BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT India possesses one of the most advanced missile programs outside the original five declared nuclear states (China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States). With its sophisticated missile and space programs, New Delhi is technically capable of indigenously developing long-range nuclear-tipped missiles. India's research into ballistic missiles began in the 1960s. In July 1983 India created the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), with the aim of developing an indigenous missile infrastructure. The IGMDP's first indigenously developed missile was the Prithvi (Earth). India's second ballistic missile system is the Agni (Fire) missile series, which is longer in range than the Prithvi.

Ballistic Missiles

The short-range Prithvi was developed in Hyderabad, starting in 1983, and was first tested in February 1988. There are two versions of the Prithvi ballistic missile, an SS-150, designated P-1, with a range of 93 miles (150 km), and an SS-250, designated P-2, with a range of 155 miles (250 km). The SS-150 missiles are used by the Indian army, and the SS-250 by the Indian air force to attack enemy airfields and by the Indian army for battlefield support. A third version was reported to be in development in 1994, an SS-350, designated P-3, with a range of 217 miles (350 km), but it is not known if this development has continued. A nuclear warhead was originally planned for the Prithvi missile, probably for the SS-250 and SS-350 versions. With the successful introduction of the Agni I missile, it is no longer expected that nuclear warheads will be fitted to Prithvi missiles.

In the early years of the 21st century, there were reports that a solid-propellant motor was being developed. Solid-fueled Prithvi missiles would have the advantage over liquid-fuel variants of being able to be readied for launch in a shorter time. Liquid-fuel missiles have to receive their fuel prior to firing, while solid-fueled missiles are manufactured with their fuel in place, enabling a shorter preparation time to launch. A ship-launched version, named Dhanush, believed to be similar to the SS-250, was tested from a naval vessel INS Subhadra, in April 2000 and 2004. It is believed that this program is a technology demonstrator, and that this missile might be fitted to future destroyers and frigates, or to India's new nuclear-powered submarine. The Dhanush may be converted into a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The SS-150 was first test flown in February 1988 and entered service in 1994. User trials were completed in June 1994, carried out by the 333rd Indian Army Missile Group at Secunderabad. The 444 Missile Group was reported to have been formed in May 2002, with a mixture of Prithvi and Agni I missiles. The SS-150 missiles are kept in storage and can become fully operational at short notice. Production of the SS-150 version began in 1993 and continued until 1999, with around sixty missiles built and some thirty-five transport erector launcher (TEL) vehicles constructed to launch the missile. The TEL vehicles can also fire the SS-250 missile.

A first reported trial of the SS-250 was carried out in January 1996, with further tests in June 2000, March 2001, and December 2001. The SS-250 entered service with the Indian air force in 1999, and it is believed that around seventy missiles will be built. In 2002 the control of the SS-250 was transferred from the air force to the army, but with the air force retaining responsibility for providing target data.

There are unconfirmed reports that the SS-350 was first tested in November 1993, and then in April 2001. It is not clear if this program has been discontinued, although it is possible that some design work continues as a later upgrade option, probably entering service around 2010. The ship-launched Dhanush was first tested from INS Subhadra, a Sukanya class offshore patrol vessel, in April 2000. The test failed after about 30 seconds of flight. A second test was made in December 2000, and a third in September 2001. The last test is reported to have been over a range of 93 miles (150 km).

Agni I, II, III, and IV, and Surya

By late 2003 three Agni versions were in production or development: Agni I (435-mi. or 700-km range), Agni II (1,243-mi. or 2,000-km range), and Agni III (2,175-mi. or 3,500-km range). The Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile program began around 1979 and first test launched in 1989. No further tests were carried out on the Agni I in the early and mid-1990s by successive governments, in light of international pressure. Partly to placate international concerns, the early Agni I was referred to as a technology demonstrator. This changed with the electoral victory of Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998. In April 1999 the BJP authorized the launch of Agni II. The Agni I was flight tested in January 2002.

Development on a shorter-range Agni (currently called Agni I) began in 1999. The system uses the first stage of the original Agni, developed in the early 1990s, and its warhead assembly. A reduced payload would enable the missile to strike targets 746 mi. (1,200 km) away, sufficient to target all of Pakistan. Agni I has been designed to provide a short reaction time nuclear capability.

The 1,243 miles (2,000 km) range Agni II, first tested in April 1999, is a two-stage solid propellant design, developed from the original Agni demonstrator program from 1997. Agni III is believed to be a two- or three-stage missile, with an official maximum range of 1,864 miles (3,000 km). Agni III could, however have an increased range capability of 3,107 to 3,728 miles (5,000–6,000 km) with improved motors and reduced payloads. A range of around 2,796 miles (4,500 km) would enable India to target Beijing.

It was reported that an Agni IV was on the drawing boards, with a possible range of 3,418 miles (5,500 km), making this an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It was unclear whether this missile was also the Surya (Sun) that India was working on to create a series of ICBMs, building on the experience of the Agni family. Like the Agni missiles, the Suryas would incorporate propulsion systems developed for India's satellite launch vehicle programs. There were reported to be three variants under consideration: Surya I (or 3,107–3,728 mi. or 5,000–6,000 km) and Surya II (between 4,971–7,456 mi. or 8,000–12,000 km), and possibly a Surya III (12,427 mi. or 20,000 km). Although there was ambiguity surrounding the designation and range of the ICBMs, India was technologically capable and intent on developing ICBMs.

The first Agni successful test launch was made in May 1989, when a trial missile flew about 621 miles (1,000 km). A second test flight was made in May 1992, which failed. A third test flight was made in February 1994, with a range reported to be 901 miles (1,450 km). In 1995 it was reported that a further five flight tests were planned and that a nuclear warhead design had been prepared.

The Agni II's development began in 1997. The maiden launch occurred in April 1999 from a railcar launcher with a payload of 2,205 pounds (1,000 kg) over a range of 1,429 miles (2,300 km). A second test flight was made in January 2001. Low-rate initial production of the Agni II version began in May 2001. Around five were operational from late 2001. Ten to twelve missiles are produced a year and are operated by the Indian Army Strategic Rocket Regiment, 555 Missile Group. The nuclear warheads are stored at separate locations from the missiles.

The 435-miles (700 km) range Agni I was first flight tested in January 2002. U.S. intelligence reports suggest that the reentry did not separate as planned. A second test was made in January 2003 from a transport erector launcher vehicle, and was reported to have been successful. The Agni I missiles are planned to be delivered to the Indian Army Strategic Rocket Regiment, 444 Missile Group, which also operates the short-range SS-150. Agni III is in full development, and has been ready for its first test flight since 2003. Information on the ICBMs (Agni IV and Surya) is limited.

Cruise Missile

India is placing extensive resources into the development of air- or ship-launched cruise missiles that could be armed with nuclear warheads. The development of nuclear-armed cruise missiles is a natural progression for India, which is seeking to develop various platforms for its nuclear deterrence. Although it is likely to be the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century before nuclear-tipped cruise missiles enter service, the technologies are in place to develop this capability in the form of existing programs, notably the antiship PJ-10 BrahMos missile, jointly developed by Russia and India. This appears set to be developed into a nuclear-armed land attack cruise missile launched from air, submarine, and surface ships. BrahMos comes from the Indian and Russian companies Brahmaputra-Moscow Pvt. The airframe and engine will be manufactured by Machinostroyeniye of Russia.

The antiship version (carrying a high-explosive warhead) incorporates an Indian-developed guidance system and a Russian ram-jet propulsion system. Official Indian sources state that the missile can be launched from a container that can be fitted onto a ship, a submarine, and after modification, to an aircraft. The air-launched version of BrahMos is likely to be carried by Indian air force Su-30MKI fighters. The submarine-launched variant is referred to as the Sagarika, and is likely to be deployed on the new nuclear-powered submarine advanced technology vessel (ATV) that is under development. Some reports refer to Sagarika as the sea-launched ballistic missile (Dhanush). Five ATV vessels are under development and are due to be operational in 2008. Originally the name Sagarika was applied to a project started in 1994 that was canceled in 1996. With the advent of the PJ-10 BrahMos program on the antiship missile front, India now has the option of applying proven Russian technology to the Sagarika project. With the capability to carry a warhead weighing 441 pounds (200 kg), a nuclear-armed version would require what is called "miniaturizing" the nuclear device to fit atop the cruise missile. Nuclear warheads have been developed for the Prithvi and Agni missiles, weighing in the region of 2,205 pounds (1,000 kg).

In November 2004 the antiship BrahMos missile was successfully tested for the sixth time. The first test took place in June 2001 and the missile was scheduled to enter production in 2005. Initial production will focus on the antiship variants carrying a high-explosive warhead, before the land-attack version equipped with a nuclear warhead is developed. In 2005 a nuclear land-attack version, capable of being delivered by sea or air, based on the PJ-10, could be operational, if India can develop a miniaturized nuclear warhead without conducting further nuclear tests. India clearly is capable of and intent on developing a nuclear-tipped air- and sea-launched cruise missile. The delivery mechanism should be in place for India to add this weapon to its nuclear arsenal once it has developed a suitable warhead.

National Security Concerns

Ballistic missiles offer India, as with any other country possessing this capability, certain advantages on the battlefield. Compared to manned aircraft, ballistic missiles cannot be brought down by antiaircraft artillery or surface-to-air-missiles. Once a missile is launched, it is almost certain to reach its target, as long as it does not suffer a technical malfunction. To India, the development of missiles provides an assured means of attacking fixed targets in Pakistan or China. The only real constraints are the range of the missile, the accuracy of the missile, and the size of the warhead (payload). Consequently, the possession of ballistic missiles by India remains a highly effective means of deterring its opponents. India has ordered from Russia the Antey-2500 SAM ballistic missile defense system for itself, and this system could be complemented by the Israeli Arrow missile defense system, for possible use against missiles with a range of around 932 miles (1,500 km).

Ballistic missiles are most vulnerable during transportation to and preparation at their launch sites. For instance, if the Pakistani military, through their ground and aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, know the location of India's possible Prithvi launch sites near along their border, they could attack these locations before any missiles are launched. The short range of the Prithvi missiles means they would have to be deployed fairly close to the border with Pakistan—around 62 miles (100 km), depending on the variant used. Such close proximity to Pakistan thus raises the spectre of their movements being detected and easily attacked. The Agni, however, could be deployed much deeper inside Indian territory.

There are, however, a few drawbacks to India's ballistic missile capability. Because missiles are not that accurate, they are therefore suited to strike large targets, like cities or known troop concentrations. This is particularly the case for missiles armed with a high-explosive (conventional) warhead. The Prithvi missiles, for instance, have an accuracy of only around 164 feet (50 m). In addition, unlike an aircraft, a ballistic missile cannot search for its target or alter course during its flight. Missiles are thus suitable only for static targets whose location is known prior to launch. Second, ballistic missiles are not reusable, unlike aircraft that can be used for multiple missions (although used armaments must be replaced). Third, aircraft can be recalled during their mission. A ballistic missile, once launched, has only one option: to reach its predetermined target.

Despite these drawbacks, New Delhi considers its missiles of great value as a nuclear deterrent. Since the early 1990s, India and Pakistan have made considerable progress in developing ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. As was the case with the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, India and Pakistan both view their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles as essential nuclear deterrents and thus as a source of maintaining stability in South Asia.

Were they ever to launch a nuclear strike, India and Pakistan would likely target each other's cities. Pakistan is also capable of launching a significant nuclear strike, having developed two main ballistic missile programs. First, there is the Shaheen family based on Chinese designs: 466-miles (750 km) range Shaheen I/Hatf IV (operational); 1,553-miles (2,500 km) range Shaheen II (ready to flight test); and possibly a 1,864-miles (3,000 km) range Shaheen III (in development). Second are the North Korean–based Ghauri missiles: 932-miles (1,500 km) range Ghauri I/Hatf V (operational); 1,429-miles (2,300 km) range Ghauri II/Hatf VI (flight tested); and the 1,864-miles (3,000 km) range Ghauri III (in development). In addition, Pakistan received from China in 1992 around 30 M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) missiles with a range of 174 miles (280 km). It is believed that Pakistan is indigenously developing this missile as the Hatf III/Ghaznavi. All these missiles systems can carry nuclear warheads.

Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad seeks an arms race in the cold war sense: their ongoing ballistic missile programs are more of an arms "crawl." The key goal has been and remains the ability to convince each other that one could launch a nuclear attack against the other's city, if required, even if one had already been attacked by a nuclear weapon(s). The ability to strike back after first succumbing to a nuclear strike is known as "second strike capability" and requires effective nuclear command and control mechanisms that could survive a nuclear strike. This is an important issue, since Islamabad has stated that it reserves the right to launch a nuclear attack first (most likely by a ballistic missile to ensure a successful strike) should it believe the attack necessary for its survival. Should, for instance, Indian troops cross into Pakistan, New Delhi would be justified in fearing that Pakistan might be tempted to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, should Islamabad perceive its national survival under threat. Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as essential to compensate for its weakness in nonnuclear forces, where India holds a numerical and technological advantage. Islamabad's refusal to follow India's decision to adopt a policy of "no first use" in 1998 was due to Pakistan's concerns that such a stance could create a destabilising military imbalance between the two nations.

An intriguing dimension to India's missile developments is the strong influence of the nation's missile scientists in continuing to develop longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles because they can and desire to build them. The process in which technology drives developments is known as technological determinism. The pursuit of technological achievements may have worked well in India's initial pursuit of ballistic missiles, but now that a minimum nuclear deterrent has been accomplished, maintaining and augmenting the existing capabilities is arguably all that is required. But India's scientists do not want to stop there, thinking rather of developing longer-range nuclear-tipped missiles, including ICBMs.

Indian officials are already speaking openly about work on the Agni IV, which could have a range in excess of 3,418 miles (5,500 km), providing India with an ICBM capability and a nuclear warhead of at least 160,000 tons (160 kilotons). India's development of such long-range missiles runs the risk of initiating a dangerous new round of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

Ben Sheppard

See alsoBallistic Missile Defenses ; Nuclear Programs and Policies ; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development ; Weapons Production and Procurement

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chengappa, Raj. Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India'sQuest to Be a Nuclear Power. New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2000. A detailed insight into the emergence of India's missile programs.

Karp, Aaron. Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. A good general introduction to ballistic missile proliferation.

Lennox, Duncan. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems. Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2003. Details the specifications and hardware of ballistic missiles.

Mistry, Dinshaw. Containing Missile Proliferation. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003. Looks at India's program in the general issue of missile proliferation and international attempts to curtail their developments.

Sheppard, Ben, ed. Special Report: Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2000. An overview of missile proliferation; based on the 1999 Jane's Ballistic Missile Proliferation Conference.

Thomas, Raju G. C., and D. R. SarDesai, eds. Nuclear India in the Twenty-first Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Contains an in-depth chapter by Ben Sheppard into the ramifications of missile proliferation in South Asia.