Austerlitz

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AUSTERLITZ

The Battle of Austerlitz was fought on 2 December 1805 between the armies of France, Austria, and Russia, commanded in person by Napoleon, Francis II, and Alexander I respectively. It was the culmination of a war that had begun in late August with the Austrian invasion of Bavaria and the Battle of Ulm, which destroyed the main Austrian army in Germany. By November, Napoleon had chased the Austrian remnants and General Mikhail Kutuzov's auxiliary Russian corps into Moravia, where they joined with rein for cements coming from Russia at Olmütz (modern-day Olomouc). Napoleon feared that a hostile Prussia might intervene against him and that Austrian rein for cements commanded by Archduke Charles might arrive in his rear. He launched diplomatic feelers toward Alexander to explore the possibilities for a negotiated peace, and simultaneously prepared for a climactic battle he hoped would end the war.

Alexander, exhilarated by his first appearance at the head of an army and encouraged by the size of the force at his command, rudely rejected Napoleon's peace overtures. The tsar and his advisors believed that they might be able to isolate Napoleon's main body, concentrated at Brünn (modern-day Brno), from reinforcements near Vienna by enveloping the French from the south. The difficulties of supplying the Allied army in the poor lands of Moravia contributed to this decision. The Allied army accordingly marched southwest from Olmütz in the last days of November, and by 1 December had taken up position near the village of Austerlitz (modern-day Slavkov u Brna).

The Allied battle plan came from the Austrian chief of staff, Colonel Franz von Weyrother, and was approved by Tsar Alexander over the objections of the nominal commander in chief, General Kutuzov. Alexander was eager to attack; Kutuzov feared to fight with the patchwork Allied force he commanded. The tsar supported Weyrother's plan because it promised the action he wanted, and Kutuzov, unable to derail the unwise decision, remained silent about the plan's obvious flaws.

Napoleon had initially occupied a formidable defensive position anchored on the Pratzen Heights to the west of Austerlitz. He feared, however, that the Allies would not attack so strong a position, and so withdrew from it, leaving the high ground to the Allies. On 2 December the Allies attacked in accord with Weyrother's plan. The bulk of the Allied army streamed to the southwest from the Pratzen Heights in four columns, while a separate corps commanded by Prince Peter Bagration held the army's northern flank. The Allies aimed to turn Napoleon's right flank and envelop and then destroy his army from two directions.

Napoleon had prepared for precisely just such a maneuver, which the nature of the terrain strongly encouraged. He waited until most of the Allied troops had left the Pratzen Heights and then struck with his main forces against the Allied center. The fight for control of the Pratzen was fierce, and Napoleon's commanders nearly gave in at a critical moment. But the French had the great advantage of knowing what they were doing, while the Allies tried desperately to react to the total collapse of their own plans and preconceptions. The determination of the French generals contrasted with the confusion that swept the Allied upper echelons at this critical moment, and allowed the French finally to drive the defenders away from the Pratzen and retake the heights they had abandoned a few days before. Napoleon was aided in this effort by the timely arrival of Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout with reinforcements from Vienna after a three-day, 145-kilometer (90-mile) forced march.

The French command of the Pratzen Heights allowed Napoleon to turn the Allies' retreat into a rout by stationing artillery on the dominating hills at the southern end of the range beyond which the Russians tried to withdraw. Even so, the Allied army lost only about a third of its strength in the battle, and the remnant still outnumbered Napoleon's disposable forces when the fighting stopped. Archduke Charles continued his northward march with reinforcements, and Prussia continued its preparations to enter the fight on the Allies' side.

Napoleon now brought his diplomatic skill to bear to turn a solid victory into a decisive one. He began at once to negotiate with both the Austrians and the Prussians and succeeded in driving the Prussian emissary, Count Christian von Haugwitz, to a treaty on 15 December (the Treaty of Schönbrunn). Tsar Alexander had been devastated by the loss of his first battle and had withdrawn in haste as soon as he had collected his army. The beleaguered and abandoned Austrians were forced to accept the disastrous Treaty of Pressburg on 26 December, yielding Napoleon substantial Austrian territory, including the Tyrol, Venice, and Dalmatia.

The opposing armies at Austerlitz were evenly matched in tactical skill. Russian, Austrian, and French soldiers all fought using roughly similar techniques and equal determination. The outcome of the battle resulted from political complexities within the Allied command structure that led to a premature and ill-considered attack, and from Napoleon's skill in setting the terms of the battle very much in his favor from the outset. At that, had Alexander kept his nerve or Napoleon not been as skillful a diplomat as he was a warrior, the battle would not have ended the war. It might, in fact, have been simply the prelude to the early destruction of the French army and Napoleon's rule.

See alsoAlexander I; Clausewitz, Carl von; French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars; Napoleon; Napoleonic Empire; Ulm, Battle of.