SIMULATION

Simulation is a special form of untruthfulness. It is an acted lie; for while the lie, properly speaking, is untruthfulness in speech, simulation is untruthfulness in deed.

Simulation is sinful, having the same kind and degree of malice as a lie; i.e., in itself it is venially sinful, but according to circumstances (e.g., when it causes another person grave injury) it can be mortal. However, its sinfulness is not quite so obvious as that of the lie. Words have definite meanings; and so if certain words are used that are contrary in meaning to what one has in mind, it is evident that a lie is being told. But actions are not so definitely significative. Except for a few conventional gestures, actions have no set meaning. Here it is the intention that counts. A woman may dye her hair, not wishing to deceive anyone or to appear what she is not, but simply to beautify herself, which, within certain limits, she has every right to do. Another may do exactly the same thing, but with the definite intention to deceive, e.g., to be taken for another woman. Here the intention vitiates the act, and the result is a sin of simulation.

Simulation can manifest itself in a variety of ways and spring from a multiplicity of motives. A man by affectations in demeanor or speech or dress may pretend to a culture or knowledge or wisdom that is not his own. Another may simulate a professional competence, as in the case of the quack or even of the legitimate doctor who poses as a specialist in areas of medicine other than his own. Another may simulate spiritual gifts and virtues, as does the fortune-teller, the clairvoyant, or the hypocrite. Still another may protest a love and respect for one whom in reality he despises. All of this may be from motives of monetary gain, reputation, power, or simply from uncontrolled feelings of inferiority. Ignorant of his own worth and potential, a man puts on a mask that he might appear in the power and worth of another.

It may seem that there are cases in which simulation is legitimate and even virtuous. For instance, one who is sick may act as though he were quite well so as not to cause inconvenience to others; or he may affect ignorance when he feels that a display of knowledge might embarrass another. These are cases not of simulation but of dissimulation. There is no real pretense here springing from a desire to deceive, but simply silence in order to keep one's secret. In ordinary circumstances one need not speak all one knows, and has no obligation to declare to others the state of his body or soul. By the same token one has a right to dissemble, i.e., to act in such a way as to ward off the curiosity of others. However, if being sick, one should simulate health in order to get a job in which health is required, or if one should pretend ignorance to avoid an obligation, which otherwise would be legitimately imposed upon him, then he would be committing the sin of simulation. For he would not simply be forestalling the curiosity of others, but actually and positively deceiving them.

Bibliography: j. a. mchugh and c. j. callan, Moral Theology, rev. e. p. farrell, 2 v. (New York 1958) 2:2403–04.

[s. f. parmisano]