Fichte, Johann Gottlieb
FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB
Founder of absolute transcendental idealism and father of the philosopher Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879); b. Rammenau in Saxony, May 19, 1762; d. Berlin, Jan. 27, 1814. The elder Fichte received his early education under the patronage of Baron von Miltitz. Agitated and rebellious, he studied theology at Göttingen, Jena, and Leipzig from 1780 to 1784, then devoted nine years to private instruction. Asked to explain Kant's philosophy, he so thoroughly penetrated it that his anonymously published Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (Königsberg 1792) was thought to be Kant's own work. Fichte decided to supply a philosophy of religion for Kant's system. Reducing religion to Kant's "moral law," he held that sensible representations in various religions are an illusion of practical reason. In 1794 he started to teach at the University of Jena, but he was accused of atheism in 1798 and had to cede his position to F. W.J. schelling the following year. Going to Berlin, he began to give courses in philosophy there and at Erlangen (1805). Inciting German nationalism by his Reden an die deutschen Nation (1807–08), he eventually became the second rector of the newly established University of Berlin. He died of typhus, which he contracted from his wife.
Teaching. According to Fichte, dogmatism abstracts from understanding and proposes the thing in itself as a reality that is the cause of thought, whereas idealism abstracts from the thing and substitutes intelligence in itself for the reality. Thus idealism holds that thoughts are representations accompanied by an awareness of necessity, produced by the intelligence. At the end of a lengthy transcendental deduction, Fichte proposes the Ego, itself transcending objectification, as the condition of all objectifiability and the necessary condition of self-consciousness. The transcendental Ego is attainable only by intellectual intuition, in which it is recognized by its activity within consciousness. Life arises in intellectual intuition, and, without it, there is death.
Fichte's absolute idealism claims a "victory over the opposition between thought and being," as well as between being and action. This victory establishes absolute activism and pure freedom, and morality is absolute and unconditioned. Reason determines its own activity by itself and, from this fact of self-determination, it must recognize that others, too, have freedom. The concept of law, then, is a condition of one's own consciousness. The essential condition for a juridical situation (Rechtszustand ) is the state, and the law of the state is the principal scope of the philosophy of law. The basis for all life in the state is the "pact of the citizens" (Staatsbürgervertrag ), which embraces a defense pact (Schutzvertrag ) and a property pact (Eigentumsvertrag ). The ultimate complement of this concession is the "closed commercial state," in which work and merit should be divided by the state as such according to a type of socialism. Whoever violates the pact of the state by an infraction of the law will be excluded from the pact of the state.
In accord with deism and illuminism, Fichte makes religion identical with morality and duty. He adopts the formula "faith in the moral order of the world" as the expression of the very essence of religion. Like Kant, he attributes to faith the capacity of attaining the supersensible. Faith is the actuation of freedom from all influence of the sensible world, this freedom having the scope of positing oneself through oneself. The self-certitude provided by faith does not require any further explanation, justification, or authorization. It is not based upon or determined by any other truth; rather every other truth is based upon it. This is the world of morality, the content and scope of freedom to which the transcendental viewpoint leads.
Instead of speaking of the divinity (Gottheit ), Fichte speaks of the divine (das Göttliche ), which, from the semantic viewpoint, is an even vaguer term. According to him, the divine becomes living and real in man. Like authentic incredulity and impiety, true atheism consists in rationalizing the consequences of one's own actions, in not obeying the voice of one's own conscience, in placing one's own judgment before God's judgment, and in making oneself God. Denying the fact of original sin, Fichte reduces all revealed religion to natural religion, wherein there is no dogma, all Biblical statements having value only in reference to moral action.
Critique. In general, Fichte starts with the illuministic positions of Spinoza, Rousseau, and Lessing and ends up in dissolving thought into action and destroying the very possibility of truth. Pursuing the logic of his predecessors, he adds only a Germanic preoccupation with deterministic morality. As his son later wrote, "in the chain of [his] thoughts, everything is predetermined … so that … in the world of conscious natures, there is no room for free initiative" (Sämmtliche Werke 5:vi).
Bibliography: Works. Nachgelassene Werke, ed. i. h. fichte, 3 v. (Bonn 1834–35); Sämmtliche Werke, ed. i. h. fichte, 8 v. (Berlin 1845–46; repr. 1964); Werke, ed. f. medicus, 6 v. (Leipzig 1908–12); Fichtes Briefwechsel, ed. h. schulz, 2 v. (Leipzig 1925–30). Literature. f. c. copleston, History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md. 1946–) v.7. j. d. collins, A History of Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee 1954). x. lÉon, Fichte et son temps, 2 v. in 3 (Paris 1922–27). r. adamson, Fichte (Edinburgh 1881). h. heimsoeth, Fichte (Munich 1923). m. wundt, Fichte (2d ed. Stuttgart 1937). r. w. stine, The Doctrine of God in the Philosophy of Fichte (Philadelphia 1945). h. c. engelbrecht, Johann Gottlieb Fichte: A Study of His Political Writings, with Special Reference to His Nationalism (New York 1933).
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