Jefferson, Thomas

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Jefferson, Thomas

Excerpt from "To the U.S. Minister to France"

Written on April 18, 1802
Published in The Works of Thomas Jefferson, edited by
Paul Leicester Ford, 1905

When Spain ceded Louisiana to France in October 1800, the deal created a dangerous situation for the United States. With the Spanish controlling Louisiana, the United States had felt safe, because Spain had grown militarily weak and was unlikely to pose any threat. Since signing the Treaty of San Lorenzo in 1795 (and ratifying it in 1796), Spain had stopped charging fees to U.S. boats navigating the Mississippi River and loading and unloading at New Orleans. The United States could not risk losing access to the Mississippi or the port of New Orleans; both were essential to the success of western settlements. With good reason, the United States feared that powerful France might not allow American ships to use the waterways of Louisiana. Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821), dictatorial ruler of France since 1799, had ruth-lessly expanded the French empire in Europe and had hopes of conquering all of Europe. With his massive ego, Napoléon expected to eventually rule the world. Part of Napoléon's plan was to create a French empire in the New World, as Europeans at that time called North and South America, starting with New Orleans.

Napoléon assembled two armies to send across the Atlantic. One was sent in January 1802 to recover the island of Santo Domingo (present-day Haiti), which was an important source of a valuable product—sugar. French sugarcane plantation owners in Santo Domingo had been overpowered in a rebellion by ex-slaves, and France intended to retake the island. Napoléon planned for a second French force to land in New Orleans. The army in Santo Domingo was to put down the slave rebellion and then join the second army in Louisiana to prepare for action against the United States.

The U.S. State Department learned of Napoléon's plans in early April 1802. President Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826; served 1801–9) reacted immediately; he wanted to open negotiations with the French and attempt to defuse and settle the affair. Jefferson sent an urgent letter to Robert R. Livingston (1746–1813), the U.S. ambassador to France, stating that the "possessor" of New Orleans was a natural enemy of the United States. He stressed that the port of New Orleans was vital to all trade going up and down the Mississippi River, and whatever country controlled it would be at odds with the United States. Jefferson wrote that the moment France took over New Orleans, the United States would have to "marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." Jefferson realized that the only way to protect U.S. interests from the French, if they established themselves at New Orleans, was to quickly build up the U.S. Navy and join with Britain, the greatest naval power in the world, to drive France out of New Orleans.

Jefferson asked Livingston to try to persuade France to cede New Orleans and Florida to the United States. If the offer of money was not enough, then Livingston should threaten a stronger alliance between the United States and Britain. Jefferson then told Livingston that "every eye in the U.S." was watching what would happen in Louisiana and that the situation was causing a great deal of uneasiness. Jefferson was sure that if France established itself in New Orleans, the French would permanently close the port and navigation of the Mississippi to all ships except their own. Since the only trade route for the western settlers was by way of the Mississippi, Jefferson knew the western settlers might take matters into their own hands, raise militias (local groups of soldiers), and attack New Orleans. His letter to Livingston was an attempt to negotiate an agreement before the United States was pushed into a war. Facing a rival as powerful as France, Jefferson feared his nation might not survive the battle.

Things to remember while reading excerpts from "To the U.S. Minister to France":

Free navigation of the Mississippi River and the right of deposit (the right to load and unload cargo) on the docks of New Orleans were vitally important for western settlements to get their produce to East Coast markets and abroad. Roads were primitive across the Appalachian Mountains, making the transport of large amounts of produce impractical.
Spain, a weakening European power, was no longer a threat to navigation along the Mississippi, but if France took control of New Orleans, the western lands and all of the United States would be in grave danger.
Jefferson held out hope that Livingston could negotiate a settlement that would be acceptable to the United States and France.

Excerpt from "To the U.S. Minister to France"

DEAR SIR—. ... Thecession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain to France works mostsorely on the U.S. On this subject the Secretary of State [James Madison] has written to you fully. Yet I cannotforbear recurring to it personally, so deep is the impression it makes in my mind. It compleatly reverses all the political relations of the U.S. and will form a newepoch in our political course. Of all nations of any consideration France is the one whichhitherto has offered the fewest points on which we could have any conflict of right, and the most points of a communion of interests. From these causes we have ever looked to her as our natural friend, as one with which we never could have an occasion of difference. Her growth therefore we viewed as our own, her misfortunes ours. There is on the globe one single spot, thepossessor of which is our natural andhabitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market, and from itsfertility it willere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants. France placing herself inthat door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Herpacific dispositions, herfeeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession of the place would be hardly felt by us, and it would not perhaps be very long before some circumstance might arise which might make the cession of it to us the price of something of more worth to her. Not so can it ever be in the hands of France. Theimpetuosity of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character, placed in apoint of eternal friction with us, and our character, which though quiet, and loving peace and the pursuit of wealth, is high-minded, ... enterprising and energetic as any nation on earth, these circumstancesrender it impossible that France and the U.S. can continue long friends when they meet in so irritable a position. They as well as we must be blind if they do not see this; and we must be veryimprovident if we do not begin to make arrangementson that hypothesis. The day that France takes possession of N. Orleansfixes the sentence . ... It seals the union oftwo nations whoin conjunction can maintainexclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we mustmarry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attentions to amaritime force ... : and having formed andcemented together a power which may renderreinforcement of hersettlements here impossible to France, make the firstcannon ... in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of Americain sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. ...

If France considers Louisiana however as indispensable for her views she might perhaps be willing to look about for arrangements which might reconcile it to our interests. If anything could do this it would be the ceding to us the island of New Orleans and the Floridas. This would certainly in a great degree remove the causes ofjarring and irritation between us . ... It would at any rate relieve us from the necessity of taking immediate measures forcountervailing . ... I have no doubt you have urged these considerations on every proper occasion with the government where you are . ... Every eye in the U.S. is now fixed on this affair of Louisiana. Perhaps nothing since the revolutionary war has produced more uneasy sensations through the body of the nation. Notwithstanding temporary bickerings have taken place with France, she has still a strong hold on the affections of our citizens generally. I have thought it not amiss, by way of supplement to the letters of the Secretary of State to write you this private one to impress you withthe importance we affix to this transaction . ...

What happened next ...

France refused to negotiate with the United States. Jefferson's worst fears were realized in October 1802, when Spanish officials withdrew the right of deposit from American ships at New Orleans. The officials were no doubt taking instructions from Napoléon, the dictator of France. Withdrawing the right of deposit at New Orleans immediately crippled trade for all U.S. western lands. Jefferson feared it was only a matter of time before settlers in the West formed militias and marched on New Orleans to open the port themselves.

Luckily for Jefferson, events outside the United States were about to greatly ease the situation. French troops who had been sent to Santo Domingo in early 1802 were losing their battle against a group of ex-slaves led by François-Dominique Toussaint-L'Ouverture (c. 1743–1803). The forces Napoléon had intended to send to Louisiana had instead been sent to reinforce his troops already in Santo Domingo. Toussaint-L'Ouverture and his men were relentless against the French. French troops who were not defeated by the island resistance were instead overcome by mosquitoes carrying yellow fever. By the end of 1802, Napoléon gave up on retaking Santo Domingo but had no French troops left to send to Louisiana.

Nevertheless, the closing of the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans was an explosive situation, and settlers in the West were ready to fight. Determined to settle the matter by diplomacy, Jefferson addressed Congress in January 1803 and asked for $2 million, hoping that he could tempt Napoléon into selling the U.S. rights to the river and the port. Jefferson appointed former Virginia governor James Monroe (1758–1831) to join Livingston in France to negotiate or buy a settlement. The result was the landmark Louisiana Purchase, which is covered in the next entry.

Did you know ...

As early as 1790, the United States had tried to buy New Orleans from Spain.
Even though Spanish officials announced measures to close the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans in October 1802, the closure was never complete. The control point was Natchez (present-day Natchez, Mississippi) on the Mississippi River, where Spain had a fort. Spanish river patrols stopped some U.S. boats, but it was impossible to stop all of them. Some boats got through by bribing Spanish officials. The overall situation was tension-packed.
President Jefferson's famous statement that "we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation" shows just how worried he was about the French establishing themselves at New Orleans. Since before the American Revolution (1775–83), Jefferson had considered Britain to be America's real enemy. Jefferson had served as U.S. minister to France in the late 1780s and considered France America's friend. However, Napoléon's dictatorial rule since 1799 and his determination to dominate Europe and the world had caused Jefferson to change sympathies.

Consider the following ...

In his letter, Jefferson says of New Orleans, "There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy." Discuss why the port of New Orleans was so important to the United States in the early 1800s.
Why did Jefferson consider France's possession of Louisiana so dangerous when he had worried little about Spain as the "possessor?"
Why did Jefferson think that the United States would have to turn its attention to its "maritime force" if France insisted on controlling New Orleans?

Cession: Formal surrender.

Sorely: Disagreeably or painfully.

Forebear recurring to it: Keep from mentioning it again.

Epoch: Era.

Hitherto: Previously.

Possessor: Owner.

Habitual: Constant.

Fertility: Ability to produce.

Ere: Before.

That door: New Orleans.

Assumes to us the attitude of defiance: Becomes a potential enemy of the United States.

Pacific dispositions: Peaceful ways.