast, and with accelerating declines in real commodity prices and high interest rates, indebted nations were forced to turn to the IMF. The IMF prescription was to press for liberalization and the curtailment of the public sector. In the short term, the recessions had a purgative effect associated with a downswing in the business cycle, promoting a general restructuring of capital and capital-labor relations. The recession and the links between different aspects of global restructuring facilitated the material and ideological reemergence of U.S. hegemony with the boom of 1982 under President Ronald Reagan. The combination of financial stimulus through expanded military expenditure and supply-side tax cuts stimulated investment and improved productivity and competitiveness in certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Reagan's stress on a "strong America" complemented the deregulation of industry and banking, tax cuts, attacks on union power, and the speculative short-term mentality in the United States. By the late 1980s the United States appeared to have succeeded in restructuring the major sectors of its economy more successfully than elsewhere, especially Western Europe.

Key to the neoliberal triumph was the propagation of monetarism in policy circles. (Largely unpopular since the 1920s, monetarism continued to attract the support of some economists, journalists, and government officials, particularly in the United States and Britain, reemerging after 1945 in a number of private international groups such as the Mont Pelerin Society inspired by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman.) By making money scarce, the monetarists argued, inflation could be combated and sound microeconomic reasoning could be forced upon state and society as a whole. As the 1970s crisis deepened, monetarist arguments grew more convincing, winning over more and more influential bodies. Crucial neoliberal victories were scored in Chile (with the rise to prominence in 1975 of General Pinochet's regine) and Britain (with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's emergence in 1979). A significant turning point came in 1979 when Paul Volcker was appointed chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and initiated a strict monetarist regime that drove up real interest rates in the United States and in the world economy. This rapid shift toward monetarist policies resulted in moves away from the preceding corporate-liberal pattern to an individualist one in which the interests of mobile capital were predominant. Stock ownership was popularized through privatization, and bank profits increased relative to those of industry. Investment banking and financial services became the leading sectors. In reaction to the Keynesian corporate-liberal consensus of the post-1945 years, neoliberalism ushered in an era extolling the virtues of the free market and the withdrawal of the state from the management of the economy. The core neoliberal values of liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and internationalization and the new individualist ethic, so memorably captured in Thatcher's 1987 statement that "there is no such thing as society," eclipsed traditional forms of social democracy. Since then agents such as the World Economic Forum and others have carried forward the neoliberal agenda.

The rise to hegemony of neoliberalism during the 1970s and 1980s occurred primarily in the developed capitalist parts of the world if not globally. However, since the crisis of the 1970s, a range of other states have subscribed to the neoliberal project. These neoliberal projects have taken a number of different forms—salinismo in Mexico, "shock therapy" in Poland, Reaganomics in the United States, or Thatcherism in Britain—but they have all been characterized by the state's attempt to engender processes of depoliticization, liberalization, and deregulation, forcing adaptation in areas including labor relations, competitiveness, welfare, and corporate governance. While these policies might not eliminate differences in the face of local or national "embeddedness" and "path-dependency," there are progressively more common global and regional neoliberal forces at work and a common direction of change. In an abstract sense neoliberalism is the outcome of liberal internationalist representations of cosmopolitan money and industry capital that has outgrown its national confines. The paradigmatic scale of operation of industrial capital in the early twenty-first century is global in tendency. Simultaneously there is the relative disintegration of national state frameworks into a multiplicity of local and regional frameworks. However, these projects or programs are never simply put into practice: they are shaped and continuously reshaped in a process of struggle, compromise, and readjustment. The ultimate goal is, therefore, to decompose labor within national spaces, facilitating to the fullest degree possible the capability of capital to perform in a vision of a truly competitive world market in which capital has complete access to the global population and is able to compete in the labor market for its means of reproduction on a global scale. Despite the toll such a strategy exacts upon the populations of states, whether in the form of increased job insecurity or the ratcheting down of welfare regimes, neoliberal state policies are increasingly presented as "common sense" and necessary because "there is no alternative."

CONSEQUENCES OF NEOLIBERAL CONSOLIDATION

The outcome of this common sense has been the global consolidation of neoliberalism, and not just in the advanced industrial states. Any notion of an alternative to the rule of footloose global capital has become unrealistic and discredited as neoliberal changes have been locked in and normalized. Since the collapse in 1989–1990 of existing state socialism as the only alternative economic and social system, any incentive for capitalists in the West to accommodate workers has disappeared, and instead, the opportunity for carving out ever greater political space for the radical overhaul of the structures of postwar corporate liberalism has materialized. The strategy that has emerged is, as noted above, centrally concerned with the depoliticization of the economy and society by the weakening and, where possible, removal of historically accumulated forms of social protection. Existing forms of non-market coordination and state regulation have been abandoned as enterprises have been encouraged or, indeed, compelled to look to their own devices rather than to the state. Collective organizations such as unions have been weakened, and ever-increasing amounts of discipline have been enforced through the direct dependence on profit as the sole means of accounting for or evaluating successful employment or economic development. Demands on public services are resisted on the grounds of the need to reduce state spending to increase competitiveness.

These main characteristics of what has become a global consensus regarding the requirements and necessities of the world economy within a common ideological framework have been translated into a general interest. The implications are far-reaching. To theoretically grasp the new structure of the global political economy and the nature of neoliberalism, a convenient point of departure is Robert Cox's concept of the internationalization of the state. Cox analyzes the mechanisms for maintaining hegemony in the era of Pax Americana and argues that the internationalization of the state is associated with the expansion of international production and the process through which "the nation state becomes part of a larger and more complex political structure that is the counterpart to international production" (p. 253). In this process of change the internal structures of states are adjusted so that each can best transform the neoliberal global consensus into national policy and practice. At the apex of this emerging global structure is the transnational managerial class situated in the higher echelons of the Trilateral Commission, the World Bank and IMF, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The members develop a common framework of thought and guidelines for policies that are disseminated through the process of the internationalization of the state. In peripheral areas the financial power exercised by the IMF and the World Bank, which was intensified after the debt crisis of the 1980s, serves to impose or restore the discipline of the market where it is lacking or weakening. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transformation of the global state system have eliminated many obstacles to the further expansion of markets through the enhanced global reach of transnational capital.

The priorities of economic and social policies worldwide have been recast to reflect the new dominance of investors. International institutions (such as OECD, IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization, or WTO) and groupings of dominant states (G7) are engaged in the legal and political reproduction of this disciplinary neoliberalism and ensure through a variety of regulatory, surveillance, and policing mechanisms that neoliberal reforms are locked in (Gill). In the core areas of the world economy this discipline appears in the shape of "voluntary" programs of competitiveness, deregulation, and austerity that are codified in such arrangements as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) stability pact or the WTO liberalization regime. Gill refers to the erosion of democratic control implied in this process as "New Constitutionalism," the move toward construction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability (Gill, 1995). Despite an increasingly homogeneous formal governance framework, indicated by membership of intergovernmental bodies and adherence to their rules and norms, and despite the almost universal national presence of electoral democracy and market-regulated consumption, the unequal distribution of wealth and power both within and among nations is staggering and arguably increasing (Cammack).

See alsoBretton Woods Agreement; Fordism; Keynes, J. M.; Thatcher, Margaret.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cammack, Paul. "Making the Poor Work for Globalisation?" New Political Economy 6, no. 3 (2001): 397–408.

Cox, Robert W. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York, 1987.

Gill, Stephen. "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1995): 399–423.

Polanyi, Karl. "Evolution of the Market Pattern." In his The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 56–67. Boston, 1944.

Radice, Hugo. "Globalisation and National Capitalisms: Theorising Convergence and Differentiation." Review of International Political Economy 7, no. 4 (2000): 719–742.

Ruggie, John G. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Order." International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–415.

Rupert, Mark. "The Hegemonic Project of Liberal Globalization." In his Ideologies of Globalization, 42–64. London, 2000.

Weiss, Linda. "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State." New Left Review 225 (1997): 3–27.

Stuart Shields

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