Nuclear Test Ban Treaties

Introduction

Nuclear test-ban treaties are international agreements to forbid test explosions of nuclear weapons. There have been three nuclear test-ban treaties, two of which have entered into force (become legally binding on their signatories) and one of which, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), remains in legal limbo. The first test-ban treaty was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which entered into force in 1963. It forbade nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, but did not forbid underground explosions. The second was the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which forbade underground test explosions above a certain size. The CTBT would forbid all nuclear test explosions in all environments. Some countries, including India, North Korea, Pakistan, the United States, and China, have refused to ratify the CTBT, arguing that it is unenforceable or against their national interests.

Historical Background and Scientific Foundations

The first nuclear weapon test was also the first nuclear explosion in history, the blast code-named “Trinity” set off by the United States on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico. The Soviet Union was the second nation to conduct a nuclear test, in August 29, 1949. Other nations have followed: the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), Pakistan (1998), and North Korea (2006). There is some evidence that Israel and South Africa may have conducted a test over the Indian Ocean in 1979.

From 1945 to 2008, well over 2,000 nuclear test explosions have been conducted worldwide, most by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States has conducted the most tests, exploding at least 1,150 bombs; the Soviet Union is second with over 960 bombs; France is third with at least 210 bombs; and China fourth with 45 bombs.

The first tests by any nation are conducted to verify that their nuclear bomb design can be made to explode. Later tests are conducted in order to verify new bomb designs (especially designs for smaller, lighter-weight bombs that can be mounted on missiles or for other special purposes) and to verify that aging bombs in an arsenal will still explode on demand.

There are four basic categories of nuclear tests, according to location: atmospheric tests, which involve exploding a weapon anywhere from the surface of the ground on up to the stratosphere; exo-atmospheric tests, above the atmosphere in outer space; underwater tests; and underground tests. In the 1940s and 1950s, most tests were atmospheric, with bombs exploded at the ground surface or not far above it. This practice caused radioactive dust to spread downwind from the test explosions. This material, called fallout, was a hazard to health, containing radioactive isotopes such as americium-241, cesium-137, iodine-131, and strontium-90. Several of these, especially iodine-131 and strontium-90, can be concentrated up the food chain and in the human body. In large quantities, fallout can cause almost immediate death; in smaller quantities, it can cause cancer. Iodine-131 concentrates in the thyroid gland, increasing the chances of thyroid cancer; strontium-90 is chemically similar to calcium, and so is concentrated by children in their bones and bone marrow. Other animals concentrate fallout too, but the amount of fallout from surface testing was not large enough to cause widespread environmental harm.

In 1954, the United States tested a large hydrogen bomb, the Castle Bravo test, at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The bomb turned out to be about three times more powerful than expected and produced more fallout than expected also. This was carried by winds over the

WORDS TO KNOW

COLD WAR: At term describing the ideological, political, economic, and military tensions and struggles between the two dominant superpowers of the era, The United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) between 1945 (the end of the WWII) and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

RADIOACTIVITY: The property possessed by some elements of spontaneously emitting energy in the form of particles or waves by disintegration of their atomic nuclei.

Pacific, raining radioactivity on a Japanese fishing boat and on several inhabited Pacific islands. One member of the crew of the Japanese boat died from radiation burns. In the continental United States, fears grew over radioactive contamination from U.S. surface tests. However, the full extent of such contamination was not even known by the public; in 1997, a report by the National Cancer Institute revealed that American children had been exposed to 15 to 70 times as much radiation in 1951–1958 from the Nevada Test Site (where the United States carried out most of its atmospheric tests) as had been previously reported. Nevertheless, enough was known in the 1950s to trigger a nationwide scare over fallout and cancer.

Public fears put pressure on ongoing test-ban negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, which had begun in May 1955. The Soviet Union proposed linking a test ban to a general disarmament treaty that would reduce both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies opposed such a linkage. The Soviets were also opposed to on-site inspections to verify a test ban, because they feared that the United States would use inspections as an opportunity to spy. The United States feared that without on-site inspections, there would be no way to detect small nuclear tests by the Soviets in violation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Public concern over fallout moved the Soviet Union and United States to stop nuclear testing in November 1958. The suspension held until September 1961, when the Soviets resumed testing. The United States resumed testing on April 25, 1962.

Despite resumed testing, agreement on a partial test-ban treaty was near. After the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, during which the United States and the Soviet Union came perilously close to an all-out nuclear war, U.S. President John F. Kennedy (1917–1963) and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) resumed negotiations toward a test-ban treaty in July 1963. Khrushchev gave up the Soviet demand for a ban on underground testing as well as atmospheric, exo-atmospheric, and underwater testing. After just 12 days of negotiations, the PTBT was agreed upon, and the two countries signed the treaty on August 5, 1963. The U.S. Congress ratified the treaty on September 23, 1963. By 2008, 113 other countries had also signed the treaty. China and France have never signed the treaty and Pakistan has signed but not ratified; all three of these countries do, however, now restrict nuclear tests to underground explosions. France continued atmospheric testing until 1975.

The second test-ban treaty was the TTBT, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1974. These two countries remain this treaty’s only signatories. It forbids the testing of nuclear devices with yields greater than 150 kilotons. In nuclear-weapons jargon, a kiloton is a unit of explosive force equal to that of 1,000 tons of the conventional chemical explosive trinitrotoluene (TNT). Compliance with the terms of the treaty could be monitored independently by each country by seismic monitoring, that is, recording of vibrations in the ground.

The third test-ban treaty was the CTBT, which bans nuclear explosions in all environments. It was opened for signature in September 1996, after long and contentious negotiations. As of 2008, it had been signed by 178 governments and ratified by 144, not including the United States, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, all nuclear powers.

Impacts and Issues

Soon after the signing of the PTBT in 1963, levels of radioactivity from fallout began to steadily decline worldwide as the radioactive isotopes began to disappear. (Every such isotope has an innate half-life, or time period after which half of any given amount of the substance has emitted radioactivity and transformed into some other isotope; eventually, all radioactive substances become non-radioactive, some quickly, some slowly.) Most scientists agree that the PTBT has been at least a partial success, diminishing harm from fallout.

The TTBT was less-warmly received. In the mid-1970s, many scientists who had called for treaties limiting or abolishing nuclear weapons and weapons testing opposed the TTBT on the ground that it was inadequate. The Arms Control Association opposed the treaty as worse than not having any treat at all; the Pugwash group of nuclear scientists characterized it as a “mock-cry”; and the Federation of American Scientists stated that it was a “counter-productive sham.” Two of the objections of these groups were that (1) the treaty’s explosive threshold, 150 kilotons (about 10 times larger than the bomb with which the United States destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945), was far higher than it needed to be to permit verification, and would allow the superpowers unrestrained development of new nuclear weapons in the range of explosive power they were most interested in anyway; and (2) the treaty allowed for nuclear explosions of any size for peaceful purposes, even though these are not physically different from weapons tests.

In the United States, political opposition to the CTBT centered around two claims, namely that (1) a complete ban on nuclear explosions would be technologically impossible to verify, allowing cheating, and (2) continued testing was necessary to assure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The U.S. Senate rejected the treaty on October 13, 1999, in a partisan split. Lack of participation by the United States, one of the world’s largest nuclear powers, has crippled the treaty. A 2002 study by a panel convened by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that none of the technical objections raised against the CTBT were serious problems, should the United States choose to ratify and implement the treaty. As of 2008, it was still possible that the United States could choose to ratify the CTBT.

Despite the CTBT’s initial rejection by the United States, the signatory nations have proceeded to construct a global system of vibration sensors to allow the treaty to be verified. By 2005, the system consisted of 85 sensor stations listening to vibrations in the air, ground, and water, feeding their data in real time to the International Data Center in Vienna, Austria. For global coverage and sensitivity, it outclasses all other seismic sensor networks and has become a powerful tool for geologists, seismologists, and other earth scientists.

Primary Source Connection

At the height of the Cold War in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis accelerated the debate of a nuclear arms embargo, as U.S. naval ships blocked a convoy of Soviet ships delivering intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missiles to Cuba. The events that followed nearly brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war.

In response to the general feeling of insecurity and the fear of total nuclear destruction of the world in a future war, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water was formed on August 5, 1963, and took effect on October 10, 1963. The agreement, also known as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT), the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), or the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), was a result of substantial arms control efforts taken by both the United States as well as the Soviet Union.

The treaty also banned tests that could cause radioactive fallout to settle beyond the territorial limits of the country conducting the tests. Therefore, it set certain territorial limits for radioactive tests and banned countries from conducting those tests that affected regions beyond the specified territory limits. The treaty proclaimed its principal aim was the speedy end to the

arms race and to stamp out incentives for nuclear weapons production and testing. The treaty also declared itself to be of unlimited duration.

As environmental consciousness grew, the treaty was also seen as vital in protecting the environment from radioactive fallout and other negative impacts of nuclear testing.

TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE, AND UNDER WATER (LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY)

Signed at Moscow: August 5, 1963 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate: September 24, 1963 Ratified by U.S. President: October 7, 1963 U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow: October 10, 1963 Proclaimed by U.S. President: October 10, 1963 Entered into force: October 10, 1963

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the “Original Parties,”

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

Article III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be reistered b the Depositar Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government of the United States of America

DEAN RUSK

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

SIR DOUGLAS HOME

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A. GROMYKO

KENNEDY, JOHN F. “TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE, AND UNDER WATER (LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY).” AUGUST 5, 1963. HTTP://WWW.UCSUSA.ORG/ASSETS/DOCUMENTS/GLOBAL_SECURITY/LIMITED_TEST_BAN_TREATY.PDF (ACCESSED APRIL 12, 2008)

See Also Radioactive Waste

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Hansen, Keith A. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider’s Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.

Periodicals

Glanz, James. “Panel Finds No Major Flaws in Nuclear Treaty.” New York Times (August 1, 2002).

Hansen, Keith. “CTBT: Forecasting the Future.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 2005).

Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H. “Nuclear Insecurity.” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2007).

Web Sites

Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “Summary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.” http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/aptctbt.pdf (accessed May 11,2008).

Department of State. “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.” http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4797.htm (accessed May 11, 2008).

Office for Disarmament Affairs. “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.” http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (accessed May 11, 2008).

Larry Gilman