Due Process

A fundamental, constitutional guarantee that all legal proceedings will be fair and that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the government acts to take away one's life, liberty, or property. Also, a constitutional guarantee that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.

Brown v. City of Michigan City, Indiana

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to state and local governments in the same way the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to the federal government. The clause prohibits state governments from arbitrarily or unfairly depriving individuals of their basic constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property. Procedural due process is concerned with the methods used by the legal system to carry out its work. In cases where an individual has claimed a violation of due process rights, the court must determine whether a citizen is being deprived of "life, liberty, or property" and what procedural protections are due that individual. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the existence of substantive due process, which evaluates the importance of the right or the severity of the infringement. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with both types of due process in Brown v. City of Michigan City, Indiana, 462 F.3d 720(7th Cir.2006), ruling that a city could constitutionally deny a convicted sex offender access to city parks. The appeals court concluded that the ban did not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Robert Brown, a resident of Michigan City, Indiana, frequented Washington Park, a large park on the shores of Lake Michigan, on a regular basis. Brown entered the park free of charge with a resident pass issued by the city. Brown began visiting the park on a daily basis in 1988 with his wife. After her death that year he continued his daily visits for 14 years. He would park his R.V. near the lake, drink coffee, smoke cigarettes, and watch people at the beach, sometimes with binoculars. Brown usually remained in his van. In early July 2002 a park official received a phone call from the recreation director in LaPorte, Indiana concerning Brown's presence and behavior at a beach in that city. Brown had been observed watching beach patrons through his binoculars. The LaPorte police investigated and discovered that Brown had been convicted of one count of child molestation in 1995 and had spent three years in prison. He had been placed on probation and had completed a counseling program after his release. Armed with this information, Michigan City park employees watched and logged Brown's visits to the park. They alleged that he had watched children at a day camp within the park and sometimes entered the park twice daily. In late July Brown was approached in the park by police officers and a city attorney. The attorney confiscated Brown's park pass and was informed he was no longer allowed in the park. If he returned he would be charged with trespass. The city parks and recreation board met several days later and passed a resolution deny access to city parks to Brown and to any other person convicted of child molestation. The board rescinded the resolution in late August after Brown commenced a federal civil rights lawsuit and sought to make it a class action. It removed the clause dealing with sex offenders in general and limited its action to the prohibition of Brown from entering city parks. Brown then dropped his request for a class action.

In his lawsuit Brown alleged that the city had denied him procedural and substantive due process. He claimed he was denied procedural due process because the park board conducted its meetings in the park office inside Washington Park. He had been warned he would be charged with trespass if he entered the park, making attendance at the hearing risky for him. Though the city told a friend of his that he would not be charged if he attended, the city refused to put this promise in writing. Brown also a contended that the right to enter public spaces like public parks is a fundamental and basic right and that the ban was arbitrary and irrational. The federal district court rejected Brown's claims and granted summary judgment to the city, ending the litigation. The court ruled that Brown did not have a protected property interest in being permitted to enter the city parks, which negated his procedural due process claim. The court also rejected his liberty interest claim, finding that Brown's reputation may have been damaged by being labeled a threat to children but he could not show the "alteration of a legal status." To meet this burden he would need to show an injury in addition to his damaged reputation, such as finding it impossible to find employment in his chosen field. As to the substantive due process claim, Brown had failed show that access to public parks was a fundamental right. The city's ban was rationally related to its compelling interest in protecting children in its parks.

Brown's appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was unsuccessful. The appeals court agreed with the lower court that Brown had failed to point to a state law or other independent source that guaranteed him access to the park. More importantly, the state had delegated to the city parks and recreation board the authority to exercise supervision over the parks and to establish park rules. Therefore, the board had the discretion to decide "whether and under what conditions members of the public can access the City's parks." His reputation may have been damaged but he could not point to an actual injury related to this ban. Therefore, he could not claim a due process right violation.

As to Brown's substantive due process claim the appeals court was similarly dismissive. The court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a narrow category of "fundamental" rights. They included the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion. The "right to enter a public park is not among this list" and the appeals court refused to expand the list. Though Brown's "right" to enter a park for innocent purposes was "certainly important," it was not fundamental. The court agreed with the lower court that the ban was rationally related to a legitimate government purposed: the protection of children. Brown was "not just another patron of the public parks" but a convicted child molester whose "frequency of attendance and atypical behavior while in the park" justified the concerns of park officials.