Overview

Political parties in Ecuador have been marginal actors in the democratic process. The first political parties, Conservative and Liberal (founded in 1885 and 1890, respectively), were formed around individual loyalties rather than ideological or programmatic affinities. For the first half of the twentieth century, the absence of strong political parties contributed to cycles of political instability in which an influential caudillo could be intermittently replaced by a military coup, a constitutional assembly, or a populist dictator.

A charismatic figure of this period, José María Velasco Ibarra, was elected president five times but completed only one of those terms. The idiosyncratic nature of his government alliances with the military, the business elites, the labor unions, and urban popular sectors, and his reluctance to organize a political party help explain his erratic trajectory, but his populist legacy profoundly shaped the political system. The formula of a charismatic caudillo appealing directly to the impoverished masses was repeated by parties such as Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (Concentration of Popular Forces, CFP) and its later counterpart, Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE). A new party following that same trajectory is Prian, institutional renewal party of national action. Other parties founded during the prosperous postwar era, such as Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left, ID), Unión Demócrata Cristiana-Democracia Popular Christian Democratic Union-Popular Democracy (DP), and Partido Social Cristiano Social Christian Party (PSC), represented more ideological and programmatic policy options, but remained equally subject to strong individual leaders.

THE DEMOCRATIC PERIOD

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the strengthening of political parties became a key concern for the makers of a new constitution. With the goal of consolidating existing national parties and designing them to be less personality-based and more accountable to voters, political reformers established stricter criteria for party registration, required parties to nominate candidates nationwide, and established thresholds for eradicating parties with poor electoral performance. Other reforms were adopted to introduce midterm legislative elections and impose term limits.

In practice, these reforms did not produce the expected results, partly because of weaknesses in the institutional design itself, and partly because the reforms did not take into account the divisive influence of social, ethnic, and regional differences. For example, electoral rules encouraged the proliferation of political parties with loyal constituencies at the subnational level, while term limits and midterm elections promoted legislative amateurism and hindered accountability. Because of the inchoate nature of the party system—what Catherine Conaghan (1995) has called "floating politicians and floating voters"—the fate of political parties remained tightly linked to the whims of its charismatic leaders. Weak party institutionalization further hindered the prospects for democratic governance because minority presidents often relied on clienteles to assemble fickle legislative alliances.

By the late 1990s, the proliferation of government corruption scandals and a widespread economic crisis challenged the legitimacy and effectiveness of the party system. A constitutional assembly gathered in 1997 to explore new forms of participation, representation, and governance. Reforms adopted during this period included the abolition of term limits and midterm elections, the participation of independent candidates, and a personalized voting system that favored individual candidates over party organizations. The party system has also been shaped by the entry of the indigenous population into the formal political process. Since its first appearance in the 1996 general elections, Pachakutik has become one of the most successful ethnic parties in Latin America. Since 1996 its candidates have held several elected and appointed public posts, including cabinet positions and legislative seats in the National Congress and municipal governments; the party also supported the successful presidential bid of Lucio Gutierrez in 2002 and introduced important legislation on behalf of indigenous peoples in the 1998 constitution.

Another important change is the shift of party competition to the subnational arena. The introduction of legislation, such as the 1997 earmarking of 15 percent of government revenues for local governments, offered greater incentives for parties to become more accountable to their provincial constituencies. This shift also contributed to the consolidation of party competition along regional lines, with at least two parties (PRE and PSC) competing in the coastal region, and two (ID and Pachakutik) in the Andes and the Amazon. These parties remain influential players in the policy-making process, despite their lack of popularity and the rise of outsider candidates. Their success is partly explained by their ability to broker government alliances in exchange for targeted rewards for their constituents. But in the absence of payoffs for cooperation, parties have also contributed to the ousting of presidents in 1997, 2000, and 2005.

The 2006 election dramatically altered the party system in Ecuador. The legislative majority usually composed of traditional parties with strong regional representation was replaced by the presence of mass organizations led by charismatic outsiders. Such parties as the Sociedad Patriotica Party (PSP) and Prian effectively capitalized on voters' growing sentiment of frustration with poor government performance. Far from delivering on their promise of political renewal, this fragmentation of the party system was anticipated to extend the period of policy instability and democratic erosion in Ecuador.

See alsoEcuador-Peru Boundary Disputes; Velasco Ibarra, José María.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Conaghan, Catherine. "Politicians against Parties: Discord and Disconnection in Ecuador's Party System." In Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Hurtado, Osvaldo. El poder político en el Ecuador, 6th ed. Quito: Letraviva-Planeta, 1988. Translated by Nick D. Mills Jr. as Political Power in Ecuador. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985.

Jones, Mark P., and Scott P. Mainwaring. "The Nationalization of Parties and Party Systems." Party Politics 9, no. 2 (2003): 139-166.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Mejía Acosta, Andrés. Gobernabilidad Democrática: Sistema electoral, partidos políticos y pugna de poderes en Ecuador (1978–1998). Quito: Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2002.

Mejía Acosta, Andrés. "Ghost Coalitions: Informal Institutions and Economic Reform in Ecuador." In Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Torre, Carlos de la. Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000.

Van Cott, Donna Lee. Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

                               AndrÉs MejÍa Acosta