Globalization
GLOBALIZATION
GLOBALIZATION India embraced economic globalization in the wake of its severe balance of payments crisis in 1991. Today, India's economy is largely integrated into the global economy. Overall, the achievements have been positive. The country has been able to move beyond the specter haunting it since independence: the stagnant 3 percent per annum growth, known pejoratively as the "Hindu growth rate." India's economic growth in the ten-year period from 1992–1993 to 2001–2002 averaged slightly over 6 percent a year, making India one of the fastest-growing developing economies in the world.
Over four decades of statism and "export pessimism"—characterized by pervasive government planning and regulation, earning India its once dubious distinction as the most controlled economy in the noncommunist world—have given way to significant industrial and trade liberalization, financial deregulation, improvements to supervisory and regulatory systems, cuts in tariffs, the removal of quantitative restrictions, and policies more conducive to privatization and foreign direct investment. India's traditionally high custom duties were systematically lowered in its budgets from 1991. Maximum tariff rates, which exceeded 300 percent, and the average (import-weighted) tariff rate, which stood at 87 percent in 1990–1991 (the highest in the world), have been lowered.
During the prereform period, with import-substituting industrialization the cornerstone of economic development, the principal instrument of industrial policy was an elaborate industrial licensing framework under the Industries Development and Regulations Act of 1951. The act required a government license for either establishing a new production unit (above a certain defined size), or making substantial expansion to an existing unit. A long (and growing) list of industries, including iron and steel, heavy machinery, oil and petroleum, air transport, mining, and telecommunications, were reserved solely for the public sector, under the intrusive eye of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1970. This heavily protected industrial sector has witnessed the virtual abolition of the industrial licensing system as well as other regulatory impediments. Industrial licensing has been abolished for all but fifteen industries. Similarly, in an attempt to encourage greater private sector participation in the economy, many sectors that had previously been reserved for the public sector have been opened for private investment, including power, telecommunications, mining, ports, transportation, and banking.
Prior to 1991, restrictions on foreign direct investment were so strict that it was reduced to a trickle. After 1991, Indian companies with sound financial positions were permitted to raise capital from abroad by issuing equity in the form of global depository receipts, foreign currency convertible bonds, and other debt instruments. The government also created the Foreign Investment Promotion Board to facilitate one-stop, "fast-track" shopping for foreign investors. Automatic approval has been granted for joint ventures with up to 74 percent foreign equity participation, and 100 percent foreign equity and ownership are permitted in export processing zones and units that are export oriented. These reforms have not only forced Indian companies to improve the quality of their products, but have also enabled many to restructure their activities through mergers and acquisitions.
Similarly, in the financial sector (especially banking), the Reserve Bank of India has strengthened prudential requirements and introduced a capital risk-asset ratio system as a measure of capital adequacy, thereby raising minimum capital and capital adequacy ratios to conform to international standards. By 1995 the government set the minimum capital adequacy requirements at 8 percent of risk-weighted assets for Indian banks with foreign branches. In 1998 the standard was raised to 9 percent (effective March 2000), with government securities given a 2.5 percent risk weight, to begin reflecting interest-rate risk. By the end of 2000, only about two dozen public sector banks fell short of this standard. Greater competition in the banking sector and improvements in the capital and debt markets have reduced reliance on central bank financing. Banks and financial institutions are now permitted access to capital markets to expand their equity base, and the passage of the Foreign Exchange and Management Act in 1999 has greatly streamlined foreign exchange regulations.
Cumulatively, these reforms reawakened what John Maynard Keynes called the "latent animal spirits" of India's entrepreneurs, thereby giving a sharp boost to growth. Nowhere has this dynamism been more evident than in the information technology (IT) industry and the service sector. Ten years ago, India's computer industry had sales of U.S.$150 million. In 2001 its exports were over $9.6 billion, 2 percent of India's gross domestic product (GDP). Similarly, the share of IT (mainly software) in total exports increased from 1 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 2001. IT-enabled services such as back-office operations, remote maintenance, accounting, public call centers, medical transcription, insurance claims, and other bulk processing are rapidly expanding. The city of Hyderabad is now known as Cyberabad, and Indian companies such as Infosys, Wipro, and Satyam may yet become household names around the world. Robust exports of food and capital goods, garments, engineering tools, and refined petroleum products have also contributed much to India's growth in recent years. However, it is India's rapidly expanding services sector (which currently accounts for about 40 percent of India's GDP, 25 percent of employment, and 30 percent of export earnings) that has provided recent growth and stability.
India's foreign exchange reserves have risen steadily, from U.S.$42.3 billion in March 2001, to $54.1 billion at the end of March 2002, to a record level of nearly $72.4 billion in January 2003. In the foreign exchange market, dealers are now allowed to buy and sell foreign exchange for current as well as capital account transactions, and firms earning foreign exchange through exports are allowed to retain a certain proportion of the proceeds to avoid costs of conversion and reconversion. Since the rupee was floated in March 1992, its significant nominal and real devaluation relative to its value prior to 1991 provided a much-needed impetus to trade. The exchange rate of the rupee in terms of the major currencies of the world has remained reasonably stable, notwithstanding occasional fluctuations caused by normal market forces of supply and demand. It is particularly noteworthy that, for the first time, the World Bank has classified India as a "less-indebted country."
Like the proverbial rising tide that eventually lifts all boats, the fruits of economic liberalization have benefited (albeit unevenly) most sectors of society, making a significant dent in the country's stubborn poverty problem. The latest official surveys indicate that poverty levels fell from about 40 percent of the population to roughly 28 percent during the second half of the 1990s. This translates into a net reduction in rural poverty of some 60 million people between 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. In rural India, poverty was down to 27 percent, while urban poverty fell by around 8 percent, from 32 to 24 percent.
The accomplishments of the 1990s are dwarfed only by what remains to be done. One urgent task is to correct the growing regional and state-level economic imbalances, as growth continues to vary sharply among the twenty-eight states and seven union territories that make up the Indian union. Second, constraints associated with infrastructure and regulatory bottlenecks have become increasingly evident. Reforms are badly needed in the area of infrastructure: roads, railways, telecommunications, electric power, air transport, and ports all need radical expansion as well as improvement in the quality of services. Third, economic reforms have generally bypassed the agricultural sector, which accounts for about one-quarter of GDP and provides the livelihood of roughly 70 percent of the population. Initially, agricultural growth resulted from the expansion of cropped areas; then, since the 1970s, the "Green Revolution," which increased the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds, commercial fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation, spurred further growth. However, even as the Green Revolution contributed to sharp increases in agricultural production and productivity, its strategy also led to increasing reliance on explicit subsidization of inputs such as nonorganic fertilizer, and implicit subsidization of inputs such as irrigation and power through deliberate underpricing. The central government's fertilizer subsidies amounted to 110 billion rupees (U.S.$2.3 billion), or 0.4 percent of GDP in 2002–2003. The major beneficiaries of this subsidy were the inefficient domestic fertilizer industry and high-income farmers. Fertilizer use, moreover, must be complemented with a regular supply of water. The heavily subsidized electric power enables farmers to draw water from irrigation canals or to pump it from deep wells at relatively little cost. The overuse of urea (nitrogenous fertilizers) and water has greatly aggravated the problem of waterlogging, topsoil depletion, pollution of ground water, and a host of related environmental problems. While it is generally agreed that a phased increase in fertilizer prices and the imposition of user charges for irrigation and electricity would prevent abuse and raise resources to finance investment in rural infrastructure, the powerful rural interests, given their influence and control over large electoral constituencies, have made this task politically difficult. In fact, successive governments have generally skirted the issue, threatening to raise prices and cut subsidies in their budget speeches, only to back down later under political pressure.
Further exacerbating agricultural diversification and productivity are outdated laws and regulations. For example, the government's guaranteed price supports for food grains—crucial in the 1960s and 1970s to give farmers the incentives to produce more food grains—have long outlived their usefulness. Today, price controls are maintained for staples to ensure remunerative prices for farmers. In fact, support prices have long been fixed higher than market prices, encouraging overproduction. The result has been a substantial increase in stocks to unsustainable levels—over 60 million tons in mid-2002, against a norm of around 17 million tons—considered necessary to avert famine and ensure food security. In recent years, the costs of maintaining these stocks have been so prohibitive that it is not uncommon to allow food grains and other commodities to rot in poorly maintained, rat-infested storage facilities. While short-term measures, such as selling excess grain below cost, are usually undertaken, this is not a viable long-term solution. Both the central and state governments have tried to justify the maintenance of high support prices on the grounds that it allows them to subsidize the sale of certain commodities to low-income families through the public distribution system, but it is well known that such distributed grain rarely reaches the needy. The agricultural sector is also shielded through import and export controls, including tariffs and export restrictions. Perhaps the most pernicious are the interstate sales tax, and restrictions on interstate and even interdistrict movement of agricultural commodities. The price support system clearly needs to be better aligned to market demand if farmers are to be encouraged to shift from food grains like wheat and rice to other staples.
Though the financial sector reforms have liberalized Indian firms' ability to raise and hold money offshore as well as foreign investors' ability to invest in India and to repatriate their investments, the government still maintains controls on international capital movements. The 1997 Committee on Capital Account Convertibility (the Tarapore Committee) recognized the gains to capital account convertibility in terms of increased funding for investment and risk diversification, and recommended that India move toward capital convertibility over a three-year period. However, the committee's report, issued just three weeks before the floating of the Thai baht in July 1997 and the onset of the Asian financial crisis, halted the move toward capital account liberalization. India's cautious approach to capital account liberalization helped limit contagion during the Asian crisis by containing short-term debt. The authorities must nevertheless ease capital account liberalization as India's financial system and fiscal policy are strengthened. Compared to China, India's ability to attract foreign investment remains disappointing. During the 1990s, foreign direct investment in India averaged 0.5 percent of GDP, while in China it was 5 percent of GDP.
Although the number of activities reserved for the public sector has been reduced from six to three and the number of sectors reserved for small-scale industry (units whose investment in plant and machinery cannot exceed $250,000) has been reduced from 821 to 799, those numbers are still too high. This "reservation" policy has created protective enclaves within the industrial sector, with an adverse effect on industrial competitiveness and job creation. Accelerating the pace of divestment and privatization of public sector enterprises will help reduce the public sector deficit by raising revenues, increasing the efficiency of resource use, and helping to realign government policy in a way that contributes to faster economic growth.
As the Asian financial crisis clearly demonstrated, a strong and well-regulated financial sector can serve as a critical bulwark against global market turmoil. This not only means having in place prudential and supervisory systems to ensure financial stability; authorities must also take swift corrective actions to deal with weak or insolvent institutions. Despite India's achievements in strengthening prudential and supervisory systems, considerable weaknesses remain. At the core of the problem is the fact that a few government-owned banks (particularly the State Bank of India, the country's largest commercial bank) still account for roughly 80 percent of the banking sector. The vast majority of these banks are chronically undercapitalized and burdened with huge nonperforming loans. Weak banks can put the entire economy under risk during a crisis. While public ownership of banks has created an aura of invulnerability to shocks, it is urgent that the authorities move expeditiously to reduce the high level of nonperforming loans, restructure weak banks, and close insolvent public-sector banks.
Economic globalization demands constant innovation. While India's software industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors in the economy, it is important to note that India may not realize its vast potential unless some important policy changes are made. The software industry's focus is currently on mostly proprietary work for foreign multinationals, which is only a small part of the world's software market. India's cost advantage, because its software professionals are inexpensive, will be eroded as other players (such as China) with similar or lower costs enter the market. Finally, although India has been able to exploit the opportunities economic globalization has provided, the process continues to draw fierce domestic opposition. Thus, making the benefits of economic globalization meaningful to all of its more than 1 billion citizens remains India's major challenge.
Shalendra D. Sharma
See alsoAgricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991 ; Economic Reforms of 1991 ; Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms ; Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991 ; Industrial Growth and Diversification ; Information and Other Technology Development ; Trade Liberalization since 1991
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