Eclecticism
ECLECTICISM
A term deriving from the Greek ἐκλέγειν, which means to pick out, to single out, or to choose. When eclectic is applied to a philosopher, it designates one who selects various doctrines from different thinkers and weaves them into a loose sort of unity. Whereas the classical schools and systems of philosophy are marked by rigorous adherence to the deductions and conclusions that follow from their fundamental positions, an eclectic philosophy is characterized by its acceptance of principles and attitudes that, in the parent philosophies, are either mutually exclusive or at least antagonistic. An eclectic philosophy is thus an attempt to find a workable combination of previously conflicting attitudes by regarding their principles in a less rigid and more conciliatory manner.
History. In Western thought eclecticism made its appearance as a result of the skepticism of Carneades (214?–129 b.c.), founder of the New Academy. It influenced such Stoics as Panaetius of Rhodes (2d century b.c.) and Posidonius of Apamea (1st century b.c.), the Platonists Philo of Larissa (d. c. 80 b.c.) and Antiochus of Ascalon (1st century b.c.), and Peripatetics such as Andronicus of Rhodes (1st century b.c.) and Aristocles of Messene (2d century a.d.).
Early Thought. Roman philosophy, except that of lucretius, was mostly eclectic in spirit. seneca, epic- tetus, and marcus aurelius were partly Platonic and partly Stoic in their philosophies, while the School of the Sextians—which flourished for a while at Rome during the beginning of the Christian Era—combined aspects of Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism. Cicero (106–43 b.c.), the most influential of the eclectics of antiquity, had syncretized elements of Carneadean epistemology, Platonic theology, and Stoic ethics.
Because plotinus absorbed so much of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism into his own system, usually called neoplatonism, he has been regarded by some as an eclectic; those who know his Enneads, however, see there a synthesis that is decidedly different from any of its sources. One might designate several of his disciples as eclectic in that they interpreted his doctrine in such a way as to bring it more in line with Pythagoreanism, as did Iamblichus (4th century a.d.); or with Platonism, as did Proclus (a.d. 410?–485); or with Aristotelianism, as did Simplicius (6th century a.d.). Another disciple, Plutarch of Athens (d. a.d. 431), might be called eclectic in that he desired his fellow Neoplatonists to be more concerned with the agreement between Plato and Aristotle than with their differences.
Historians in the past usually described Giovanni pico della mirandola as an eclectic because of his intense interest in, and apparent agreement with, the opinions of all thinkers of all eras. More recent studies, especially by Ernst Cassirer, suggest that Pico could well subscribe to seemingly incompatible doctrines because he viewed all human truths as imperfect images and symbols of the Perfect Truth that is God, as variable approximations to the absolute limit that is the Eternal Divine Truth.
Modern Philosophy. The eclectic attitude manifests itself in the thought of G. W. leibniz, with its constant attempts to reconcile divergent and conflicting viewpoints. Leibniz hoped to bridge the philosophical differences between the rationalists and the empiricists by his monadology and by his doctrine of preestablished harmony. In the domain of religion he also made efforts to mitigate dissensions among various Protestant sects and between Protestants and Catholics. This spirit of syncretism sometimes led him to neglect distinctions between mind and matter, faith and reason, determination and freedom, and grace and nature. The eclectic attitude is seen in other German thinkers of the 18th-century Enlightenment, for example in C. Thomasius, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), and Christian Garve (1742–98); this is especially true of C. wolff. Following the rationalist tradition of R. Descartes and B. Spinoza, Wolff agreed that philosophy should employ the mathematical method; at the same time, however, he had the empiricist's regard for factual knowledge, insisting that the facts of experience agree wiith the conclusions of reason. Like Spinoza, he viewed the world as a closely concatenated order of efficient causes, although he was also profoundly influenced by the teleological explanations of Leibniz. In explaining the position of Leibniz, he so modified its basic points that he failed to recognize fundamental inconsistencies.
Eclecticism marked the thought not only of followers of Wolff, such as Martin Knutzen (1713–51) the famous mathematician, Alexander Baumgarten (1714–62) the theorist in aesthetics, and Johann Lambert (1728–77) the psychologist, but also that of Wolff's opponents, such as Andreas Rüdiger (1673–1731) and Christian Crusius (1715–75).
But the best-known of the more modern eclectics is Victor cousin, who not only was convinced that the French Revolution made necessary new formulations in political life but also demanded a reconstruction in philosophical thought. This reconstruction, he was determined, should be founded upon the method of complete and total observation of consciousness and all its elements. In this way the new philosophy would avoid the imperfections of J. locke, T. reid, and I. kant, each of whom, in Cousin's judgment, had made only an imperfect analysis of consciousness. Because he was convinced that his method would discover all truths, some of which had been uncovered previously by past philosophies, Cousin called his philosophy eclecticism. Theodore Jouffroy (1796–1842), Étienne Vacherot (1809–97), Paul Janet (1823–99), and Jules Simon (1814–96), his disciples, carried on his work.
Because of the many changes in his philosophical outlook, often brought about by his readings in past and contemporary philosophers, F. W. J. von schelling is judged by some to have been an eclectic; one can nonetheless maintain that he remained an idealist throughout his long and prolific career as a professor of philosophy.
Recent Thought. Much of existentialism could be called eclectic in that it contains elements of Cartesian subjectivism, Kantian moralism, Nietzschean voluntarism, Husserlian phenomenology, and positivistic nominalism. These are held together in different ways by the various existentialists, most of whom deny any validity to systematic thought.
Critique. The history of philosophy shows that the origins of eclecticism are far from uniform. It has arisen, as in the case of the Romans, after a period of skeptical thought has made some men wary of fixed and consistent positions. It has also made its appearance when the human spirit became weary with continuing conflicts among schools of philosophy and was only too ready for a conciliatory approach. This was the case with some of the minor eclectics during the German Enlightenment. In other philosophers it has been engendered by the conviction that each philosophical system contains some truths that can be discovered or recovered by the sympathetic researcher. Leibniz and Cousin could be cited as examples of this attitude. Then, too, eclecticism can be very congenial to a thinker who is sufficiently shallow and superficial to feel at ease with principles that are mutually contradictory. Schelling has been so regarded by some.
As a philosophy, eclecticism makes no appeal to a truly creative spirit, for it lacks the unity and cohesiveness that such a mind demands. For the historian of philosophy it makes an unsatisfactory term of reference since it says nothing positive about the philosopher whom it is attempting to describe; for this reason there is a growing tendency to avoid its use.
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[v. m. martin]
