Acheson, Dean
Acheson, Dean (1893–1971), lawyer, statesman, secretary of state.After holding lower State Department posts from 1941 to 1947, Acheson became secretary of state under President Harry S. Truman in January 1949, serving until January 1953. As a diplomatic official, Acheson held strong views about how, when, and why to use armed force in international affairs.
Acheson was a hawkish interventionist before U.S. entry into World War II. After the war, in 1945–46, he advocated an agreement with the USSR on control of nuclear arms (embodied in the Acheson‐Lilienthal Plan). In 1949, when the Soviets first exploded an atomic bomb, Acheson feared it would neutralize the West's nuclear weapons. In response, he consistently advocated building strong conventional U.S. and NATO military forces. Acheson thought an East‐West war unlikely, but should it occur, he wanted a military that could stop aggression before the Soviets could conquer Western Europe. With some ambivalence, he always favored keeping a powerful American nuclear arsenal, and in 1950 as an adviser he recommended to President Truman that the United States build the hydrogen bomb. He worked to keep the Korean War from becoming a general war, but used the sense of resulting urgency to push for greater NATO forces, including the rearmament of West Germany.
Advising Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon after 1953, he consistently took hard‐line defense positions, especially in the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the early stages of the Vietnam War. However, by 1968 he became an influential advocate of ending the war in Vietnam.
Acheson's key strategic concepts focused on the efficacy of various forms of power, the importance of “strategic reach” to project the first line of U.S. defense far from American shores, and developing “positions of strength” before engaging in negotiations with potential adversaries.
[See also Berlin Crisis.]
Acheson was a hawkish interventionist before U.S. entry into World War II. After the war, in 1945–46, he advocated an agreement with the USSR on control of nuclear arms (embodied in the Acheson‐Lilienthal Plan). In 1949, when the Soviets first exploded an atomic bomb, Acheson feared it would neutralize the West's nuclear weapons. In response, he consistently advocated building strong conventional U.S. and NATO military forces. Acheson thought an East‐West war unlikely, but should it occur, he wanted a military that could stop aggression before the Soviets could conquer Western Europe. With some ambivalence, he always favored keeping a powerful American nuclear arsenal, and in 1950 as an adviser he recommended to President Truman that the United States build the hydrogen bomb. He worked to keep the Korean War from becoming a general war, but used the sense of resulting urgency to push for greater NATO forces, including the rearmament of West Germany.
Advising Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon after 1953, he consistently took hard‐line defense positions, especially in the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the early stages of the Vietnam War. However, by 1968 he became an influential advocate of ending the war in Vietnam.
Acheson's key strategic concepts focused on the efficacy of various forms of power, the importance of “strategic reach” to project the first line of U.S. defense far from American shores, and developing “positions of strength” before engaging in negotiations with potential adversaries.
[See also Berlin Crisis.]
Bibliography
Dean Acheson , Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 1969.
Gaddis Smith , Dean Acheson, 1972.
Douglas Brinkley , Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–71, 1992.
Melvyn P. Leffler , A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, 1992.
Robert L. Beisher
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