Howe, William

views updated

Howe, William

HOWE, WILLIAM. (1729–1814). Fifth Viscount Howe, British general. William, younger brother of George Augustus Howe and Richard Howe, was born on 10 August 1729 and educated at home and at Eton (1742–1746). He entered the army in 1746 as a cornet of the Fifteenth Dragoons, and his unusual application and ability, coupled to powerful connections, enabled him to rise rapidly. Promoted to lieutenant in 1747, he served in Flanders until the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. He became a captain in the Twentieth Foot on 2 January 1750 and formed a close friendship with Major James Wolfe. He was made major in the new Sixtieth (later the Fifty-eighth) Regiment in 1756 and became its lieutenant colonel in 1757. He served with distinction at Louisburg in 1758, Quebec (where he led Wolfe's advance guard onto the Plains of Abraham) in 1759, and the capture of Montreal in 1760. He led a brigade at the capture of Belle Isle in 1761 and was adjutant general of the expedition to Havana in 1762. During the years of peace he continued to rise: colonel of the Forty-sixth Foot in 1764, lieutenant governor of the Isle of Wight in 1768 and major general in 1772. In the late summer of 1774 he was given charge of seven line companies learning light infantry tactics on Salisbury Plain. When war broke out in America in 1775, Howe was a successful soldier distinguished for energy, leadership, and courage.

When George was killed in 1758, William replaced him as member of Parliament for Nottingham. He used his seat to oppose the ministry's policy of coercion in 1774 and it was thought he would not agree to serve in America. His appointment as Gage's second in command and prospective successor was thus something of a surprise, which he explained to his constituents as a matter of duty over personal preference. He also seemed to think that a negotiated settlement was still possible and that he might be the man to reach it. This background has led some historians—most prominently and persistently Ira D. Gruber—to attribute his later military failure to overanxiety to find a political solution. (Gruber rightly has little time for older accusations of laziness, self-indulgent living, and overattachment to his American mistress, Mrs. Joshua Loring). The matter is still open to debate. However the alternative argument put many years ago by Piers Mackesy—that Howe was slowed by intractable military difficulties—appears to be more convincing.

When he reached Boston on 25 May 1775, the time for negotiation was already past: Lexington and Concord had been fought and Boston was under siege. Howe planned and led—with great courage—the British attack on Breed's Hill and Bunker Hill on 17 June. The terribly high price of the British victory demonstrated that costly attacks were to be avoided for two reasons: first, the army's qualitative advantage over the rebels must not be eroded by losses, and second, the Americans must not be allowed to gain confidence through even partial successes. On the contrary, the redcoats' superior discipline and skill in maneuver was the key to ultimate victory: pitched battles were to be avoided until victory was certain. All this was conventional military wisdom in 1776: the idea of attacking and annihilating the enemy's army regardless of cost is Napoleonic in origin and by definition was not available to Howe.

STRATEGY IN NEW YORK

He took over command in Gage's absence on 10 October. Compelled to hurriedly evacuate Boston early in 1776, Howe took his army to Halifax to reorganize and await adequate reinforcements and transports. He was still waiting for his reinforcements and campaign equipment when he reached Staten Island off New York late in June and landed his men on 2 July. His brother, Admiral Richard Lord Howe, arrived on the 12th with supporting warships, some reinforcements, and the news that he and William had been appointed peace commissioners. Both brothers knew that their power to offer pardons and an end to restrictions on trade in return for rebel disarmament were out of date and useless. On the other hand Howe needed more men, supplies, and essential camp equipment before he could risk his precious regulars in a campaign. He had no choice but to wait. Thus, far from changing his strategy to make room for negotiation, as Gruber would have it, he and Richard used the period of enforced inactivity to begin negotiations on 14 July. The overture came to nothing, largely because the Howes would not address Washington as "General"—a point, had they been really serious, they might have overlooked.

But still Howe could not move, largely because everything he needed had to come across the Atlantic and because the government, which determined strategy, sent Clinton off on a wild goose chase to Charleston before he went on to join Howe. Meanwhile, some British regulars and Germans arrived from Europe, but Howe did not feel strong enough to risk an amphibious assault on Long Island until Clinton finally arrived on 12 August. Even then Howe would launch his offensive without the last of his equipment, the camp kettles that were essential to his men's health in the field. When they arrived at the end of August, he promptly attacked Long Island.

Brilliantly outmaneuvering Washington and pinning the rebels against the water at Brooklyn on 27 August, Howe opted for a regular siege of their works rather than an immediate storm. The memory of Bunker Hill cast a long shadow. Howe knew that he must not risk giving the Americans even the illusion of success, a policy that Clinton, who was very critical later when blame had to be apportioned, heartily approved at the time. In the same way, after Washington's escape, Howe planned another outflanking move that would lever Washington out of New York City rather than force him to fight for it street by street. That meant a wait until boats, transports, and supporting warships could be concentrated inside the East River, and once again the Howe brothers used the lull to negotiate. Then the indirect assault began, again catching the Americans off balance and driving them out of the city at minimal risk. Washington escaped, of course, but his army was shaken and demoralized and nearer to the point when Howe could risk a final battle. The pattern was repeated at Harlem and White Plains. Then, when he was sure that Fort Washington was isolated and vulnerable, Howe proved he could attack decisively. A few more weeks and Washington's army might have been harried to pieces.

FRUSTRATION IN NEW JERSEY

But the campaigning season was now far advanced. As autumn turned the roads of New York and New Jersey to mud and the soldiers became exhausted, hot pursuit became impossible and Washington escaped behind the Delaware. Howe's army went into winter quarters and on 30 November the brothers used the unavoidable lull to offer a pardon to all who would return to their allegiance within sixty days. This might have succeeded in pacifying New Jersey but for Washington's double success at Trenton and Princeton, demonstrating that the British army was now dangerously overextended. Howe's subsequent retreat behind the Raritan exposed the New Jersey men who had come out to support him and shook the faith of Loyalists everywhere in the ability of the British army to liberate and protect them. Worse still, it confined the British in New York in an area too small to provide it with adequate supplies, leaving it dangerously dependent upon transatlantic shipments of everything from powder and flints to writing paper and firewood. However, the attempt to overrun and rally support in New Jersey was fully justified by the winter pause in operations, something eighteenth-century commanders took for granted, and one Howe could not ignore if he was to conserve his precious regulars.

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA

Howe's objective in 1777 was to engage and defeat Washington's army, and all his apparent hesitations and delays sprang from the difficulty of bringing this about. His fundamental strategic error, failure to thrust up the Hudson to meet Burgoyne, was one shared with the ministry and with Burgoyne himself: no one imagined that Burgoyne would need direct help. On the other hand, if Howe could pin down and decisively defeat Washington's army, he would render effective help to Burgoyne while bringing the rebellion swiftly to an end. An amphibious invasion of Pennsylvania would—by threatening Philadelphia—probably force Washington to offer battle on Howe's terms. It would also give Howe secure lines of communication, restore Loyalist confidence, and secure an adequate territory from which to draw supplies. The draw-back was that because so many troops had been sent from Britain to Burgoyne rather than to New York, Howe would have to evacuate the Jerseys in order to find enough men for Pennsylvania.

For a moment, Washington's appearance at Middle Brook north of the Raritan seemed to promise a decisive battle without going to Philadelphia at all. In June, Howe successfully lured Washington out of his strong position and tried to cut him off and make him fight in the open. The attempt failed, and Washington escaped to his fastness at Middle Brook. Once again refusing an assault on a strong position—a decision later praised by Charles Lord Cornwallis—Howe then evacuated the Jerseys and resumed his plan to attack Philadelphia.

His primary target was still Washington's army, not the city, and its movements determined his strategy. As in 1776, the embarkation was delayed by the shortages of troops, shipping, and supplies, not to mention contrary winds. Howe had also to make sure that Burgoyne was not running into any unexpected trouble and that Washington did not slip north to intercept him. He had no orders to march up the Hudson himself, except in an emergency; so far from ignoring his instructions (as Gruber insists he was), Howe was being commendably careful and conscientious. Consequently, there was a three-week pause on Staten Island from 1-23 July before he embarked his fifteen thousand men for Pennsylvania.

Howe already knew that he could land at Chester or New Castle, below the known Delaware forts and obstacles, or in the Chesapeake at Head of Elk, depending on Washington's movements. When the expedition reached the mouth of the Delaware on 30 July, Howe discovered that his opponent had not marched north against New York or Burgoyne, a move which would have ended the whole British expedition. Instead, Washington appeared to have moved south and west, towards the line of the Susquehanna River, behind which he would be hard to get at and would be able to threaten the flank of an advance from the Delaware to Philadelphia. As Howe's primary objective was still Washington's army, he decided to go to Head of Elk, further from Philadelphia but closer to Washington and on a line of operations that would keep the enemy to his front and might—by still threatening Philadelphia—bring him to battle. That meant longer at sea, and when Howe's men disembarked at Head of Elk on 25 August, they were so exhausted that it was the 28th before they could march inland.

Once on the move, Howe consistently outgeneraled Washington. On 11 September he won a clear victory at Brandywine Creek, a battle Washington survived only because Howe's cavalry horses were still in no state to offer hot pursuit. Washington was again outmaneuvered on the Schuylkill, Philadelphia was occupied on 26 September, and Washington's counteroffensive was skillfully contained at Germantown on 4 October.

Washington's army survived, however, and Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga negated all of Howe's achievements in Pennsylvania. Howe, already irritated by criticism from a ministry that had kept him short of men and shipping, offered his resignation on 22 October 1777. On 14 April 1778 he learned that it had been accepted and on 25 May, after Clinton's arrival and the abortive attempt to trap Lafayette at Barren Hill, Howe sailed for home.

RETURN TO BRITAIN

Howe was greeted by a barrage of criticism from the opposition and the press. He and his brother Richard (who returned home on 25 October 1778) insisted on a parliamentary inquiry, and from 22 April to 30 June 1779 they vigorously defended their conduct. In 1780 William gave up his Commons seat and resumed his military career. In 1782 he became a privy councillor and lieutenant general of the ordnance, a post he held until 1804. He became colonel of the Nineteenth Dragoons in 1786, and after the outbreak of war in 1793 he was given regional commands in the north and east of England. He was governor of Berwick from 1795 to 1808 and of Plymouth from 1808 until his death in 1814. On Richard's death on 5 August 1799, he became the fifth viscount Howe. He died at Plymouth on 12 July 1814.

ASSESSMENT

Although Howe's excessive caution led him to miss decisive opportunities in 1776 and 1777, he was neither lazy nor did Mrs. Loring keep him from operations in the field. It is true that the Philadelphia expedition was partly misconceived: a thrust up the Hudson might have as effectively brought Washington to battle while eliminating most of the risk to Burgoyne. However, that would have sacrificed the political and moral advantages of invading Pennsylvania, not to mention the prospect of conquering a territory large enough to provide adequate supplies. Howe in the field was slow and methodical but his tactical performance was nothing short of stunning. Howe was a capable commander saddled with an enormous task, inadequate means, and (in 1777) a flawed strategy imposed from above.