Intelligence

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INTELLIGENCE.

PRE-1914 ORIGINS
WORLD WAR I
THE INTERWAR PERIOD
WORLD WAR II
THE COLD WAR
SINCE 1991
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Intelligence has a long European pedigree. The term itself originates from the "intelligencers"—specially assigned individuals who, during the reign of England's King Charles I (r. 1625–1649), were tasked with spying on the enemy. In other European countries too there was a growing trend in surveillance of both internal and external threats. However, intelligence as it is now understood is a twentieth-century creation.

PRE-1914 ORIGINS

The contemporary British system can trace its origins to 1909, when the newly formed Secret Service Bureau split, creating the Security Service (MI5), and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), dealing with domestic and foreign targets respectively. In France, following the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, an intelligence organization was founded, though it was disbanded in 1899. In its place an intelligence component was assigned to the Deuxième Bureau of the Army General Staff. This complemented other intelligence organizations, in particular the Foreign Ministry's Cabinet Noir.

In Germany, as part of its General Staff, the earlier Intelligence Bureau was reformed in 1912 into a specialized intelligence and counterespionage division known as Department IIIb. In Italy, the secret services established in the mid-nineteenth century were reorganized many times, and in 1900 the Office of Information was established. The Russian secret police was initially founded in the sixteenth century by Ivan the Terrible. In 1883 the Okhrana was founded, which remained intact until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

WORLD WAR I

World War I was a momentous event that demonstrated for the first time how useful an effective intelligence organization could be. As would be the case with World War II, rapid technological advances were made, particularly in cryptography. In some instances intelligence proved to be decisive. One of the greatest successes for French intelligence was the discovery of the German plans to launch a gas attack on the Allied armies in 1915. Despite such information, some British and French commanders rejected the warning—with dire consequences, as the Battle of Ypres would show.

Examples of good, close intelligence collaboration included the Anglo-French base at Folkestone, in southeast England, set up to conduct agent-running operations into occupied parts of western Europe. Perhaps the greatest coup for the French was their spy situated within the German High Command, who provided a stream of valuable information.

The British intelligence effort was just as important during the war, especially in the field of code breaking. A good example of this was the interception of the Zimmermann telegram, which detailed advances made by the Germans in requesting Mexican involvement in the war. As a response to this, the United States entered the war in 1917.

In contrast to the Allied effort, German intelligence was less effective, suffering mixed fortunes. There were some successes, for instance predicting military developments in Russia, but there were also notable failures, notably the overreliance on opensource (i.e., freely available, such as radio broadcasts and published) information, which was susceptible to British deception efforts. At the same time, the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service did produce good results, especially in code breaking, and overall fared relatively well, particularly with regard to the Russian army, whose messages they could read.

Italy's introduction to the war in 1915 resulted in an increase in the size and scope of its intelligence effort, with collection stations opened in numerous European cities, including London, Paris, Madrid, Bern, and St. Petersburg. Russian intelligence though badly structured, was generally good, particularly in terms of espionage. This was no doubt assisted through collaborative relations with the French. However, the poor structure caused great problems, for unlike some of its allies, Russia had to fight on two fronts.

THE INTERWAR PERIOD

World War I cannot be considered an "intelligence war" as World War II would be. To be sure, intelligence provided an effective means of gathering information, but in a period when such information was often novel, it was generally believed only when it conformed to the existing preconceptions of military and civilian decision makers. At the same time, however, the success of intelligence during the war served to increase its stature and importance, both militarily and diplomatically.

As a result, intelligence efforts were enlarged in all the major European countries. This was especially true among the victorious powers. In Britain, MI5 grew from nineteen staff members before the war to 844 by war's end. The code-breaking effort was increased, and in 1919 the Government Code and Cipher School was created. It was not until the mid-1930s, however, that the Air Ministry set up an intelligence outfit, and this would prove to be crucial a few years later when hostilities again broke out. Of perhaps greatest importance was the creation in 1936 of the Joint Intelligence Committee—a body composed of the various elements of the intelligence system, designed to produce all-source estimates for military and political decision makers.

France, the other major European victor, also increased its intelligence effort with the introduction of new intelligence organizations, each geared toward different objectives, including code breaking and combating foreign agents within France. Following Benito Mussolini's accession to power in 1922, Italian intelligence became a bureaucratically controlled yet loosely organized system. Mussolini, as would become the norm with other authoritarian dictators, considered himself the supreme intelligence analyst, and he alone was allowed to see the full range of information available.

Of the defeated powers the biggest changes occurred in Germany. The imperial police intelligence system had been dissolved by the Allies, and in its place a new organization was installed with the primary task of providing information on any political threats. In addition, the armed forces retained intelligence units, yet these were also directed toward providing information on internal, not external, threats.

With the Nazi Party's acquisition of power in the early 1930s, intelligence in Germany altered irrevocably. The Third Reich attached huge importance to the gathering of information on potential enemies, in many ways reflecting the insecurity that would dominate Soviet intelligence for so long. Intelligence was therefore omnipresent. Like other areas of the government, competing intelligence organizations strove to dominate Adolf Hitler's affection, concentrating on diplomatic, military, economic, and social-ideological targets.

In Soviet Russia intelligence had become an effective mode of governance with Vladimir Lenin's rise to power. The tsarist Okhrana was replaced by the Bolshevik Cheka, a ruthless organization designed to suppress internal opposition. By 1919 a covert foreign section had been set up to organize and spread the worldwide communist revolution. By the 1930s the Soviet intelligence system, now known as the NKVD (the acronym for Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennyk Del, or People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), had become Joseph Stalin's omniscient tool of terror, which, while coercing the populace at home, was also remarkably successful at recruiting agents abroad.

WORLD WAR II

After 1918 intelligence had grown to become an integral component of government in all the major European countries. From the mid-1930s onward it became crucial, not least in monitoring the rising German aggression. Traditionally it has been assumed that the Anglo-French appeasement policies of the late 1930s were a characteristic of the intelligence failure to identify the Nazi threat. Yet intelligence records reveal this explanation to be far too simplistic: information had been gathered on the nature of Germany's diplomacy and its military capabilities, but intelligence was only one cog in policy makers' decisions. Indeed, the failure of German intelligence to gauge the British and French reactions to Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939 was far more disastrous than appeasement ever was.

From the outset, World War II rapidly became an intelligence war. In every major conflict intelligence played a role. Scholars have debated ever since the impact of intelligence. While there can be no definitive answer, one simple fact is clear: without intelligence the war would have been unrecognizably different.

One key area was intelligence liaison, which in general terms was effectively maintained in defiance of a common enemy. Polish intelligence and resistance proved to be crucial in this respect, for, by providing the first Enigma machine to British intelligence—enabling the Allies to intercept and decipher German Enigma codes—they achieved what many regard as the greatest intelligence coup of the war. Through Ultra—the code name given to the breaking of the German code—the Allies were able to discern enemy plans. Thus crucial tactical and strategic information was provided and turned out to be decisive in, for instance, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of El Alamein. A corollary of this was the "XX System," or double-cross system. British intelligence managed to identify and intercept every single German spy within its shores. It also was able to "turn" many of them, so that they began to send false information back to Germany. Through Ultra, the Allies were able to observe the German acceptance of and reaction to such information.

A related war effort was the Allied use of deception. In its simplest sense, this involved camouflaging truck and tank movements in the desert so that their tracks could not be observed from the air. At the other end of the scale were the hugely successful campaigns to mislead the Germans about where the invasion of France would occur in 1944, codenamed Operation Overlord. Through the double-cross system and the fabrication of dummy army bases on the southeast coast of England, the Germans were tricked into believing that the attack would take place at the Pas de Calais, when in fact it would take place farther along the French coast in Normandy.

With the German war machine rolling through Europe, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill set up the Special Operations Executive (SOE), whose task was to "set Europe ablaze." This was intelligence in its covert action sense, and it proved to be extremely useful. Through SOE, European resistance efforts to German occupation could be coordinated and extended. To take one example, Norwegian workers provided the Allies with information regarding German attempts to build an atomic bomb and the fact that a plant in Norway was being used to make heavy water, a crucial stage of the process. Liaising with British intelligence, SOE and the Norwegian resistance were able to severely disrupt these efforts, eventually sinking a ferry laden with all the German stocks in a Norwegian fjord.

Despite such efforts, however, intelligence was not always as effective. There is still debate as to the extent to which the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 could have been avoided, given the quantity and quality of Japanese messages intercepted. A similar yet more clear-cut case is that of the German invasion of the Soviet Union—Operation Barbarossa—in June 1941. Stalin, as the self-appointed supreme authority on intelligence, could not and would not believe that Hitler would dishonor the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. As a result he chose to ignore the plethora of reliable intelligence that indicated this was precisely what Hitler intended to do. Such an error was only rectified by the German miscalculation of their pace of advance, culminating in their defeat in the 1942 Battle of Moscow.

As a whole, however, Allied intelligence was exceptionally good during World War II. With the exclusion of the Soviet Union there were efficient chains of command, and intelligence data could flow freely both nationally and internationally. In the Soviet Union this passage was not as simple and often depended on whether intelligence confirmed existing beliefs. Where the Soviet Union did excel, as indeed it did in the 1930s and would continue to do so postwar, was in the recruitment of agents.

On the Axis side, intelligence, and in particular intelligence exchange, was more limited, and this can perhaps be seen as an outcome of the relationship between the Axis Powers. German intelligence remained divided and beset by internal competition. Given the Nazis' ideological stance, far more people offered their services to the Allies than they did to the Axis Powers, yet there were some notable exceptions. In Britain, the American William Joyce, more commonly known as "Lord Haw-Haw," provided a stream of pro-German propaganda, for which he was eventually executed. An Abwehr officer, Major Nikolaus Ritter, recruited various agents in Britain, Belgium, and America. Despite being called the "rising star of the Abwehr" by its head, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Ritter was also its biggest failing, for he inadvertently revealed all of its agents to an American spy in 1941.

The Germans managed to break several of the Turkish codes, which revealed some brief details of British-U.S.-Soviet discussions. Other intercepted signals in 1943 revealed to the Nazi high command the attempts by the Spanish to distance themselves from Germany. Militarily, in general terms German intelligence was better at the tactical level—individual military situations—than it was on the larger strategic level, and this may have been a direct result of the German inability to penetrate the higher echelons of Allied decision making.

The Italians, before their surrender, also maintained a network of foreign agents, in particular in North Africa, undoubtedly a remnant of former colonial presence. By the middle part of the war the Italian Military Information Service had a large code-breaking section. Despite collecting a vast amount of information, often through theft as opposed to interception, the Italians appear to have succumbed to Allied deception efforts.

Intelligence during World War II was therefore tantamount to the day-to-day running of the war. The accuracy and importance of such intelligence can only effectively be considered in hindsight, yet what is crucial is how much importance was placed on such information. While it may be known in the early twenty-first century that some things were correct and others false, what is more relevant is whether or not such material was acted upon at the time.

A stark contrast exists between the relative intelligence successes on the Allied side and the intelligence failings on the Axis side. While it is extremely difficult to gauge this difference and impact qualitatively, it is possible to state, as does the official history of British intelligence in the war, that "but for intelligence the war would have taken a very different course."

THE COLD WAR

The postwar period saw a monumental increase in intelligence, and this in part was due to the introduction of the United States as a major intelligence force. Taking its lead from the British system, the Americans in 1941 instigated the Office of the Coordinator of Information, replaced the following year by the Office of Strategic Services, which in 1947 became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). If there had been a nylon curtain separating the powers during the interwar period an impenetrable iron curtain separated them after 1945, and this had a direct impact on the importance of intelligence liaison.

Before the end of hostilities the British and Americans had identified that the Soviet Union would become the "new Germany," and intelligence efforts were redirected accordingly. Through several formal and informal agreements, the Anglo-American intelligence partnership flourished, bringing into its coalition several other European nations.

To those countries in the West, considerable U.S. assistance was offered, and this ensured that friendly intelligence organizations could be created, particularly in West Germany. Initially a CIA-controlled intelligence network was created there called the Gehlen Organization. In 1956 this became the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst, or Federal Intelligence Service), which lasted throughout the Cold War. The BND was crucial in the gathering of intelligence on East Germany, as for many it became a "window on the east." Within Berlin, various military missions were established to observe conventional Soviet forces.

Several European countries were important due to their geographical proximity to the Soviet Union: Norway became the ideal spot to monitor Soviet missile and nuclear tests from the 1950s onward, and Turkey likewise was a site for capturing Soviet missile telemetry. Italy, with its large contingent of communists in the postwar period, was a useful base from which to disseminate propaganda, mainly through the sponsorship of terrorist attacks that could be blamed on the communists. In Germany, radio stations were used to spread information, and in many countries large military bases were established.

In the Eastern bloc, with the vast and all-pervasive KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or Committee for State Security) at its heart, intelligence became synonymous with internal policing. As had long been its stable tradecraft, the Soviet Union, along with its Eastern bloc satellites, excelled in the recruiting of Western agents, and this continued right up until the end of the Cold War. The Soviet signals-intelligence effort, about which very little is known, was vast in scale and scope and included among its triumphs the bugging of numerous foreign embassies in Moscow, including that of the United States.

Intelligence became the stable ingredient of the Cold War, with ever-increasing budgets and ever-advancing technological means. As with World War II, it is extremely difficult to measure the impact of intelligence. Once more, it is possible to identify the often decisive role that intelligence played in individual episodes. In general terms, while it is difficult to quantify, it is possible to state that intelligence was consistently a crucial ingredient in policy making.

SINCE 1991

Famously, Western intelligence failed to foresee the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, as did, it seems, Soviet intelligence. The initial post–Cold War environment was a strange one, since for the first time since 1900, there was no easily discernible enemy or threat. Growing throughout the Cold War but really only evident afterward was the rising threat of terrorism. This had moved from its Cold War state-sponsored form to a post–Cold War non-state-sponsored form. As it did so, the threat diversified, culminating in the attacks on the United States in September 2001.

A growing characteristic since 1991 has been the increasing importance of liaison with countries that previously had been considered hostile targets, in particular those in the Middle East. Internal policing and security also have increased in importance, as has the exchange of information. This has become especially crucial in Europe, as many of the terrorist targets travel through and frequent European cities. By 2004, and in the wake of new high-casualty, high-impact terrorist attacks, intelligence liaison had become the crux of European security policy.

Since World War I intelligence has grown to become the cornerstone of governmental decision making and policy. Whereas its initial goal had been military, this scope has diversified to reflect the nature of the international scene, for as the target changes, so too must the intelligence organization. It is safe to say that intelligence will go through further stages, yet it is by no means clear how, when, or why this will happen. In the meantime intelligence, battered as it may be by the 2003 scandals regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, will remain a permanent fixture of governance.

See alsoEnigma Machine; Espionage/Spies; Warfare.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrew, Christopher M. Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community. London, 1985.

Bungert, Heike, et al., eds. Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. London, 2003.

Haswell, Jock. Spies and Spymasters: A Concise History of Intelligence. London, 1977.

Hess, Sigurd. "Intelligence Cooperation in Europe, 1990 to the Present." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 1 (summer 2003), 61–68.

Hinsley, F. H. British Intelligence in the Second World War. Cambridge, U.K., 1993.

May, Ernest R., ed. Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars. Princeton, N.J., 1984. Reprint, 1996.

Plougin, Vladimir. Russian Intelligence Services. Vol. 1, The Early Years. Translated by Gennady Bashkov and edited by Claudiu A. Secara. New York, 2000.

Porch, Douglas. The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War. New York, 1995.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. Foreign Intelligence Organizations. Cambridge, Mass., 1988.

Michael S. Goodman

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