Subject
SUBJECT
Subject is a term derived from the Latin subiectum, meaning what is thrown under or underlies and signifying a substrate or foundation that is determined or specified by something else, whether the determiner be a predicate, an attribute or property, an accident, or an object. It has various meanings in different disciplines. In logic the subject is that to which some predicate is attributed or of which some property is scientifically demonstrated. see predication; science (scientia). In the philosophy of nature the subject may be either the substratum that underlies accidental change, viz, substance or secondary matter, or that which underlies substantial change, viz, primary matter (see matter and form). In psychology the subject is the individual who experiences a psychological state (the self) or who is the object of clinical or experimental study; the term may also refer to a po tency or to the soul or one of its faculties as the proper locus of a particular act or habit. In metaphysics the subject is something that subsists in itself and does not depend upon another as the material cause of its existence; this is substance as distinguished from accident (see subsistence). In epistemology the subject is the knower, distinguished precisely as such from the thing known, or object (see knowledge). In social and political philosophy the subject is either the individual person who comes under the authority of another or the physical or moral person bound by a particular law.
Subjective is a derivative of subject and is also used in many senses. It may refer to the personal, as opposed to the impersonal, and accent the feelings, tastes, and desires that affect a particular action or judgment. It may signify what occurs in the human mind or in a knowing subject as opposed to what exists objectively and independently of the knowing process, particularly when emphasizing the apparent, the unreal, and the illusory. It may refer to the content of consciousness, stressing the latter's interiority as opposed to its exteriority. It may indicate, finally, something characteristic of the phenome na, the data of sense experience, as opposed to the reality of the thing-in-itself.
See Also: relativism; idealism.
Bibliography: p. foulquiÉ and r. saint-jean, Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique (Paris 1962) 697–699. a. lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie (8th ed. Paris 1960) 1036–41, 1066–69. r. eisler, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, 3 v. (4th ed. Berlin 1927–30) 2:165–172. a. guzzo and v. mathieu, Enciclopedia filosofica, 4 v. (Venice–Rome 1957) 4:759–764. w. b. selbie, j. hastings, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 13 v. (Edinburgh 1908–27) 11:908–909. j. m. baldwin, ed., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, v. 2 (New York 1928) 607–610.
[b. a. gendreau]
