Wilson, Charles E.
Wilson, Charles E. (1890–1961), industrialist and secretary of defense.Wilson received an engineering degree in 1909 at Carnegie Tech University. A distinguished career in industry led to his appointment as vice president of General Motors (GM) in 1928 and president in 1941. During World War II, Wilson directed GM's outstanding performance in producing tanks, aircraft engines, trucks, and munitions.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower selected Wilson as his secretary of defense in 1953, and he remained in office for almost five years. Since the president formulated national defense policy, Wilson's principal responsibility was managing the Department of Defense.
Wilson's years in office were troubled ones. The outspoken secretary of defense made a habit of needlessly offending others. During his Senate confirmation hearings in January 1953, for example, a beleaguered Wilson insisted that his heavy stockholding in GM could constitute no conflict of interests “because for years I thought that what was good for our country was good for General Motors and vice versa.” More important, he was indecisive and failed to grow in his job. As a result, the services squabbled among themselves, and Wilson expected the White House to provide him with both general guidelines and assistance in resolving technical matters. Finally, while knowing little about foreign affairs or strategic doctrine, Wilson acted as chief spokesman for the administration's “New Look” defense policies, which emphasized airpower and nuclear weapons over conventional forces. This strategy came under severe attack from within and outside Congress, and from the armed services—particularly the army. Critics charged that the nation was no longer able flexibly to meet its strategic obligations.
Under Wilson, military budgets declined by over 10 percent. These cuts stemmed from Eisenhower's desire to protect the civilian economy and curb the growth of a military‐industrial complex, goals shared by Wilson. However, reduced military spending was complicated by the administration's strident anticommunism, which led to growing commitments abroad—commitments the administration proposed to meet through policies labeled “brinkmanship” and “massive retaliation.”
Wilson was in part a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Effectively managing the Defense Department without having a voice in strategic doctrine was nearly impossible. Moreover, justifying military cutbacks would have been easier had the administration seized various opportunities to reduce Cold War tensions.
[See also Cold War; Commander in Chief, President as; Flexible Response.]
President Dwight D. Eisenhower selected Wilson as his secretary of defense in 1953, and he remained in office for almost five years. Since the president formulated national defense policy, Wilson's principal responsibility was managing the Department of Defense.
Wilson's years in office were troubled ones. The outspoken secretary of defense made a habit of needlessly offending others. During his Senate confirmation hearings in January 1953, for example, a beleaguered Wilson insisted that his heavy stockholding in GM could constitute no conflict of interests “because for years I thought that what was good for our country was good for General Motors and vice versa.” More important, he was indecisive and failed to grow in his job. As a result, the services squabbled among themselves, and Wilson expected the White House to provide him with both general guidelines and assistance in resolving technical matters. Finally, while knowing little about foreign affairs or strategic doctrine, Wilson acted as chief spokesman for the administration's “New Look” defense policies, which emphasized airpower and nuclear weapons over conventional forces. This strategy came under severe attack from within and outside Congress, and from the armed services—particularly the army. Critics charged that the nation was no longer able flexibly to meet its strategic obligations.
Under Wilson, military budgets declined by over 10 percent. These cuts stemmed from Eisenhower's desire to protect the civilian economy and curb the growth of a military‐industrial complex, goals shared by Wilson. However, reduced military spending was complicated by the administration's strident anticommunism, which led to growing commitments abroad—commitments the administration proposed to meet through policies labeled “brinkmanship” and “massive retaliation.”
Wilson was in part a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Effectively managing the Defense Department without having a voice in strategic doctrine was nearly impossible. Moreover, justifying military cutbacks would have been easier had the administration seized various opportunities to reduce Cold War tensions.
[See also Cold War; Commander in Chief, President as; Flexible Response.]
Bibliography
Douglas Kinnard , President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, 1977.
E. Bruce Geelhoed , Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957, 1979.
Paul A. C. Koistinen
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Wilson, Charles E.