Consent, Moral

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CONSENT, MORAL

From the Latin consentire, literally, to feel together. Consent is sometimes understood to include feeling, a sort of sympathy, a complacency with regard to something. Strictly speaking, it is an act of the will acquiescing in a judgment of the mind. Before consenting, one must make up one's mind that what is proposed is good. Consent is the will's determination to implement the verdict of the mind that something is worthwhile.

Consent is an immanent, free movement of the will, and it establishes a certain responsibility for whatever is consented to. It means more than mere willingness and is distinguished from other voluntary acts such as velleity and intention. Volition is sheer willingness, without any thought of ways and means. What a person does of his own volition he is taken as willing to do. Consent enters into the actual doing of it, but the initial willingness to do it comes first. If one analyzes the whole process of willed activity, one sees that velleity itself must presuppose a suggestion by the mind that something might be desirable or good. Whatever is willed must first be known. Velleity is vague, tentative, provisional, leaving undecided whether what is suggested is feasible. It is only when the mind has formed a judgment about the latter that the will goes on to form a firm intention to pursue the proposed objective.

What remains is to explore the ways and means, in case several are available, by which what is suggested can be achieved. The outcome of this investigation is counsel that proposes to the will how its desired objective may be reached. It is at this point only that consent, properly speaking, is given. Aquinas defines it as "the application of the appetitive movement to the decision of counsel" (Summa theologiae 1a2ae, 15.3). By his consent, man is determined to secure the desired good. To quote Aquinas again: "Consent denotes the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of the person applying it. In this process of willed activity, there is first the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then counsel about the means to the end, and then the desire to take the means" (Summa theologiae 1a2ae, 15.1).

This desire and decision to take the appropiate steps to achieve one's objective is what St. Thomas understands by consent in the strict sense. It is followed by a further investigation to decide which is the best of all the means available. This discriminating judgment is followed by a further act of the will, election or choice. If there is no choice of means presented, there is no difference between consent and choice. Strictly speaking, in such a case one has no choice, but the consent may still be free. Freedom depends on the possibility of forming another judgment about the desirability of the end proposed. One can always withhold consent from anything proposed to one's will as a good thing if one can judge that something quite different might be a good thing too. (see free will.)

From what has been said about the meaning of consent, it appears that consent always implies freedom of judgment, deliberation, and a freely given acquiescence in what is thought desirable. The first condition of free consent is, therefore, freedom of judgment. If there were no freedom of judgment there could be no free consent. The blessed in heaven, therefore, do not consent to enjoy the vision of God; they are captivated by it; they could not possibly judge anything that would exclude it to be good; their act of enjoyment, therefore, is not free. Here again the distinction must be made between voluntary and free, between volition and consent. The enjoyment of the blessed is perfectly voluntary, being in the will, and proceeding from perfect knowledge; but it is not free. There is free consent only if there is possible dissent, as would not be the case if a person were to be so blinded by passion or intoxication that he could not possibly form any other judgment than that what he proposes to do is good. It might be free in its cause, if free consent were already given to the infatuation, fury, or intoxication that now prevents deliberation. That ignorance can vitiate consent is a corollary to what has been said. Consent implies that one knows what is proposed for one's acceptance and acquiescence. This appears clearly if one considers the mutual consent given by persons who get married. This consent constitutes the essence of the contract. Obviously, it implies that the persons know the meaning and purpose of marriage and also that they know one another. Error either about the purpose or about the person could vitiate the consent necessary to the marriage contract.

Consent being essentially an immanent act cannot be coerced. Violence is incompatible with consent. Violence means force applied from without, without the victim's cooperation. Coercion may either vitiate consent or reduce its willingness and may make it legally rescindable. A general might say that he was coerced into surrendering his army by fear of the consequences of refusal, but consent given reluctantly or grudgingly may still be free consent.

Bibliography: thomas aquinas, Summa theologiae 1a2ae, 15. d. m. prÜmmer, Manuale theologiae moralis, ed. e. m. mÜnch (Freiburg-Barcelona 1955) 1:4898; 2:255258. 1917 Codex iuris canonici (Graz 1955) 108187, 108993.

[a. doolan]