Evolution

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EVOLUTION

The International Darwin Centennial Convention (Chicago 1959) defined evolution as an irreversible process of developmental change in time, which during its course generates novelty, diversity, and higher levels of organization. It operates in all sectors of the phenomenal universe but has been most fully described in the biological sector. The general statement of evolution explicitly asserts that the natural history of organisms has been and is being accomplished by materials and forces belonging to the organic world, and that no miraculous intrusion is needed to account for the proliferation of new forms.

Philosophical Evaluation

A key issue that contemporary evolutionary theory poses for the philosopher is how best to express both the extent and the limitations of the concept of evolution. Since the publication of Charles darwin's Origin of Species (1859), a tendency has developed to make of scientific evolution a philosophical principle for evolutionism. But to regard all things as in a state of flux and to make change the sole principle of all knowledge, the sole property of all activity and behavior, and the sole condition of all laws, art, morals, religion, and history is to extend evolution far beyond its documented limits.

Evolution is not a philosophical principle. The value of this theory is great, especially in the biological sciences, but it has important limitations. There is a sense in which all cosmological events have a history, a spatio-temporal context, but of equal importance is the stability of nature and of physical laws. When scientists speak of the evolution of life, of chemical elements, of planets, of the stars and galaxies, the concept of evolution is extended metaphorically. Even in the purely scientific sphere, evolution is not a single-valued term, equally tested in every area of science. For example, in speaking of the evolution of man, one must understand the limited sense in which the term is extended to man's unique psychosocial conditions. Man's spiritual endowments, his intelligence and freedom, necessitate new nonbiological principles of development. Man, in a real sense, fashions his own evolution, his own future niche, his destiny. Though subject to the conditions of time and place, man's work, his art, his language, his morals, his religion, and his history are within man's control and subject to his intelligence and freedom. Evolutionism as a philosophical principle—variously expressed in the ideologies of historicism, existentialism, and Marxism—cannot derive verification of its assumptions from biological evolution.

Nor is evolution an ultimate explanation of reality. It is not intrinsically bound up with any one metaphysical system. Thus it is not intrinsically materialistic, or mechanistic, or vitalistic; it is not intrinsically atheistic, or pantheistic, or theistic. Yet evolution, like all great scientific theories, needs a philosophical context, and this must be provided by disciplines other than biology and anthropology.

Stability and Change. Although change and its mechanisms have preoccupied evolutionists for many decades, evolutionary change would be meaningless without its corollary, stability. The organic world and its species are amazingly stable. Many representatives of vertebrate families have existed for millions of years unchanged. Although genetic mutation, natural selection, and isolation are natural phenomena, organisms strenuously resist change. And when a variation does come about, the general process is (1) to proliferate, (2) to adapt functionally, (3) to stabilize and find equilibrium, and (4) to become extinct. Extinction of species, so dominant a part of the evolutionary process, is the result of specialization and overstabilization.

The important philosophical insight here is that nature is to be seen in terms of two tendencies, two correlative principles both of being and of knowledge, namely, change and stability. The importance of knowledge of history for the understanding of the cosmos has been clarified by studies of the evolution of organisms. Indeterminism in cosmology and physics, brought to light by relativity and the quantum theory, has meant the death of physical determinism and of the view that the universe is fixed in all of its parts and its development. Nevertheless, science remains founded upon the stability of the cosmos. Hence, science of nature built upon stability alone or change alone must remain fragmentary and illusory. Realism is maintained by applying both correlative principles.

Natural Species. How best to define natural species has always been a problem for both the logician and the naturalist. The theory of evolution has forced the concept of species to refer to something more fluid and develop-mental. Traditional philosophies of nature, based upon the teachings of plato and aristotle, tended to define natural species like numbers, claiming that they are immutable, eternal, indivisible, and necessary. The Platonic tradition divided nature into kinds of essences with fixed properties that were, in turn, immutable, eternal, indivisible, and necessary. In his biological works, Aristotle repudiated dialectical classifications that attempted to place all of nature into sic et non categories. But until natural history accumulated real evidence for the transformation of organic species, the concept of natural species tended to be identified with that of an immutable, eternal essence.

Although Darwin, and others since, thought that a species was but an arbitrary category for individually distinct organisms, contemporary evolutionists insist that real specific discontinuity exists in nature. Yet, the classical morphological basis of taxonomy is giving way to a more dynamic biological concept of populations. Natural species are not fixed physiological or morphological types, as Linnaeus defined them. They are interbreeding populations isolated reproductively from other inter-breeding populations. Where this genetic and ecological definition cannot be applied (e.g., to nonsexual organisms), the old morphological concept is valuable. But the concept of fixed essences has been replaced in biology by a more dynamic concept of relatively stable populations.

This latter concept corresponds favorably with the Aristotelian concept of nature, the intrinsic principle of activity and behavior. The term "essence" designates the principle of the being of a thing; the term "nature" designates the principle of activity. The physical nature of an organism could be known and its essence remain unknown. Nature is no more fixed than is the relation between the generator and the generated, and, unlike essence, the nature admits of the developmental orientation implied in a true evolution of species. Organisms are not immutable, necessary, eternal, and indivisible. The type of concept that denoted essences of this description is not compatible with evolutionary development, whereas the concept of nature can fully embrace evolutionary theory and a true transformation of natural species.

Higher from Lower. Without reinstituting the debate between Darwin and Lamarck concerning innate tendencies toward perfection, can one say that there is evidence for progress and direction in the known course of evolution? Is there a real sense of evolutionary movement from the lower forms to the higher, from the less perfect to the more perfect? To the biologist, lower and higher or less and more perfect can be judged only in terms of the capacity of the organism to secure its survival. Purpose and finality in evolution are not a priori inferences; but a posteriori, the biologist can observe a direction in evolution in terms of relative survival value. Life has tended to occupy every available niche to ensure the perdurance of the biotic community on this planet. The biologist defines life in terms of an active capacity to transform environmental energies into living energy; in such transformation the organism attains some measure of independence from the environment. Biologically, life is higher and more perfect to the extent that it attains greater independence in any single ecological niche. In this sense, vertebrates are higher than invertebrates, vascular plants than nonvascular plants, reptiles than fishes, birds than reptiles, mammals than birds, and man than other primates.

Furthermore, greater freedom from the control of the environment is achieved by the greater complexity of parts and more integral subordination of parts to the whole organism. This direction to higher complexity and integration is observed also in the fossil record of plants and animals. The general course of evolution has been from the simple forms to the highly complex forms of life. The primary, universal goal of evolution is survival, and although the future of any species cannot be predicted a priori, its history in retrospect can be seen to have followed orderly laws. Those laws have brought forth higher forms from the lower forms in the sense defined. To this extent the natural philosopher may speak of a hierarchy within organic nature.

For the philosopher, the question naturally arises: how can higher organisms arise from lower organisms? The biologist describes the evolutionary process in terms of mutation and selection pressures acting upon an inter-breeding population, with isolating mechanisms moving parts of the population further and further from the original through races, varieties, and subspecies all the way to new species. This progress is entirely natural. But the natural philosopher asks for an account of the efficient causes that are sufficient to educe these higher effects. Does this process necessitate the intrusion of nonbiological causes?

The resolution of this problem can be found in the complex interplay of both univocal and equivocal agents acting upon organic matter to produce an effect slightly different from the univocal parent. Mutations are caused by many factors outside the univocal agent, such as cosmic rays and chemical changes caused by atmospheric conditions. Again, many parent-progeny endowments remain latent and are induced only by the requirements of adaptation. No single univocal agent is sufficient to explain the origin of the bird from reptile stock, but a unified complex of univocal and equivocal causes, some acting quite per accidens over a long period of gradual change, are sufficient reason for the origin of the new species. This unified convergence of univocal and equivocal causes would be sufficient to explain the natural origin of life by biopoesis, provided that the dynamic order of causes could be accounted for. Although the development of life manifests the presence of some opportunism and randomness, the dynamic order of the whole process must be accounted for.

Chance and Order. In all evolution, chance is an important factor. Environmental forces command adaptation on the part of the organism. The organism itself has very limited power to dominate its ecological niche; moreover, although the environment tends to be stable, it too is subject to chance alterations. Genetic mutations are apparently caused by chance concurrence of environmental events. Does this influence of chance destroy any basic order in the history of organisms? By no means. Evolutionary history cannot be predicted a priori, but neither is it random.

The relation of chance and order in evolution can be compared to the tossing of a coin. In the individual toss, the chance of heads occurring is 50–50, even though one cannot predict the next individual toss. But in 1,000 tosses, one can predict the chances of heads to be about 500 times. Actuarial tables are constructed upon this statistical principle. The same principle applies to evolution. The forces of nature that bring about change and variation are complex and unpredictable in the individual event or phylogeny, but the general process of speciation takes place according to verifiable physical and biological laws. Every biological law restricts evolution. And although the scientist cannot predict the course of evolution from these laws, he can explain the course of evolution that has ever been under the dominance of these laws. The application of the laws of statistics to organic populations has become a very useful tool in analyzing events of the group when cosmic influences upon the individual are too complex to yield orderly treatment. Events, then, that seem to occur quite by chance at the level of the individual are subject to regular laws at the level of the group. Thus, in the general course of evolution, a dynamic order prevails.

Order and God. It is this dynamic order of the organic world—so dependent upon the order of the microcosm on the one hand and upon the order of the megalacosm on the other—that raises for philosophers the question whether or not the ultimate explanation of evolution demands the existence of a transcendent cause as designer. The classical arguments for the existence of God obtain with as much force in a dynamic unfolding order as they do in a universe of static order alone, if not more. Thus, for many thinkers, organic evolution must necessarily be theistic to be complete. This is not to say that God in His intelligent providence and governance of this dynamic order is seen to make a miraculous intrusion upon the natural causes and laws with which He has endowed His creation. In a real sense the laws of nature are the operation of His governance. The dynamic order of nature, especially in the unfolding process of evolution, thus makes the inference of a sufficient coordinating and governing cause seem a necessity.

For other thinkers this cause is intrinsic to the cosmos, a conclusion that leads to pantheism. For one who subscribes to atheism, on the other hand, no such cause is needed. Philosophically, neither the pantheistic nor the atheistic position accounts sufficiently for the organization and the governance of the dynamic order of the cosmos, both of which demand the operation of intelligence and will. A being endowed with such faculties would of necessity be spiritual and transcendent to the cosmic order.

Bibliography: r. j. nogar, The Wisdom of Evolution (New York 1963). p. g. fothergill, Evolution and Christians (New York 1961). j. de bivort de la saudÉe, ed., God, Man and the Universe (New York 1953). f. c. bawden et al., Symposium on Evolution (Pittsburgh 1959). e. c. messenger, ed., Theology and Evolution (London 1952). c. hauret, Beginnings: Genesis and Modern Science, ed. e. p. emmans (Dubuque 1955). b. vawter, A Path through Genesis (New York 1956). j. levie, The Bible: Word of God in Words of Men, tr. s. h. treman (New York 1962). l. r. ward, God and World Order (St. Louis 1961). p. teilhard de chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, tr. b. wall (New York 1959). m. j. adler, ed., The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World, 2 v. (Chicago 1952) 1:451–467. a. m. dubarle, The Biblical Doctrine of Original Sin, tr. e. m. stewart (New York 1965).

[r. j. nogar]

CATHOLIC TEACHING

Man, intelligent, free, graced, and the recipient of revelation, has a relationship beyond other creatures to God, his Creator. Hence, there are theological dimensions to such evolutionary postulates as the historical origin of mankind from lower animal forms, the present state of human nature in a condition of dynamic flux, and future goals of the race to be achieved, perhaps, through man's conscious control of his own evolution.

Pope Pius XII confined the question of man's genesis to "the origin of the human body as coming from preexistent and living matter" (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum, ed. A. Schönmetzer [32d ed. Freiburg 1963]3896). The human soul, spiritual and immortal, is not explained by purely material antecedents. Man may share biological continuity with lower animals, but there is at least some measure of psychic and moral discontinuity.

To the question "What is the origin of man?" Scripture gives a religious answer. The Book of genesis teaches that God is man's Creator and Father and that man is the most excellent of earthly creatures, a creature "made to the image and likeness of God" (Gn 1.3). The Genesis account is a "popular description of the origin of the human race … in simple and figurative language adapted to the mentality of a people" in a nontechnological culture (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3898). In his hymn of praise of the Creator, the sacred writer may have taken something (under inspiration) from popular, nonbiblical narrations.

Traditional Idea. For most of Christian history the possibility of evolution in its modern connotation was imagined only as most improbable speculation. The traditional idea that God had created things as they are, fixed in species, did not have a serious rival. Evolution (transformism) came into prominence chiefly through the work of Charles Darwin (The Origin of Species, 1859) and Alfred R. Wallace. Early proponents of Darwinism (e.g., T.H. Huxley in England and Ernst Haeckel in Germany) were militant materialists, atheists, or agnostics (Huxley's term). Many churchmen responded to evolution as to an attack upon Christianity, and an unfortunate atmosphere of controversy was the result. In a famous debate, typical of the times, Anglican bishop Samuel Wilberforce confronted Huxley at Oxford in 1860. In Dayton, Tennessee, in 1925 the celebrated "monkey trial" of John T. Scopes saw Clarence Darrow ridicule the fundamentalist ideas of William Jennings Bryan.

Statements of the Fathers and theologians before Darwin are not strictly ad rem, since the issue had not even been raised. St. Gregory of Nyssa is sometimes cited as an evolutionist, but he also held that man was privileged above other creatures in being formed by God's own hands. St. John Chrysostom held the view, hardly evolutionary in the modern sense, that Adam's body was lifeless before it received a soul. St. Augustine taught that in the beginning God created rationes seminales, the seeds or germs of all things that would eventually develop in time. These seminal causes were postulated to account for the appearance of new things without contradicting the doctrine that God had created all things simultaneously. Augustine also proposed principles applied in 1893 by Pope Leo XIII to cases of apparent conflict between science and the Bible: "Whatever they [scientists] can really demonstrate to be true of physical nature, let us show to be capable of reconciliation with our Scriptures" (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3287); and "the Holy Spirit [in the Scriptures] … did not intend to teach men these things in no way profitable unto salvation" (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3288).

After Darwin. Although churchmen after Darwin regarded evolution as inopportune and dangerous, no official statement of condemnation issued from Rome, and no written work was placed in the index of forbidden books for that reason. The record of the attitudes of theologians, however, shows considerable change since mid-19th century. The provincial council of Cologne (not ecumenical) in 1860 declared that the theory of transformism whereby some lower form spontaneously became a human body was contrary to Scripture and to the faith. Vatican Council I in 1870 was content to repeat the commonsense advice: the same God gives revelation and reason; one truth cannot contradict the other (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3017). In 1909 the Biblical Commission refused to call into question the literal and historical meaning of Genesis in cases "which touch the fundamental teachings of the Christian religion" but ruled that one is not bound to seek for scientific exactitude of expression in the first chapter of Genesis and that free discussion of the six days of creation is permitted (June 30, 1909; H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3512–19). In 1948 a letter to Cardinal E. Suhard from the secretary of the Biblical Commission noted that the replies of the Biblical Commission in 1909 are "in no way a hindrance to further truly scientific examination of the problems in accordance with the results acquired in these last 40 years" (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3862).

In 1950 the encyclical humani generis marked the starting point of a new development. Materialism and pantheism were condemned, caution and moderation were counseled in reinterpreting Scripture, but evolution was expressly recognized as a valid hypothesis:

The teaching authority of the Church does not forbid that, in conformity with the present state of human sciences and sacred theology, research and discussions on the part of men, experienced in both fields take place with regard to the doctrine of evolution. [H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3896]

Pope John Paul II, in a discourse to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (Oct. 22, 1996), reiterated Pius XII's teaching from Humani generis on the direct creation of the human soul by God. He cast the whole topic of evolution in the terms of a Christian anthropology, insisting that both theology and the sciences must be judged by what Christian faith knows about human nature: namely, that man is made in the image and likeness of God. The Christian has no objection to evolutionary theories in se, but only those that, because of their philosophical principles, do not do justice to who man is. "The theories of evolution which, because of the philosophies which inspire them, regard the spirit either as emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a simple epiphenomenon of that matter, are incompatible with the truth about man. They are therefore unable to serve as the basis for the dignity of the human person" ("Discourse," 5).

Bibliography: r. collin, Evolution: Hypotheses and Problems, tr. s. j. tester (New York 1959). d. l. lack, Evolutionary Theory and Christian Belief (London 1957). s. tax, ed., Evolution after Darwin, 3 v. (Chicago 1960).

[o. w. garrigan/eds.]

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