MURRAY, Williamson

PERSONAL:

Male. Education: Yale University, M.A., 1963, M.A., 1971, PhD., 1975.

CAREER:

Yale University, New Haven, CT, instructor, c. 1975-77; Ohio State University, Columbus, professor of history, 1977-95, professor emeritus, 1995—; Institute of Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA, senior fellow. Secretary of the Navy Fellow, Naval War College, 1991-92; Centennial Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, 1994-95; Matthew C. Horner Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, 1995-97; Charles Lindbergh Chair at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, 1997-98; Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History at the Army War College. Military service: U.S. Air Force, 1963-69, served in Southeast Asia with the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing.

AWARDS, HONORS:

Andrew D. White Prize in European history, Yale University, 1963.

WRITINGS:

Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945, Air University Press (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), 1983, published as The Luftwaffe, 1933-45: Strategy for Defeat, Brassey's (Washington, DC), 1996.

The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin, Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ), 1984.

Luftwaffe, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America (Baltimore, MD), 1985.

(Editor, with Allan R. Millett) Military Effectiveness, Unwin Hyman (Boston, MA), 1988.

German Military Effectiveness, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America (Baltimore, MD), 1992.

(Editor, with Allan R. Millett) Calculations: Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II, Free Press (New York, NY), 1992.

(Editor, with MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein) The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 1994.

Air War in the Persian Gulf, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America (Baltimore, MD), 1995.

(Editor, with Allan R. Millett) Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 1996.

(Editor) The Emerging Strategic Environment: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, Praeger (West-port, CT), 1999.

War in the Air, Cassell (London, England), 1999.

(With Allan R. Millett) A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, Belknap Press of Harvard University (Cambridge, MA), 2000.

(Editor, with MacGregor Knox) The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2001.

(Editor) Army Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA), 2001.

(Editor) Transformation Concepts for National Security in the Twenty-first Century, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA), 2002.

(With Robert H. Scales, Jr.) The Iraq War: A Military History, Belknap Press of Harvard University (Cambridge, MA), 2003.

(Editor) National Security Challenges for the Twenty-first Century, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA), 2003.

(Editor) A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA), 2004.

War in the Air, 1914-1945, Smithsonian (Washington, DC), 2005.

(Editor, with Richard Hart Sinnreich) The Past As Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession, Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2006.

Contributor to magazines and scholarly journals, including the National Interest, Strategic Review, Orbis, and Joint Forces Quarterly.

SIDELIGHTS:

Williamson Murray is a military historian and U.S. Air Force veteran who has written and edited many books focusing on military strategy, innovation, and effectiveness in warfare. Murray has used his experience and knowledge to convey to a general audience what works and what does not in fighting war.

A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, which Murray wrote with Allan R. Millett, "is likely to become the definitive single-volume account of military operations from 1939 to 1942," according to Cole C. Kingseed in the Joint Force Quarterly Review. The book traverses familiar ground, beginning with the effects of World War I, which led to the rise of Nazism in Germany. Central to the discussion are the technical innovations that made Germany a powerful opponent on the battlefield. Murray and Millett give equal time to the war in the Pacific as well, outlining the tactics that made Japan such a potent enemy and ultimately persuaded President Truman to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

The authors also rate the generals who fought the war, often providing assessments that run contrary to established views. These include criticisms of Generals Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, and Omar Bradley, all of whom made errors in their decisions and did not act boldly enough. However, they give high marks to General George Patton, who understood how to exploit the weaknesses of the Axis powers and capitalize on the strength of the Allied powers, and also the Soviet generals, who utilized military intelligence and deception operations to plan and carry out maneuvers that effectively brought the Germans to their knees. Much of the war, the authors maintain, boiled down to being able to supply troops with enough supplies and equipment to stay on the offensive. The Allied powers rallied from a late lead and overpowered the Axis forces, whose leaders did not have the foresight to secure supply routes and did not have sufficient forces to fight a ground war after the Allied Invasion. Summarizing A War to Be Won in a review for the Journal of Modern History, MacGregor Knox concluded that it "succeeds simultaneously as a serious analytical work, packed with insight on virtually all major issues, and as a good read.… It will long remain a standard by which to judge works on this greatest of wars." Similar in sentiment was Michael Marino's conclusion in a review of the book for Teaching History: A Journal of Methods: "This book is highly readable yet rigorous and scholarly in its tone and style. It is rare when a book can reach both popular and academic readers."

Murray and MacGregor Knox edited The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, a collection of writings by leading military analysts outlining the evolution of warfare from the time of England's Edward III. The book details various military revolutions, such as the introduction of air campaigns and the creation of aircraft carriers, which created unique situations that advanced the way wars are fought and won. Ultimately, the editors and authors agree that when it comes to winning a war, advances in technology cannot replace strategy and a deep understanding of military and political issues. Jeremy Black, in a review for the English Historical Review, warned that the authors' focus on Western warfare at the expense of the rest of the world "limits the number of explanatory models and greatly lessens the possibilities of discussion and analysis by means of informed comparison and contrast." Conversely, Scott Stephenson, writing in the Military Review, concluded that the book "belongs on the reading lists of officers from all four services."

Murray and Robert H. Scales wrote The Iraq War: A Military History, even as the war continued to rage. Defying the convention that a war cannot be understood until it is safely in the past, the authors outline the transformation in the American military after defeat in Vietnam and how these changes enabled U.S. forces to defeat the Iraqi military so quickly at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In terms of offering a detailed analysis of the early part of the war, which was unusual in the lack of solid intelligence available to commanders and the speed with which they had to take action, the book "is a pleasant surprise," according to Raymond Puffer in Kliatt, although he added that it assumes the reader is already somewhat familiar with the nature of military operations. All the technological innovations since previous wars, the authors assert, were no substitute for the clear-thinking, insight, and superior military intelligence needed on a warfront in which the enemy was not often visible. Additionally, they make clear that fighting the war and winning the peace are two separate battles, and that political forces did not sufficiently plan for an extended occupation. Writing in the Naval War College Review, F.G. Hoffman appreciated the book's maps and photographs and called the book "an extremely rare occurrence—an insightful overview and assessment of the second Gulf war produced while the guns were still warm.… [that combines] lucid prose and mastery of both history and operational detail to permit the reader to grasp clearly the dynamics of the race to Baghdad."

BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL SOURCES:

PERIODICALS

Aerospace Power Journal, winter, 2000, James P. Gates, review of A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, p. 108.

Air and Space Power Journal, winter, 2004, Merrick E. Krause, review of The Iraq War: A Military History, p. 114.

Air Power History, spring, 2004, James R. FitzSimonds, review of The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, p. 50.

Canadian Journal of History, December, 2001, Michael A. Hennessy, review of A War to Be Won, p. 646.

English Historical Review, February, 1999, Jeremy A. Crang, review of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, p. 245; September, 2002, Jeremy Black, review of The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, p. 1041.

Foreign Affairs, May-June, 1997, Eliot A. Cohen, review of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, p. 128.

Joint Force Quarterly, autumn, 2000, Cole C. King-seed, review of A War to Be Won, p. 108.

Journal of Modern History, September, 2003, MacGregor Knox, review of A War to Be Won, p. 671.

Kliatt, March, 2006, Raymond Puffer, review of The Iraq War, p. 40.

Military Review, March-April, 2003, Scott Stephenson, review of The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, p. 92.

Naval War College Review, spring, 2003, Brian R. Sullivan, review of The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, p. 154; spring, 2004, F.G. Hoffman, review of The Iraq War, p. 171.

Parameters, winter, 2002, Gregory Fontenot, review of The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, p. 158.

Policy Review, October, 2000, Woody West, review of A War to Be Won, p. 80.

Teaching History: A Journal of Methods, spring, 2001, Michael Marino, review of A War to Be Won, p. 54.*