STAHL, GEORG ERNST

(b. Ansbach, Germany, 21 October 1660 [1659?]; d. Berlin, Germany, 4 May 1734)

medicine, chemistry.

Stahl has aroused much controversy. As a physician he was outstanding; he held the highest academic positions, enjoyed a very active practice, and through his writings became vastly influential. As a philosopher he supported the viewpoint known as vitalism and wove that concept into the fabric of his medical system. As a chemist he elaborated and maintained the doctrine of phlogiston, which, until outgrown later in the eighteenth century, provided a reasoned explanation for many chemical phenomena. But his teachings, particularly his stand on vitalism, in large part ran counter to the trend of the times; his chemical theories were overthrown; his vitalist doctrine, in the form that he elaborated it, could not stand up against the onrushing tide of research and experimentation: while his system of medical practice faded away before numerous competitors. Furthermore, his personality was often antagonistic, his style of writing obscure and hard to understand. Yet, even though he seemed to be discredited, Stahl influenced the whole of eighteenth-century medicine; and his imprint is being increasingly appreciated as historians trace his role in the drama of eighteenthcentury medical thought.

Although the generally accepted date of Stahl’s birth is 21 October 1660, Gottlieb disputes this and claims that the baptismal register, in the parish of St. John in Ansbach, shows 1659. There is little information about Stahl’s early life. Even as a youth he had considerable interest in chemistry. He studied medicine at Jena and received his degree in January 1684. He then devoted himself to scientific work and lectured in chemistry at the university, attaining considerable reputation. In 1687 Stahl was invited to become court physician at Weimar, where he remained for seven years. He subsequently joined the medical faculty of the new University of Halle.

Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg (Frederick I of Prussia), eager to surpass his neighbors, decided to establish a new university at Halle. The great liberal jurist Christian Thomasius. who had been expelled from Leipzig, settled at Halle at Frederick’s invitation. The elector built his university around Thomasius and attracted such men as August Francke in oriental languages and Friedrich Hoffmann in medicine. In 1693 the university received the imperial privilege and was officially inaugurated in 1694.

Hoffmann, needing help, was instrumental in securing Stahl’s appointment as the second professor of medicine. In 1694 Stahl went to Halle, where he remained until 1715, lecturing particularly on the theory of medicine and on chemistry. Hoffmann and Stahl, although different in many respects, formed a very strong faculty. and Halle became a leading medical school. In 1715, at the request of Frederick William I of Prussia, Stahl left Halle and went to Berlin to be court physician. He remained there until his death.

Stahl’s personality has received much unfavorable comment. He has been condemned as misanthropic and harsh, narrow-minded and intolerant. These qualities also have been contrasted unfavorably with the sunnier and more open disposition of Hoffmann. Much of the evaluation rests on rather slender evidence and stems particularly from the statements of Haller, which many historians have repeated. On the other hand, Stahl had many defenders. The truth is virtually impossible to establish, unless further primary source material should be discovered.

Stahl was a devout Pietist —Halle, in the early days, was the center for Pietism as well as rationalism and this background undoubtedly colored his doctrines. Many misfortunes attended his personal life. His first wife died in 1696 of puerperal fever and his second wife in 1706, of the same disease. A daughter died in 1708. These were the years of his greatest productivity, and it is only reasonable to see in his outward attitudes some reflection of his personal life. He was a prodigious worker, and pride and self-confidence apparently were notable qualities. Gottlieb quotes Stahl’s personal motto as E rebus quantumcumque dubiis quicquid maxima sententium turba defendit, error est. for which I suggest the translation, “Where there is doubt, whatever the greatest mass of opinion maintains. . . is wrong.”

Stahl’s style of writing is prolix and convoluted, and difficult to understand. Perhaps the style is the man himself.

Stahl, who lived well into the eighteenth century, was nevertheless part of the seventeenth-century rebellion against tradition; and his doctrines reflect, in a way, the intense turmoil of that period. The rebellion, of course, involved all phases of intellectual life. In medicine the Galenic theories, which rested largely on Aristotle, had come under severe attack. In astronomy and physics, especially mechanics, new experimental methods had shown how untenable were the older views. In physiology and biology Harvey was the greatest among many investigators who introduced new concepts that were firmly grounded on empirical demonstration. In philosophy Descartes offered new vistas and new methodology, while Gassendi helped to reintroduce atomism. In chemistry the arch-rebel Paracelsus had given great impetus to a movement of which the leading representatives were van Helmont, in the early seventeenth century, and Sylvius and Willis in the later part. At the same time traditional religion remained powerful and entrenched. Piety and orthodoxy were strong values, and atheism and materialism were epithets dreaded by most scientific workers. The new philosophy and the new science, which threatened orthodox religions, had to come to terms with religious tenets.

In the medical world of the later seventeenth century, many different theories competed actively; but no clear victory was in sight for any one. The traditional Galenic theories were in retreat but by no means annihilated. latrophysicists tried to explain all medical phenomena on the basis of matter, motion, and the simple laws of mechanics; iatrochemists relied on the chemical “principles” as their explanatory terms. The dichotomy between mind and body had taken deep root and was influencing medical theory, while the close relation between the “mind” of medical doctrine and the “soul” of religious orthodoxy was troublesome indeed.

Although Stahl did not provide any straightforward or systematic exposition of his doctrines, his prolix writing contains certain recurrent themes that serve as a foundation for his more specific discussions. Foremost among his basic concepts is the irreducible difference between the living and the nonliving. Mind and matter are distinct and ultimate. Matter, particulate in its nature, exists as a real entity in its own right and comprises the material aspect of the universe. But equally real and equally deserving of the designation ens are the immaterial aspects, of which the anima is the key manifestation. While both the living and the nonliving are composed of matter, only living creatures have an anima. The immaterial vital principle serves as the ultimate differential feature that distinguishes the living from the nonliving.

A second major principle involves the concept of goal or purpose. The philosopher (or scientist) who tries to describe and explain the phenomena of life must take account of the goal activity. Behavior is not blind or mechanical. Living creatures can be understood only if we pay attention to their striving toward particular ends or purposes. This striving, in turn, implies a directive agency controlling the goal-seeking effort. The agent is the anima.

A third principle concerns the place of mechanism in the scheme of things. All nonliving creatures-the inorganic or “mixed” — are entirely mechanical. Living creatures, up to a point, also are mechanical; but the mechanism involved represents only the instrument of the directing agent or anima. The agent exerts itself, manifests itself, through mechanical principles.

These major doctrines give rise to certain corollaries: the anima that directs the purposive activities of the body acts in an intelligent fashion. It is rational and exhibits foresight to bring about the desired ends. Furthermore, the directing force can be understood only as a process involving a time span. It implies wholes rather than parts, and only a false philosophy will focus exclusively on the parts and neglect the whole.

On this framework Stahl elaborated a rather detailed and intricate, if rambling and untidy, superstructure. The entire doctrine of animism rests on the ultimate distinction between the living and the nonliving. Stahl pointed out certain significant differences — the nonliving, which may be either homogeneous or heterogeneous, is relatively inert, remains stable over an indefinite time span, and is not readily changed or decomposed. Living creatures, however, are always heterogeneous and always have a great tendency to decomposition and putrefaction. Yet the components of the living body, despite this tendency to putrefaction, remain stable over the limited time that life persists. The tendency to decomposition is held in check by a conserving agent. This agent, the essence of life, is the anima, which thus preserves the body from corruption.

The living body depends on motion — most obviously the motion of the heart and the circulation of the blood. The anima exerts its control over the body through this very property of motion. By using this concept Stahl engages in some remarkable semantic juggling that enables him to construct a formal and orderly system.

He explicitly denies that motion is in any sense a function of matter. Although material objects do exhibit motion, this property is not intrinsic to them. On the contrary, matter-consisting of material particles-is inert; motion is something added, superimposed from outside. For Stahl motion derives from the anima. It is in no sense material (this, indeed, follows clearly from the concept that motion is not a property of matter). On the contrary, he considers it to be immaterial. Motion, then, is somehow reified into an immaterial entity representative of the anima, which is also immaterial. The immaterial anima acts through motion-also immaterial—and in turn affects material particles.

This sequence is Stahl’s answer to the problem, how can an immaterial entity act on something material. This difficulty, the crux of Cartesian dualism, had remained a stumbling block. One popular “solution,” widely accepted, involved an intermediary— the animal spirits, which were extremely subtle matter. The soul acted on the animal spirits, which, being material, could then act on the coarser material elements. This formulation employs a sort of Neoplatonic maneuver whereby extremely subtle matter seems to mediate the transition between the conceptual realm and the material world.

This “solution,” however, simply begs the question. Stahl, by calling motion an immaterial entity subject to control through the anima. believed that he had solved the problem. The concept of motion served as a link whereby an immaterial anima could act on the body.

The most important motions of the body are primarily the circulation of the blood. and then those motions that activate the processes of excretion and secretion. Without these, life could not exist. Motion, operative on the humors and the solids, maintains life and health. If the motions are impaired, disease occurs, Motion. Stahl emphasized, is not life but merely its instrument. This concept of instrumentality has extreme importance for his system, which centered on the anima.

We do not perceive the anima, nor can we study it directly. Instead, we perceive and study the bodily activities in health and the changes in disease, that is, physiology and pathology, and from these data we infer the nature of the anima. Stahl was not in any sense an obscurantist or mystic but, rather, a hard-headed clinician. He taught that the proper study of medicine involves the functions of the body, and his voluminous writings concerned themselves with physiology, pathology, and clinical medicine. But while emphasizing the importance of these aspects, he placed them in a suitable perspective: that the motions of the body, in health and in disease, are subordinate to a certain directing and integrating force–the anima.

The mind acts on the body in various ways. So-called voluntary actions, depending on a deliberate exercise of will, are quite obvious. But more important for Stahl’s system are those bodily effects that result from other psychic causes. Stahl repeatedly referred to the effects on the body produced by psychic disturbance, and he offered examples in two major areas. What we today call emotions–anger, fear, disgust, hatred, love –produce certain significant changes in the bodily functions. The alterations in pulse, respiration, or various digestive activities that result from emotional stress were well-known and obviously were quite different from “voluntary” motions that involve skeletal muscle. Stahl’s reasoned explanation presupposed an immaterial ens, the anima, that felt the emotion and reacted on the bodily organs by inducing changes in their motion.

In a second major illustration, used repeatedly, Stahl fell back on the belief that in a pregnant woman the emotions of the mother exert a material effect on the body of the fetus. It was a firm article of belief that a mother could “mark” the baby in utero. In emotional states such as fright or desire, the psychic state could have a physical effect upon the baby. Stahl could not explain in detail how this came about: but he did use these examples to bolster his claims that the anima, of immaterial psychic character, had power over the body.

The physical effects of emotion provide merely a striking example of a general situation; that primary changes in the mind are, through motion transferred to the solids and fluids of the body. But this is merely a special case. Actually, according to Stahl, the anima affects the body at all times. It is continually exerting regulatory and directing functions over all bodily activities —and these functions are all purposive.

This is the crux of animism. The anima regulates all bodily actions in accordance with certain goals. Life is purposeful. The anima is the source not merely of motion but also of directive, purposeful motion. Purpose thus involves the deliberate activity of mind, whereas chance concerns the activity of matter alone, without the intervention of mind. Purpose, implying a goal toward which activity is directed, has what we may call a forward reference, comparable with the final cause of Aristotle. Whatever happens by chance depends solely on backward reference, the vis a tergo.

Around these ideas Stahl constructed his important distinction between mechanism and organism. Mechanical properties depend only on the configuration, size, position, and movement (or disposition to movement) of the component parts. The movements have purely mechanical causes. In an organism, however, movements are combined toward a specific end, with a responsible agent that regulates and integrates them. To be sure, in any organism the activities involve mechanism, but merely in an instrumental fashion, subordinate to the purpose, goal, or intent constitutes the reason for existence of the organism. A mechanism does not have such a reason for existence.

Stahl provides numerous examples. In a watch, for instance, a skillfully constructed mechanism, the parts act on each other in mechanical fashion. But the watch also has properties of an organism, insofar as it has the goal of keeping time. If, because of defective parts, it fails to keep correct time, it no longer has the properties of an organism but remains a mere mechanism.

In entities that are not man-made, the question of possible goal or purpose lies beyond human knowledge. Thus, no one can penetrate the ends served by celestial bodies or the existence of so many species of insects. The answers can lie only in the will of God.

The anima Stahl made explicitly clear, exists only in the body, is inseparable from it, and cannot be thought of apart from the body. It is not a religious concept, nor is it an obscurantist or mystical doctrine. It is understood by rational analysis, which discloses that the anima is entirely dependent upon the body for perception and ideas. The body is the instrument of the anima, which must have sensory organs to aid the intellect and locomotive organs to aid the will.

Stahl rejected the view that bodily action is carried out solely by the motion of particles. The mechanical philosophy, depending on the vis a tergo, simply did not explain observed phenomena. For example, a certain noise—a stimulus falling on the ear —may induce a turning of the eyes toward the noise. Mechanists explained this by the activity of certain particles of the body, incited by the sense organs and reaching the motor organs to act upon them directly and to induce movement. In contrast, Stahl gave the example of a miser who hears a noise like a falling coin. He not only turns his eyes (what we would call a simple reflex) but also searches the entire room, with all the complicated associated movements. He does not stop until he finds the object of his search. That such complex behavior should have a simple mechanical explanation in the motion of particles seemed utterly absurd to Stahl.

Stahl propounded some views that may also seem absurd unless we relate them to the Aristotelian background and see the relationship between the anima of Stahl and the form of Aristotle (especially as the Aristotelian doctrine is manifest in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Galenits). Stahl declared that the body exists only because of the anima, and its form structure are determined through the energy of the mind. More important, there must reside in the anima some special knowledge of the organs, knowledge that regulates growth, shape, and function, and keeps the organs in proper proportion and relationship— proper, that is, for undertaking their functions and achieving appropriate goals. This concept of the immaterial entity controlling both growth and other activity ties in with the Galenists’ notion of “substantial form.” The form of the oak inheres in the acorn and determines its development into an oak rather than into a pine or a dahlia. Because of an appropriate form, the seed of a radish develops into a radish and not into a chrysanthemum. Stahl’s anima includes among its many other functions the directive activities that earlier writers had attributed to form.

Stahl met one obvious objection head on. The anima is a conscious agent, but many of the activities attributed to it do not appear in consciousness. We are, for example, consciously aware of sensations but not of directing the growth of bodily parts. Stahl disposed of this objection through a verbal distinction. He distinguished logos from logismos, ratio from ratiocinatio. Logos is simple “intelligence” or “perception” which cannot be the subject of reasoning or memory and can inhere in the anima without being perceived. This is quite different from ideas, which, derived from the external senses, serve as the subject of reasoning and memory (logismos Stahl was saying that the soul has ideas and activities of which it is not fully aware.

All this, of course, merely begs the question; but it does maintain the empirical analysis. At work are forces the nature of which can be identified through observation. Stahl drew into a single concept all the forces operative in living organisms and bestowed on this aggregate the name anima.

In carrying out a particular activity, the anima must regulate all actions necessary to achieve that goal, even those performed unconsciously. Stahl gave the example that in jumping over a ditch, one controls various muscular movements without any awareness of doing so. Although conscious only of the final goal, the anima regulates all the activities needed to achieve that end. Similar considerations apply to the efforts of the anima in combating disease. For carrying out the proper end—the restoration of health—it performs all functions necessary for the task and for this goal calls into action various mechanical activities. The anima, in brief, is an intelligent agent that wills certain ends and therefore must have organs suitable for achieving them. The human body is the organ of the rational anima and is formed for its needs.

The goals of medicine are intensely practical: to maintain health, to keep the body free from threatening ailments, and to combat disease. To achieve these goals, practical medicine must rely on established experience, assisted by sound reason. Speculations that deflect medicine from its goal, even if buttressed by skillful arguments and experiments, have no use. Stahl emphasized that many aspects of knowledge are of little or no positive help. For example, he denied the value of detailed anatomical or chemical studies because attention to precise anatomical findings draws attention away from the body as a whole. And, as Stahl repeatedly indicated, medicine has to do with the whole living organism, presided over by the anima, rather than with specific actions of specific parts, which are only instruments. He also rejected from the confines of medicine the specific study of chemistry. Although one of the leading chemists of his era, he expressly denied that chemistry was advantageous in the theory or practice of medicine.

In his strictures Stahl was referring specifically to the teaching of the iatrochemists, who explained bodily activity by the use of a small number of concepts —acidity and alkalinity, coagulation and liquefaction, fermentation, volatility, acrimony. He cogently pointed out that a wide range of ailments was being attributed to essentially the same causes, and that the explanations had neither a priori support from assured theory nor confirmation in solid a posteriori experience, such as a concrete demonstration of fermentation or acidity. This type of doctrine he condemned as useless, unscientific, and sterile. The humors in health or disease simply did not show the various chemical changes that were being invoked as explanatory principles.

We need not concern ourselves with specific details of Stahl’s physiology or pathology. He stated that free and orderly circulation, secretion. and excretion are necessary in maintaining health. Harmful material must be eliminated, and if refractory to direct elimination, it must be converted into a state suitable for elimination. The basic reactions of the body exemplify the healing power of nature, through which the anima, as an intelligent active force, conserves life and restores health. If nature falters, the physician must use appropriate means to aid the natural processes.

In chemistry as in biology, Stahl strongly disavowed the mechanical viewpoint, which in turn opposed the qualitative philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotelian elements, four in number, embodied qualitative properties that served as the “principles” for material objects. In the mechanical philosophy, on the other hand, the particulate elements had quantitative attributes—size and shape, position and motion —while qualities and properties depended on the interaction of atoms. All atoms obeyed the laws of mechanics; but those that were round, for example, would react differently from those that were pointed or angular.

In addition to the Aristotelian and corpuscular philosophies, a third and more specifically chemical tradition with three principles (salt, sulfur, and mercury) had developed. These principles had a rather ambiguous status, for they represented not only certain qualities or predictable modes of behavior—such as hardness, inflammability, or volatility— but also concrete material substances. This ambiguity— being characteristic objects and at the same time representing properties that, by inhering in many discrete objects, explained the phenomena of change —went unresolved. Nevertheless, the spagyric elements helped to provide an essentially chemical mode of explanation.

Stahl realized that the simple mechanical atomist viewpoint could not adequately explain the phenomena in chemical operations. He was also aware that the atomist viewpoint must be not totally rejected but merely regarded as inadequate. Matter is not infinitely divisible but exists in elementary particles that are indivisible and impenetrable. Simple elementary bodies, however, are not found in isolation. Everything that we observe is composite, and these composites exist in a hierarchy of increasing complexity. Atoms, never existing by themselves, join to form simple molecules. These in turn unite into more complex molecules, to produce visible objects.

Correlative to this aspect of Stahl’s philosophy was the need to explain properties or qualities. In order to account for observed phenomena, the atoms must have specific reactive and qualitative characteristics. Stahl’s atoms do indeed bestow particular qualities on the various compounds. However, precisely how a particular quality or functional property relates to the size and shape of atoms he could not satisfactorily explain.

In his attempts to find adequate explanations, Stahl relied heavily on the doctrines of Becher, who believed in three elementary principles— air, water, and earth. Air, however, did not enter into combinations, so that water and earth formed the material bases of objects. “Earth,” however was not a unitary principle. It comprehended three different types: the first, having to do with substantiality. rendered bodies solid and vitrifiable; the second, of moist oily character, provided color, odour and combustibility: the third supplied weight ductility, and volatility. These three kinds of earth, despite denials, have rather obvious relationship to the spagyric salt, sulfur, and mercury.

Stahl adopted these views from Becher and used the name “phlogiston” to designate the second earth—the principle of combustibility. It differed from the other two earths, for the first and third could not be separated from the bodies in which they existed, whereas phlogiston did not form any such stable compound.

While the concept of three kinds of earth applied to the vegetable and animal kingdoms as well as to the mineral, the experimental bases for phlogiston rested principally on the behavior of minerals and metals. Striking evidence arose from the reversible relationship of metals and their calxes. A metal contained all three kinds of earth. When the metal was heated intensely, the phlogiston was driven off and a calx appeared. However, when phlogiston was reintroduced into the calx, the metallic form reappeared. Here we have a reversible process: calx plus phlogiston yields the metal; the metal minus phlogiston yields the calxes. When phlogiston was driven from a substance, the properties of that substance changed very markedly. And, similarly, if a substance lacking phlogiston received this element through appropriate chemical manipulation, the properties would change. This process also applied to nonmetallic minerals. Sulfur, for example, which had lent its name to the spagyric terminology, was deemed a compound consisting of vitolic acid plus phlogiston. Far from being synonymous with sulfur, phlogiston was merely a constituent of it.

For minerals the expulsion or reception of phlogiston was a reversible process, but this was not the case in the animal or vegetable kingdoms. Plants were particularly rich in phlogiston: but once it was driven out, the original compound could not be reestablished.

Phlogiston was an element or substance and not an abstract quality or property. As a substance it combined with other chemical substances to form compounds. But, unlike other elements, which could not exist in isolated form, phlogiston could exist in relatively pure form. Finely divided carbon or lampblack, obtained, for example, by holding a cold object close to burning turpentine, was relatively pure phlogiston, visible and palpable. But ordinarily the phlogiston was not directly perceptible. From its combined form it was set free and passed into the air. Flame was considered the whirling motion produced by the escape of phlogiston, and air was necessary for the production of this motion. The air did not enter into the compound but was the receptacle for the phlogiston. In the absence of air, phlogiston could not escape and consequently combustion could not occur. This provided a reasonable explanation for the observation that calcination could not take place in a closed vessel.

Stahl recognized the close relationship between phlogiston and air. Where the quantity of air was limited, the amount of combustion was correlatively limited. He explained this phenomenon through the postulate that air could absorb only a limited amount of phlogiston; and when the limit had been reached, no more combustion—no more liberation of phlogiston—could take place. What happened to the phlogiston that was poured into the air? The Stahlian chemistry held a theory of recycling-the phlogiston in the air passed into plants and thence could pass into animal bodies through the ingestion of plant material.

A retrospective analysis can point out innumerable flaws in the phlogiston theory; and the way in which later eighteenth-century chemists quite demolished the theory forms an important chapter in the history of science and of thought. But this should not blind us to its important role as a bridge between the older concepts and the new. It tried to modify an existing intellectual framework in order to explain experimental observations. It succeeded, but only at the expense of ignoring certain other observations. And it proved unable to encompass new observations as scientific ingenuity devised new experiments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Stahl was a very prolific writer, and his doctrines form the subject of a vast secondary literature. Only a few of the more important writings can be mentioned here.

I. Original Works. Three relatively short essays provide a background for Stahl’s general medical philosophy. Disquisitio de mechanismi et organismi diversitate (Halle, 1706); Paraenesis, ad aliena a medica doctrine arcendum (Halle, 1706); and De vera diversitate corporis mixti et vivi (Halle, 1707). His greatest single medical work is Theoria medica vera, physiologiam et pathologiam. . . sistens (Halle, 1708), which provides in quite massive detail his doctrines of physiology and pathology, and presents his animistic philosophy as incidental to the exposition. The work includes, as intrinsic introductory material, the three essays mentioned above, plus a fourth, Vindiciae & indicia de scriptis suis. A further ed. of the Theoria medica vera was published at Halle in 1737. A more recent, 3-vol. ed. edited by Ludovicus Choulant was published at Leipzig in 1831-1833. The work has never been translated into English.

A French rendition of Stahl’s writings, Oeuvres médico-philosophiques et pratiques, translated with commentaries by T. Blondin, II-VI (Paris, 1859- 1864), apparently was intended as 6 vols. , although vol. I was not published. This ed. is, unfortunately, rare. The translation is fairly good, although sometimes quite verbose and excessively interpretive.

A German text expounding Stahl’s doctrines is Karl Wilhelm Ideler, Georg Ernst Stahl’s Theorie der HeilKunde, 3 vols. (Berlin, (831–1832). Although often referred to as a translation, it is only an abbreviated paraphrase. At best it can serve as a “finder” — a rapid way of getting an overview and of locating significant passages that must then he studied in the original Latin.

Stahl and his pupils published extensive clinical studies, describing particular problems, that are significant for the light they throw on the medical practice of the times—for instance. Collegium casuale magnum (Leipzig, 1733)— but these are not especially relevant here. He also wrote or was coauthor of a considerable number of dissertations, many of which are available at the National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, Md., and are important for any definitive study of Stahl.

A further work that deserves special mention is Negotium otiosum seu ??i????i?(Halle. 1720). an attempt to answer some objections that Leibniz had made to Stahl’s animistic doctrines.

Stahl’s more specific chemical writings are very numerous. Partington, II 659–662, has devoted almost four pages to the bibliographic listing, taken from an eighteenth-century bibliography prepared by J. C. Goetz.

One of the earliest is Zymotechnia fundamentalis (Halle. 1697). Other important works are Specimen Beccherianum appended to Stahl’s ed, of Becher’s Physica subterranea (leipzig. 1703): and Zufällige Gedancken. . . über den streit von den sogenannten Suplhure (Halle, 1718). which was translated into french by Holbach as Traité du soufre (Paris, 1766). Fundamenta chymiae dogmaticae et experimentalis (Nuremberg. 1723), prepared by Stahl’s pupils, was translated by Peter Shaw as phylosophical Principles of Universal Chemistry (London, 1730). fundamenta chymiae dogmatico-rationalis g experimentails( Nuremberg. 1732) had a 2nd ed. In 1746. Another important work that presents Stahl’s doctrines was written by his pupil Johann Juncker: Conspectus chemiae theoretico practicae (Halle,1730)

II. Secondary Literature. Only a few of the more significant secondary sources can be listed. A relatively recent work is Bernward Josef Gottlieb. “Bedeutung und Auswirkungen des Hallischen Professors. . . Georg Ernst Stahl auf den Vitalismus des XVIII Jahrhunderts, insbesondere auf die Schule von Montpellicr,” in Nova acta Leopoldina, n.s. 12 , no. 89 (1943). 423–502. which covers a great amount of literature but does not exhibit any specially penetrating insight and is far too concerned with Teutonic chauvinism. Walter Pagel, “Helmont, Leibniz, Stahl,” in Archiv für Geschichte der medizin24 (1931), 19–59, is an important contribution. Albert Lemoine. Le vitalisme de l’animisme de Stahl (Paris, 1864) is an important nineteenth-century analysis: an older but very helpful discussion is under the heading “Stahlianisme.” Dictionnaire des sciences Médicales, 60 vols. (Paris, 1812–1822), LII, 401–449. Every general history of medicine devotes space to Stahl. Of especial value, and a source for many subsequent but more shallow discussions, is Kurt sprengel Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte der Arzneikunde 2nd ed.. V (Halle. 1803), 9–47. Stahl’s animism especially in relation to Friedrich Hoffmann’s mechanistic views, is discussed in two recent articles by Lester S.king: “Stahl and Hoffmann: A Study in Eighteenth Century Animism,” in Journal of the History of Medicine, 19 (1964). 118–130; and “Basic Concepts of Early Eighteenth Century Animism,” in American Journal of the psychiatry124 (1967), 797–807

A very important secondary source dealing with Stahl’s chemistry is J. R. Partington, History of chemistry (London. 1961). 637–690. An indispensable analysis of the chemical doctrines is Héléne Metzger, Newton Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique ( Paris, 1930).

Lester S. King