ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSÉ

Spanish philosopher; b. Madrid, May 9, 1883, d. there, Oct. 18, 1955. Ortega obtained his doctorate in philosophy and letters at the Central University, Madrid (1904), and subsequently attended the universities of Leipzig, Berlin, and Marburg. From 1910 to 1936 he was professor of metaphysics at the University of Madrid. He was a prolific writer; his complete works, including those published posthumously, fill nine volumes.

From his first writings, Ortega preferred the vitalistic philosophy of the turn of the century to the idealism of his professors at Marburg, and he focused his attention on the individual within a concrete "circumstance." The influence of F. W. nietzsche and W. dilthey is apparent in Ortega's writings, although he defends the originality and superiority of his philosophy over the empiricist thought of Dilthey. Several of his themes on human existence are also found in M. Heidegger, but Ortega is careful to point out the priority of his own publications.

In interpreting Ortega's thought, the chronology of his works (especially those published posthumously) must be kept in mind. The main ideas of his "metaphysics" and epistemology, substantially unchanged since about 1932, are the following. The radical reality is life, "my life." All other realities are rooted, in the sense that they must appear in one way or another, in my life. Life can be described as what "I" do with the "circumstance," or as the effort for "my" realization within a given "circumstance." The "I" or the ego is a project, a program. "Circumstance" means everything else, including my body and soul. Independently of my interpretations, the circumstance (i.e., things) consists in mere facilities and difficulties.

The "instrument" by which one can capture radical reality is the vital reason that, in the last analysis, is identical with life itself. My life, a continuous making and not something already made, must constantly consider and weigh the facilities and difficulties of the situation; it must choose—"we are necessarily free"—between the different possibilities or alternatives, and it must reason. This is the meaning of vital reason, and since life is essentially time or history, vital reason is also historical reason. Its method is narration. It does not use Eleatic, universal, and identical concepts, but concrete and "occasional" concepts of variable content.

Since every individual is a project, the circumstance or the facilities and difficulties each one faces are different. Hence each man has a different point of view vis-à-vis the universe. What one sees, another cannot see; what is true for one may not be true for another. All points of view are necessary for seeing the whole truth. The truth of ideas, as distinct from truth as authenticity, consists in their correspondence with one's idea of reality; it is "a matter of internal policy."

In spite of his perspectivism and his definition of truth, Ortega rejects relativism in the traditional sense of the term. A few texts in Ortega's earlier writings explicitly affirm the existence of a transcendent, absolute reality, whereas later expressions seem to preclude its truly transcendent and absolute character. The later position, which can hardly be interpreted from a purely phenomenological point of view, seems more in harmony with his final philosophy. Ortega wrote also, with genial insights, on philosophy of history, psychology, literature, art, sports, technology, and above all on social and political philosophy.

Ortega contributed immensely to the philosophical awakening of his countrymen; his writings, encompassing in masterful style all realms of culture, and the Revista de Occidente, which he founded and edited, introduced their readers to the whole of European and world thought. His own philosophy has influenced, in greater or less degree, contemporary Spanish laymen and thinkers in other lands. The deficiencies of his philosophy stem from his de-essentialized ideas concerning the "I" and life; his idealistic and, in spite of his protests, relativistic concept of truth; the inability of his vitalistic conception to reach transcendence; his radical historicism; and the exclusion of universal moral norms.

See Also: life philosophies.

Bibliography: Obras completas, 9 v. (4th ed. Madrid 1957–63). j. marÍas, aguilera, Ortega y la idea de la razón vital (2d ed. Madrid 1948); La escuela de Madrid (Buenos Aires 1959). j. ferrater mora, Ortega y Gasset: An Outline of His Philosophy (New Haven 1957). s. m. ramÍrez, La filosofía de Ortega y Gasset (Barcelona 1958). f. alluntis, "The Vital and Historical Reason of José Ortega y Gasset," Franciscan Studies 15 (1955): 60–78.

[f. alluntis]